Hume and the Self: Pride, Narrativity and Social Media by Khan, Shamsa
1 
Hume and the Self: Pride, Narrativity and Social Media 
Shamsa Khan 
Philosophy PhD 
Oxford Brookes University 
School of History, Philosophy and Culture 
January 2020 





I would like to thank everyone who supported me throughout this PhD process, it has been a 
long journey and I cannot believe it is ending!   
Firstly, I have been so lucky to have such an amazing supervisor, Dan O’Brien who has been 
incredibly helpful throughout, not only my PhD journey, but also during my time as an 
undergraduate at Oxford Brookes. Funnily enough, it was in his undergraduate class where I 
first became interested in the topic of my thesis and he has always believed in my ideas even 
if some of them were out there. I have heard horror stories of awful supervisor and student 
interactions and I am so happy that Dan has never gave me reason to complain. I am so grateful 
for his quick feedback and positive attitude that always kept me from getting stressed! The 
entire philosophy department creates such a positive environment for learning, and I have 
enjoyed attending philosophy events over the years and building a community.  My friend 
Annie Webster has given me guidance and advice throughout my educational journey at 
Brookes. 
My parents have always believed in me and my sister Adeela made me calm if I was ever too 
stressed. My younger siblings were constantly checking up on me to make sure I am not going 
crazy whilst writing. My husband Sohail provided constant motivation for me to finish this 
thesis and my shoulder to cry on when I felt too overwhelmed.  
 
Thank you again to everyone for dealing with my emotional rollercoaster over the years- hope 






In this thesis, I aim to explore the development of Hume’s theory of the self through time. I 
begin with his scepticism concerning the self in book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-
40), expressing his idea that we are simply a bundle of experiences and there is no such thing 
as the self that we can introspect and identify. I then plot his route to the discovery of the self 
in book 2 via the passions. I explore his mechanism of sympathy and the role this plays in the 
mutual construction of pride and the self as well as the double relation of ideas and impressions. 
Additionally, I suggest that Hume was a narrative theorist, as he placed importance on our 
whole lives – on our past, present and future, rather than on single, unified acts.  I highlight the 
social nature of the Humean self and show its ability to evolve with the changing times. I find 
the introduction of social media and the new ways in which we communicate are compatible 
with Hume’s account. We are still able to apply his mechanisms of human nature to the kind 
of feedback we receive from this wider social sphere. A Humean, sympathetic being feels pride 
from the positive reactions of others and encapsulates individual instances into a narrative that 
highlights the emotions. The social self is created by this changing communication platform; 
moving away from face to face interaction, I will show that the Hume’s account of the self is 
able to survive such change and we should acknowledge its adaptability. I thus detail how 
Hume’s sympathetic mechanisms and the double relation of ideas and impressions relate to the 
kind of social interactions we have in the online sphere. To my knowledge this is the first study 
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Defining the self has been a philosophical puzzle that has engaged philosophers through the 
ages, up until the present day, but Harold Noonan (1989) postulates that this is not a conundrum 
that only philosophers wish to solve. “But, perhaps unlike some other philosophical problems, 
the nature of personal identity is not merely of interest to professional philosophers, but also a 
matter of great practical concern to all of us, philosophers and non-philosophers alike” 
(Noonan, 1989, p. 1). One key philosophical issue concerning the self is discussed in terms of 
‘personal identity’, and the question of what makes a person at time A the same person at time 
B. This question can be further subdivided into a metaphysical and an epistemological one. 
The first asks: what makes a person at time A and time B the same person? The second 
considers the evidence we have for seeing ourselves and others as identical.   
Marya Schechtman (2011) highlights the difference between both questions: 
“The [first] question is a metaphysical question about numerical 
identity; aimed at defining the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the literal persistence of one and the same entity through time. It is thus 
distinguished from the epistemological questions which ask what 
evidence we use to make judgements of personal identity, and also 
from psychological and sociological questions which ask about identity 
in the sense of the stability of a unique personality or character” 
(Schechtman,2011, p.1). 
Historically the answers to these questions can be split into those involving three kinds of 
continuity through time. The first is the immaterial soul, the second is biological continuity and 
the third is psychological continuity. I will discuss these in turn, starting with the first.  
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For Descartes (1641), the essence of man lies in the combination of both body and soul; even 
though they are individual distinct substances, they are both essential to the human being.  Even 
though Descartes maintains that both substances are needed in a human being, the non-physical 
soul plays the core role as it is the “essence of the self whereas the body is something which 
the self merely has” (Thiel, 2011, p.37).  
“The soul or mind (or self) is essentially a thinking thing - a res 
cogitans. Now, for Descartes, to say that thought is the essence of the 
soul is to say that the soul always thinks - not just that it has a faculty 
of thought: if the soul stopped thinking it would cease to exist. 
Descartes then defines thought in terms of consciousness, and sees 
consciousness as relating to one’s own thoughts” (Thiel, 2011, p.37).  
According to Descartes, thought is always accompanied by consciousness and from this claim 
we can extrapolate to his theory of the self:  
“Our understanding of ourselves as thinking things is based on this 
consciousness which always accompanies thought. And this self-
understanding is in turn the basis of our knowledge of ourselves as 
individual selves” (Thiel, 2011, p.38).  
Moving on to the second type of theory, namely biological continuity. This could arguably be 
the first answer one would think of when trying to determine identity across time because, at 
face value, a person at time A would be the same as the person at time B if they had the same 
biological body. We do not, of course, have identical bodies through time, and so the criterion 




“Likewise, according to the bodily criterion of personal identity, what 
is required for the identity of person P2 at time t2 and person P1 at time 
t1 is not that P2 and P1 are materially identical but merely that the 
matter constituting P2 has resulted from that constituting P1 by a series 
of more or less gradual replacements in such a way that is correct to 
say that the body of P2 at t2 is identical with the body of P1 at t1”  
(Noonan, 1989, p. 3).  
John Locke (1689) is seen as a precursor to the third type of account; the psychological 
continuity account. He presents an answer to both the metaphysical and epistemological 
questions that focuses on overlapping chains of psychological connections between the person 
at time A and time B, therefore creating a psychological continuity. For him, psychological 
continuity is constituted by the extent to which a person can extend their consciousness 
backwards to past actions. Whilst Locke’s account is focused on the role of memory, 
developments of his view suggest the inclusion of other psychological factors such as beliefs, 
desires and even the relationship between intention and action. Noonan highlights the 
relationship between the past and present in such accounts: 
“Thus we can count as direct psychological connections the links 
between childhood experiences and adult character traits, fears and 
prejudices. In general, any causal links between past factors and present 
psychological traits can be subsumed under the notion of psychological 
connectedness” (Noonan, 1989, p. 12-13). 
David Hume (1739) steers away from this whole tradition and his account of the self is the 
focus of my thesis. Now I will outline a summary of each chapter of my thesis and the findings 
in the conclusion.  
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The five chapters of this thesis have a temporal dimension, that is, they provide an account of 
the development of Hume’s account of the self through time, both in Hume’s own work and 
beyond. First, in book 1 of his Treatise of Human Nature, he could not find the self when he 
turns to introspection, moving through sceptical arguments where he ends in doubt. In book 2, 
however, he rediscovers the self in his account involving the passions and pride. I end by 
bringing Hume’s book 2 self into the modern day and showing its relevance to social media.  I 
go through this journey in five chapters.   
The first chapter introduces the famous Humean Scepticism that denies the existence of a self 
which we can view through introspection. His scepticism of the self suggests that we are merely 
a bundle of perceptions. In this chapter, I begin with the basics of Hume’s presentation of ideas 
and impressions because it is necessary to understand how Hume describes the contents of the 
mind which in turn he calls ‘perceptions.’ Even though I do not talk about the passions in detail 
until chapter 3, I found it necessary to introduce the intertwined account of Hume’s direct and 
indirect passions at this stage. The copy principle explores the origins of ideas and the 
principles of association show the interaction of ideas and impressions. Causal reasoning being 
the strongest of the three associative principles involves past experiences and how they affect 
future events. As stated above, John Locke has an important account of personal identity 
involving sameness of consciousness which is where the psychological aspect of identity 
comes into play, and I will discuss this in more detail in relation to Hume’s approach to the 
self. In this context, I introduce dementia as a way of bringing the Lockean account into a 
practical setting. Further, concernment and responsibility were, for Locke, a way to show the 
forensic nature of his account and its relation to moral concerns. I end this chapter with the 
crux of the Humean view, namely his scepticism concerning the self; ranging from his bundle 
theory, suggesting we are just a bundle of experiences, to his associationist account of our false 
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belief in our identity through time. What I want to establish with this chapter is that Hume was 
indeed, at one point, sceptical of the existence of something that we can call the ‘self.’ 
In chapter 2, I turn to Hume’s account of the sympathetic responses we have to others and how 
we can understand their emotions. I wanted to ease the reader into Hume’s understanding of 
people and how his mechanism of sympathy plays a role in this.  First, I outline the different 
kinds of account Hume gives of sympathy, from the idea-mediated account to that described in 
terms of contagion. Next, I delve into morality again and look at its relationship with sympathy. 
Adam Smith is someone who sees sympathy as placing oneself in another’s shoes and being 
able to see the world through another perspective; I compare this to Hume’s account. It is in 
the therapeutic setting where I first show how the Humean Self is vital in understanding others’ 
minds, but this should not be limited to the interactions between the therapist and the patient; 
rather our everyday interactions are also rooted in sympathy. I discuss Louise Braddock’s work 
on exchanges in a psychoanalytic setting that simultaneously present interactions that can be 
applied to the Humean social self.  I want to use Braddock’s research to show how sympathy 
is not just a way to understand people but also a tool through which we can mould this 
understanding in a way that can positively influence and help others too.   
In chapter 3, I delve deeper into the passions, particularly the indirect passion of pride and how 
this plays a role in the construction of the self. This is where the Humean scepticism turns into 
a positive account of a passionate self. First, I outline the passion of pride itself and then the 
mechanism that produces the emotion that is described in terms of the double relation of ideas 
and impressions. This is the part of the thesis where the creation of the self is explained. A 
clear picture of how Hume moved from a sceptical stance to a positive account of the self is 
established. The chapter further explores Hume’s account of pride, some of which is 
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unconventional. Traditionally, pride is seen as a vice, whereas Hume sees it as a virtue.  
Concluding the chapter, I look at cases that display the authenticity of pride.  
Chapter 4 looks at Hume’s theory of the self through a narrative lens and shows how the self 
can have a story-like structure. Interpreting Hume as a narrative theorist, I introduce Marya 
Schechtman’s narrative theories and Galen Strawson’s critique of these. Schechtman attempts 
to answer two questions that have already been asked in this thesis; firstly, the reidentification 
question which asks what makes a person the same from time A to time B. This was the main 
question addressed by the Lockean account in chapter 1. She also discusses the role of 
psychological continuity which was outlined in the introduction. In answering a second 
‘characterization question’, Schechtman presents two versions of the narrative self-constitution 
view and I present both, followed by discussion of an interesting back and forth between herself 
and Strawson.  I then follow these two narrative theorists with Lorenzo Greco’s (2015) 
interpretation of Hume as a narrative theorist. I use examples from Hume’s History of England 
(1754-61) whilst also bringing in sympathy with past and future selves to highlight the story-
like nature of how we talk about our lives and are constantly aware of our past experiences and 
how they will affect our future self.  
The final chapter weaves components of each chapter together and brings forth the Humean 
self in a way that it relevant to certain recent social developments in society. Social Media 
presents a platform from which one can both express sources of pride and create a story of 
oneself. Our engagement with social media influences the ‘narrow circle’ that Hume discusses 
with respect to morality; this has become much wider. Further, our sense of self is now affected 
by many more people. I agree with Hume that our self is defined by the passions and I show 
this by highlighting the importance of sympathetic responses and how the reactions of others, 
both offline and online, are vital in our self-conception. I conclude by noting certain dangers 
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inherent in social media concerning the possibility of falling into vanity by filtering the self, 
and I speculate whether Hume himself would have a social media profile.   
In my thesis I show that the Humean self can be successfully inserted into the social sphere 
today.  Each aspect of the Humean self plays a role in its evolution with respect to society; 
sympathy with others, the pride felt from the reactions of others, the narrative nature of our 
self-presentation and finally a platform where all of this is on display. I believe that for Hume’s 
account of the passionate self to survive today it must encapsulate societal progress; it would 
be an oversight to look at the Humean self as involving a social account and ignore the realm 
of social media given its prominence in our lives. I aim to show that sympathy is a mechanism 
we use in everyday life, and pride is felt when others react positively to things we have 
achieved. Seeing ourselves according to a narrative structure allows for these single instances 
to join together and create a narrative that represents the entirety of a person’s character. 
Finally, this Humean self finds a place within the changing social climate and thus we can still 
see Hume’s account of the self in social terms; nothing has changed except for the platform 











WITH  RESPECT TO THE SELF 
 
In my presentation of the Humean self, I will begin by laying the foundations of his approach, 
namely his operations of the mind, followed by his understanding of the passions. The Lockean 
memory account proves influential to Hume so I find it imperative to include this. Using both 
theorists, I will compare the Lockean and Humean view on moral and legal responsibility. I 
will then turn to Hume's scepticism and his position that we have a false belief in the self. This 
encompasses Hume’s negative account of the self which needs to be understood in order to be 
aware of how he comes, later in the Treatise, to provide a positive account of the self. 
 
1. Ideas and Impressions  
I must begin at the beginning with Hume's analysis of the contents of the mind. Hume calls the 
objects of the mind, ‘perceptions’. They are what we would call today, ‘mental states’. He then 
further divides them into ideas and impressions. 
“Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may 
name impressions; and under this name, I comprehend all our 
sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance 
in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and 
reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the 
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present discourse, excepting only, those which arise from the sight and 
touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may 
occasion.” (THN 1.1.1.1; SBN 1-2). 
Ideas are faint images of impressions; “Just as one can see a tree, so one can imagine-picture-
a tree before one” (Noonan, 1999, p.60). One sees impressions, and one imagines ideas. These 
can be distinguished according to their vivacity and forcefulness. Harold Noonan states  
“the difference between impressions and ideas for Hume is not a 
difference in kind but a difference in degree; a difference between 
lively, vivid or forceful perceptions and those which are fainter, less 
lively, vivid or forceful” (Noonan, 1999, p. 60). 
For Hume, impressions are vivid, and ideas are faint. Impressions are comprised of all kinds 
of vivid mental states: emotions, sense impressions, and desires. Using the emotions as an 
example, there is a difference between feeling the sensation or emotion and thinking about the 
emotion. I feel the pain of the cold weather, or I will anticipate how cold it will be when I go 
outside later. This difference in sensation and thought finds its basis in the difference between 
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what Hume calls ‘Force and Vivacity’.1 Some theorists understand Hume's use of the terms 
force and vivacity as analogous to the clarity and brightness of a photographic image:2 
"Just as we do not need to be aware of the causal antecedents of a 
photograph in order to tell whether it constitutes a clear and bright 
image, we do not need to know the origins of a perception in order to 
tell, on the basis of introspection, whether it is a forceful and lively 
perception. Similarly, we can determine, on this construal of Hume’s 
position, whether a perception is forceful or lively without taking its 
causal consequences into account" (Bailey and O'Brien, 2006, p.35). 
                                                          
1  Hume uses the terms ‘Force’ and ‘Vivacity’ many times in his Treatise, the first time they were used was in 
Book One when talking about resemblance between ideas and impressions:   
“Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects, we may now apply ourselves 
to consider with the more accuracy their qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my 
eye, is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their 
degree of force and vivacity. The one seems to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the 
perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas” (THN 1.1.1.3; SBN 2-3).  
2 An alternative conception of vivacity is postulated by Everson (1995) who talks of vivacity in terms of the effect 
it has on your behaviour, unlike the analogy of the photograph. “Everson maintains that the difference, for 
example, between perceiving that a packet of cigarettes is within reach and simply entertaining the idea of there 
being a packet of cigarettes to hand is a matter of the behavioural dispositions involved” (Bailey and O’Brien, 
2006, p.37). For the purposes of this thesis, I will not consider this account further and will stay with the 
photography analogy.  
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Now, the impressions can be further subdivided. He distinguishes between 'Impressions of 
Sensation' and 'Impressions of Reflection.'3 The first are impressions that arrive at us through 
our sensory organs, either internal or external. The latter are impressions derived from our 
ideas. Some of the impressions of reflection are the passions and emotions.   
“After we have had an impression of pleasure or pain, the mind forms 
a copy of the impression. The copy is an idea. When the mind recalls 
the idea, a new impression of desire or aversion is produced” 
(Coventry, 2007, p.45).  
For example, if I eat a chocolate cake, I receive a pleasant sensation. Later, when I see the same 
chocolate cake, I remember this pleasant impression, this memory now becomes an idea. 
Through this, I now have a desire to have more chocolate cake. This desire is a new impression 
but simultaneously I still have the original impression of pleasure (Coventry, 2007, p.45). Fear 
is also an impression of reflection: seeing a spider gives you an impression, then that experience 
is copied into the idea of a spider. This idea is something that occurs when one thinks of spiders 
                                                          
3 The first time Hume introduces the impressions of reflection and sensation is in Book One: “I WOU'D fain ask 
those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and 
imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be deriv'd from the impressions of sensation 
or reflection? If it be convey'd to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceiv'd 
by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I 
believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore 
be deriv'd from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves 
into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of 
substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either 




on other occasions, and this can trigger a fear of spiders. The fear that one feels is a vivid mental 
state; it is an impression of reflection.  
 I will now outline Hume’s understanding of the passions because they play a vital role in his 
positive account of the self, although I will just state how they are defined and further explain 
their role in more detail in chapter 3.  
 
2. The Passions  
This section is divided into; first, my exploration of fear, hope, and probability, followed by 
the role of the passions in action and motivation. Hume identifies the roots of the passions as 
pleasure and pain; we feel a certain passion because of some object, good or evil, that produces 
the feeling of pleasure or pain. The process of reflecting on this object is a vital part of Hume's 
identification of the passions. “Hume divides the passions into those which arise simply from 
reflection on the pleasure or pain caused by some object, and those which also involve a 
relation of the object either to oneself or another person” (Wright, 2009, p.190). It is in this 
context where Hume's distinction between direct and indirect passions arises.  
“TIS easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are 
founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection 
of any kind, 'tis only requisite to present some good or evil. Upon the 
removal of pain and pleasure, there immediately follows the removal 
of love and hatred, pride and humility, desire and aversion, and of most 
of our reflective or secondary impressions.” (THN 2.3.9.1; SBN 438)  
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Hume's presentation of the direct passions is very brief; he defines them as passions that "arise 
immediately from good or evil, pain, or pleasure" (THN 2.1.1.4; SBN 276). Examples of these 
passions include desire, aversion, hope, fear, grief, and joy. "These different passions arise 
according to the possibility, certainty, or probability of their objects - what we might call their 
modalities" (Wright, 2009, p.191). Firstly, to feel desire or aversion is to consider pleasure and 
pain as possibilities. We feel desire because we reflect on the possibility of feeling pleasure. 
For example, looking at the menu in a restaurant I feel desire for the chocolate pudding because 
I consider the likelihood of the pleasure it will bring. Following the same line of thinking, we 
feel aversion when we reflect on pain. For example, there is a possibility of pain when I think 
about starting a stressful and busy shift at work. We feel joy and grief when we reflect on 
pleasure and pain that is certain or highly probable. For example, I feel joy in receiving a good 
grade in my essay and grief from losing a member of my family. In contrast, hope and fear 
arise when there is uncertainty as to whether we will feel pleasure and pain. I feel hope, when 
I think I will pass my PhD but fearful at the prospect of failing. Additionally, Hume says that 
uncertainty is linked to fear, and the feeling of hope always has an aspect of fear which lies in 
the possibility of the hope failing to materialise. “Hope is inherently unstable, and the more we 
waver between hope and fear, the more fear tends to predominate” (Wright, 2009, p.192). John 
Wright (2009) links Hume's direct passions to his later writings in his Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion (1779). He writes: “It is likely that when he wrote his discussion, Hume had 
in mind the hopes and fears of an afterlife which lie at the basis of Christianity” (Wright, 2009, 
p.191).4 
                                                          
4 Hume claims that fear and hope are a significant part of religious belief and practice and when a religious person 
feels melancholy, he delves into fear of the afterlife and furthers himself into a state of utter despair. Hume 
acknowledges that there can be states of ecstasy in a religious person’s life where they fill themselves with extreme 
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The passions are not always stand-alone, they can be integrated with each other. For example, 
Hume acknowledges that desire is a distinct passion that arises directly from pleasure and pain 
but other times he says that desire is incorporated into other passions, for example; “I not only 
have desires for new electronic gadgets or different kinds of pastry but when I am angry I desire 
the punishment of my enemy, when I feel benevolent I desire the good of my friend” (Wright, 
2009, p.191). Here, desire is integrated with anger and benevolence.  
Hume argues that the passions play a fundamental role with respect to motivation and action. 
He rejects the view that reason alone can be the source of action; he claims that “Reason is and 
ought to be the Slave of the Passions” (THN 2.3.3.4; SBN 415). Hume postulates that the 
passions are the driving force behind our actions. Without these to direct us, we would lack the 
motivation to act. Consequently, the passions become the source of action. The passions are 
impressions, they in themselves are strong perceptions that lead to feeling or an impulse to act. 
Reason, on the other hand, is a process of connecting faint ideas to form a belief. Brown and 
Morris (2012) use an example to show that reasoning alone is not enough for motivation.  
“No one thinks that mathematical reasoning by itself is capable of 
moving us. Suppose you want to stay out of debt. You calculate how 
much money you are owed, how much you owe others, and how much 
you have saved, to help you stay out of debt. In this case, it is the desire 
to stay out of debt that provides motivational force. Mathematical 
                                                          
hope and joy. However, this only forms a small part of religious belief, and the dominating passion of religion is 
to be in a state of terror. To be in a calm state of mind is impossible when your life is possibly going to end with 




reasoning by itself does not move us to do anything.” (Brown and 
Morris, 2012, p.113) 
For Hume, reasoning cannot have a motivational force without being intertwined with a desire. 
Hume questions whether causal reasoning by itself can cause us to act, but he argues that when 
causal reasoning is involved in the “production of action, it always presupposes some pre-
existing desire or want” (Brown and Morris, 2012, p.113). Brown and Morris suggest we think 
of the example of losing weight; although one may understand the causal connection between 
exercises and losing weight, unless one has the desire to lose weight, the reasoning is not 
enough to give us motivation to act. The best that reason can do alone is to create a foundation 
whereby passions can form, but alone the reason cannot create impulses or feelings. It is the 
fact that the reason cannot, by itself, produce impulses that leads Hume to adopt a view that 
relies heavily on the influence of the passions.  
Hume’s account, though, is a little more complex, as Penelhum (2015) argues. Hume states 
that passions are primary, but it seems to be the case that reason at times prompts desires as 
Penelhum highlights. Firstly, he questions whether it is correct to bundle the direct passions 
into one list because there are apparent differences between some of them. Although they are 
all “…. prompted by pleasure and pain, there is an obvious distinction to be drawn between 
those that relate to past pleasure and pain and those that relate to future pleasure and pain” 
(Penelhum, 2015, p.21). He uses the example of grief, which is directed at a past event, the 
aftermath of a tragedy. Desire and fear, on the other hand, are anticipations of future events, 
the ultimate pleasure and pain one could experience. Following this understanding, one could 
argue that passions felt from past events are felt more strongly because they have already 




Second, Penelhum suggests that the direct passions give us the motivation to act and, as I stated 
above, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them” (THN 2.3.3.4; SBN 414-5). Penelhum, however, sees 
Hume as having an instrumental view of reason. He does not see this as a correct line of 
thinking because reason prompts the desires by “making us aware of actual or possible 
situations we might want or fear, or prompt or arouse reactive passions such as joy or fear by 
enabling us to learn of events that please or displease us” (Penelhum, 2015, p.21). Reason, for 
example, could lead to us being aware of the level of pleasure and pain we will feel in the 
future. This is because we have felt this pleasure and pain in the past as a reaction to the same 
situation. For example, I may know the past pain of leaving my husband in another country 
because of a long-distance relationship. Consequently, I anticipate this pain again when I go to 
revisit my partner for a short amount of time and leave again. I anticipate the same pain in 
response to the same situation. Here, causal reasoning plays a role in the genesis of passion.   
Now that I have outlined the role of the direct passions, I will move onto the indirect passions 
and their role in Hume’s philosophy. The majority of Book Two of Hume’s Treatise is an 
outline of the indirect passions. Like direct passions, they still arise from pain and pleasure and 
"proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities" (THN 2.1.1.4; 
SBN 276). Examples of these include pride, humility, shame, love, hatred, and related passions 
such as benevolence, anger, pity, malice, and envy. Hume further describes the indirect 
passions as secondary, reflective impressions. Hume identifies principles of association that 
produce the indirect passions of love and hatred. 
“The object of these passions is another person. The subject is 
something related to that person which, quite independently of its 
relation to her, produces pleasure or uneasiness” (Wright, 2009, p.197). 
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For example, if a person admires a work of art, this produces pleasure in them. The person may 
then realise that I drew the portrait; subsequently when the person thinks of the work of art, 
they simultaneously think of me and the pleasure they felt from seeing it now becomes a related 
passion connected with another person. The person now feels admiration for not only the 
portrait but also me. The indirect passion of admiration would not be manifest without related 
pleasure or pain.  
“From the view of these causes, we may derive a new distinction 
betwixt the quality that operates and the subject on which it is plac'd. 
A prince that is possess'd of a stately palace, commands the esteem of 
the people upon that account; and that first, by the beauty of the palace, 
and secondly, by the relation of property, which connects it with him. 
The removal of either of these destroys the passion; which evidently 
proves that the cause is a compounded one” (THN 2.2.1.5; SBN 330).  
Jane McIntyre (2000) believes that the indirect passions are best understood through the 
principles of association, namely sympathy and comparison, which I will discuss further in 
chapter 2.  Now that I have seen how the passions are distinguished, I must look at the origin 
of ‘ideas’ and the role played by the copy principle.  
 
3.  The Copy Principle  
Hume advocates that for every simple idea, there is a corresponding impression and for every 
simple impression, there exists a corresponding idea. It is thought that experiences show us that 
simple impressions always precede their corresponding ideas. For example, a person who was 
born blind will not have an idea of colour because he will not have an impression of colour. If 
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you want to give your child an impression of something you get them to experience it: For 
example, to give the child an idea of the taste of a strawberry, you give them a strawberry to 
eat. Additionally, if your friend just recently overcame colour blindness and you wanted to 
teach them about the idea of the colour blue, then it is logical that you would present an object 
that would produce an impression first. Hume maintains that the constant conjunction between 
ideas and impressions shows that there is a causal dependence and it is not a relationship of 
chance. There must be a causal connection between them: impressions are the cause of ideas.  
Hume answers the question of the origin of ideas by postulating that they are copies of our 
impressions.  
“Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of Sensation and 
those of Reflexion. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from 
unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our 
ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon 
the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, 
pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a 
copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and 
this we call an idea.” (THN 1.1.2.1; SBN 7-8) 
Noonan reiterates this, ideas are “…copies of impressions, they do not merely resemble 
impressions in virtue of being feinter versions of them; they are copies of impressions in the 
sense of being causally derived from them rather as a photograph is derived from its original” 
(Noonan,1999, p.62). As outlined above, the contents of the mind include impressions and 




“There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be 
convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions 
and ideas. This division is into Simple and Complex. Simple 
perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction 
nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be 
distinguished into parts. Tho' a particular colour, taste, and smell are 
qualities all united together in this apple, 'tis easy to perceive they are 
not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.” (THN 
1.1.1.2; SBN 2)  
Simple ideas and impressions cannot be “broken down or analysed any further” (Coventry, 
2007, p.39). Examples of simple impressions include the senses and intrinsic pleasure or pain, 
also perhaps hearing a simple musical note or looking at a pure colour.  Simple ideas resemble 
simple impressions and include a shade of a colour such as blue. Complex ideas and 
impressions are comprised of simple impressions; therefore, they are divided into parts and 
components. An impression of an apple would be labelled a complex impression because 
“….We see that an apple has a particular colour, a certain taste and a certain odour. Colour is 
not the same thing as taste and taste is not the same thing as odour. An apple is capable of being 
subdivided and having its parts separated into further distinctions” (Coventry, 2007, p.39). 
Many of our complex ideas may not have had impressions that correspond to them. Also, many 
of our complex ideas are not copied into impressions. I could imagine a beautiful city such as 
New York but never have seen one. Every simple idea, however, has a corresponding 
impression. He is very confident in this constant conjunction and challenges anyone to find a 
simple idea that does not have a corresponding impression. 
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Although it was determined that impressions must precede simple ideas, Hume highlights one 
instance where this does not appear to be so. In the next section, as something of an aside, I 
will outline this phenomenon which is named the ‘Missing Shade of Blue’.  
 
3.1 The Missing Shade of Blue  
Hume acknowledged that there is an exception to the doctrine that impressions come before 
simple ideas, and he outlines the following counterexample:  
“Suppose therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, 
and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, 
excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has 
been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, 
except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually 
from the deepest to the lightest; 'tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, 
where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater 
distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any other” 
(THN 1.1.1.10; SBN 5-6). 
Suppose there is an individual who has no issues with his sight, but he has just happened to 
never be acquainted with this particular shade of blue. If he is shown a gradient of other shades 
of blue then he will see a noticeable blank where this shade of blue is supposed to be. According 
to Hume, this individual will be able to use their imagination to fill out this blank and think of 
the idea of this shade of blue. “Now I ask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own 
imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, 
tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses?” (THN 1.1.1.10; SBN 5-6). So, this 
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therefore shows the anomaly and presents a situation whereby we can have a simple idea 
without a corresponding impression. On the other hand, Hume sees this as a rare situation, and 
he does not think it demands that he should change the general maxim that impressions come 
before the ideas. “I believe there are few but will be of the opinion that he can; and this may 
serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent 
impressions; tho' the instance is so particular and singular, that 'tis scarce worth our observing, 
and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim” (THN 1.1.1.10; SBN 
5-6). 
Many Hume commentators have found it confusing that Hume outlines a contradiction to the 
copy principle and in the same paragraph rejects its use because it is a singular example. 
Noonan comments on this by saying; “For if, in fact, there can be, and for all anyone knows 
are, simple ideas not preceded by corresponding simple impressions, how can Hume argue that 
a particular philosophical notion is bogus because there is no impression from which it is 
derived?” (Noonan, 1999, pp.64-65). There is the question as to how Hume can so confidently 
continue to use the copy principle when he himself has proved that it is false. Some consider 
that Hume’s “offhand admission of the counterexample completely destroys the generality of 
the principle” (Coventry, 2007, p.41). There is even a question asked concerning whether 
Hume is right to say that such an example is a singular instance. This would appear not to be 
the case because it can be used as a template to generate examples for every single other colour 
or even taste or smell; all one would have to do is replace the term ‘missing shade of blue’ with 
any of these other examples such as ‘the missing flavour of spiciness’ (that is, a level of 
spiciness between that of two distinct chilli peppers). Hume’s counter-example would not then 
be singular; it would infect his empiricism much more deeply.  
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As said, though, Hume does not think this is the case.  He states that it is such an anomaly and 
remains just that, merely an anomaly that does not have the strength to dismantle the general 
maxim of the copy principle. Another way of understanding this is to say that Hume would 
accept a further principle that a “system of perceptions may give rise to an original perception 
that resembles these others, but not exactly” (Fogelin, 1984, p.9). Fogelin also states that the 
degree to which perceptions resemble each other can only be established through empirical 
inquiry. He also states that just because Hume puts forward the key principle of the copy 
principle, does not mean that he would not modify it.  
Fogelin says that the resemblance can only be established through empirical enquiry and this 
brings me to Noonan’s resolution to the problem of the missing shade of blue. Now the basic 
idea of the copy principle is that for every simple idea you have an impression. For example, I 
may never have seen a golden mountain, but I can think of gold and a mountain and from that 
deduce the idea of a golden mountain. Noonan’s response to the missing shade of blue involves 
consideration of why Hume is putting forward the copy principle. He is doing it to back up his 
empiricism; he attempts to have a formula that you must sign up to if you are an empiricist. 
For Noonan, you can still be an empiricist as long as you think of the copy principle differently. 
You can still call yourself an empiricist if you experience a range of different blues to then get 
the idea of the missing shade of blue; you can still comprehend the missing shade of blue using 
your idea of other shades of blue. For Noonan, Hume does not need the thought that every 
single simple idea must come from an impression. Even though the shades of blue are simple 
they can be organised in such a way where the resembling colours are together. If they are 
arranged in such a linear manner the missing shade will be noticeable because there will be an 
obvious gap in the order; being “a place where two adjacent shades are noticeably less 
resembling than the other adjacent shades. In this circumstance, Hume thinks, the mind will be 
able to make up for itself the simple idea out of the materials already presented to it” (Noonan, 
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1999, p.69). Even though Hume says the mind can raise up an idea if a sequence of resembling 
ideas is presented, this is not true “where the organs of sensation are entirely destroy'd, but 
likewise where they have never been put in action to produce a particular impression. We 
cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple, without having actually tasted 
it” (THN 1.1.1.9; SBN 5). At first Noonan presents the idea that perhaps, like the missing shade 
of blue, resembling tastes can be arranged in order to find the missing taste, but this is not the 
case. In the case of the pineapple we have not experienced several flavours of pineapple from 
which we can derive the missing flavour of pineapple, but Noonan (and Hume) would think 
this is impossible. The thought is that we have never tasted any pineapple flavours and thus 
there is nothing from which we can get the idea, and so we cannot have the idea of the taste of 
the pineapple. So, my earlier thought that the missing shade of blue can be used as a template 
to find a missing favour of chilli would not be able to materialise unless we have tasted a range 
of different strengths of chillis.  
“Rather, he introduces the example simply to indicate that simple 
impressions of a particular sense may be unavailable to a perceiver not 
only when the organs of sensation are entirely lacking (the person is 
blind or deaf) but also when, as a matter of contingent fact, they have 
never been activated to produce a particular impression” (Noonan, 
1999, p.69).   
So, the missing shade of blue acts as a counter example to the copy principle but Noonan 
highlights that unlike the simple idea of the taste of the pineapple, the example does not 
act as a counter-example to a weaker principle;  
“(B) Any simple idea is (1) a copy of a simple resembling impression 
or (2) an idea of the degree of a particular quality produced in the mind 
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by the presentation thereto of simple impressions of contiguous degrees 
of the quality” (Noonan, 1999, p.70). 
Noonan states that this above principle is weaker and does not need the empiricist maxim, 
but it still “require[s] that all simple ideas must be preceded in the mind by simple 
impressions related to them in a certain way: it is just that the ‘certain way’ is no longer 
required to be exact resemblance” (Noonan, 1999, p.70). Noonan also states that Hume 
cannot accept the empiricist maxim because of the existence of complex ideas, so even 
though the missing shade of blue is a counter-example to the copy principle, it need not 
have the strength to refute this weaker version of the principle in the above form. The 
question here is whether Hume can still use the copy principle if the weaker form is used; 
Noonan thinks he can. This is because the philosophical concepts that Hume criticises 
using the copy principle (e.g. necessary connection,  that I discuss in more detail in section 
4.1) cannot be likened to the missing shade of blue because “they are not concepts of 
degrees of quality” (Noonan, 1999, p.70). They are, rather, more like the concept of the 
taste of the pineapple where the simple idea cannot be obtained. Noonan concludes: 
“The exception of the Copy principle provided by the missing shade of 
blue can thus be explained in a way that does not extend to these 
problematic philosophical concepts, and so Hume’s confidence that the 
unqualified Copy Principle can be applied to them is justifiably 
diminished by it” (Noonan, 1999, p.70). 
Therefore, you can still be an empiricist with a modification of the copy principle; this is 
Noonan’s resolution to Hume’s puzzle.  
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Now that the counterexample of the copy principle has been resolved by Noonan’s 
interpretation of Hume, we can continue our investigations with the assumption that simple 
ideas have their origin in impressions. Further, these ideas that are derived from impressions 
do not come to us at random, in fact they come via the principles of association and I will be 
outlining these in the next section.   
 
4. The Principles of Association 
The ideas in our mind are derived from impressions, they show themselves in the mind, not in 
a random amalgamation but in regular patterns that play out according to ‘The Principles of 
Association’. Hume even says that even our most mindless thoughts and ponderings have 
underlying, unifying principles and this does not mean that there has to be a direct mutual 
influence, there is some universal force at work. 
“'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into 
complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union 
among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally 
introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be 
consider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already 
excluded from the imagination: Nor yet are we to conclude, that 
without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than 
that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which 
commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, 
languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner 
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pointing out to everyone those simple ideas, which are most proper to 
be united into a complex one.” (THN 1.1.4.1; SBN 10-11) 
They principles are as follows; Resemblance, Contiguity and Causation. These principles 
highlight the importance of associationism for Hume. “These patterns - the principles of the 
association of ideas - account for the sequence in which thoughts pass through the mind; they 
account for the particular complex ideas we form from the simple ideas with which our minds 
are stocked” (Noonan, 1999, p.71). With respect to resemblance, an idea moves from one to 
another idea that resembles it. For example, a photo will make us think of the person who is in 
the photo. With respect to contiguity, “…the thought of an object or event leads to thoughts of 
other things which have been encountered in its neighbourhood or other events that happened 
at the same time” (Noonan, 1999, p.71). Finally, in causation, when we have the thought of 
something, we think of the relation of cause and effect. For example, if someone shows me a 
picture of my teacher, I naturally think of her because the photo resembles her. Additionally, 
if someone mentions 1965, I may think of significant events that happened at that time, for 
example, Winston Churchill’s death, because they are temporally contiguous. Thinking of the 
Vatican may lead me to think of the Coliseum and then St. Peter’s Basilica as they are spatially 
contiguous. Causality works both ways, from cause to effect and effect to cause, for example, 
meeting someone’s mother may make you think of the daughter and seeing the daughter may 
make you think of the mother.   
Hume also calls the principles of association ‘natural relations’ because the human mind is 
naturally built to have thoughts move from one to another through these associations. “The 
imagination has a natural tendency to find resemblances of all kinds amongst its ideas” 
(Coventry, 2007, p.48).  
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The relationship between cause and effect is the most important associative principle for Hume, 
not only for his philosophy of identity but his philosophy in general. In the next section, I will 
delve into Hume’s arguments concerning causal reasoning. 
 
4.1 Causal Reasoning 
Causation is considered the strongest out of the three associative principles because it focuses 
on bringing together our past and present experiences alongside our expectations for our future 
experiences. Hume describes causation in more detail in the Treatise:  
“Of the three relations above-mention'd this of causation is the most 
extensive. Two objects may be consider'd as plac'd in this relation, as 
well when one is the cause of any of the actions or motions of the other, 
as when the former is the cause of the existence of the latter. For as that 
action or motion is nothing but the object itself, consider'd in a certain 
light, and as the object continues the same in all its different situations, 
'tis easy to imagine how such an influence of objects upon one another 
may connect them in the imagination” (THN 1.1.4.4; SBN 12). 
The reasoning behind causal inferences does not involve reasoning a priori because this would 
ignore any observations made from past experience. Hume says our causal reasoning is based 
on matters of fact and our experiences. 
“…there are no objects which by the mere survey, without consulting 
experience, we can determine to be the cause of any other; and no 
objects, which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to 
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be causes. Any  thing may produce anything” (THN 1.3.15.1; SBN 
173). 
 Our minds work in the following ways: when we have had multiple experiences with the same 
event, we automatically ascribe cause and effect to the event. For example, if every time I open 
my closet door, there is a noticeable creaking sound, I then come to see the opening of the door 
as the cause of the sound.  In other words, we believe that one thing is causing the other. But 
what is the nature of our reasoning that makes the transition from cause to effect? If we are to 
analyse the nature of causal reasoning, it can be shown as consisting of two processes. The first 
mirrors the example I just mentioned above; “Past observed regularity: on observing C, we 
infer that an E will follow just when we have experienced sufficiently many Cs followed by 
Es” (Beebee, 2012, p.132). In the second process; “[t]he reasoning proceeds not by 
consideration of any argument, but as a matter of ‘custom or habit’” (Beebee, 2012, p.132). 
Hume furthers his approach by saying there is a mental mechanism that takes past experience 
from the impression of C to the belief that E will follow. Additionally, this mechanism also 
gives us the impression, followed by the idea of necessary connection.  
An illustration of this exists in the billiard ball example which also highlights the two aspects 
of this association. In the past, one billiard ball has always hit the other one. Now, every time 
we see a billiard ball, we believe it will, as it has done before, hit the other billiard ball again. 
Beliefs are vivid or forceful ideas and this is where the second role for association fits in. The 
principle of association (of causation) enables us to form beliefs, since the constant conjunction 
between cause and effect will increase the vivacity of the idea of the usual effect. Hume states 
that this principle of association creates a strong connection in the imagination and is able to 
explain how “most of our beliefs, feelings and ideas are formed as they show how one thing 
reminds us of another” (Coventry, 2007, p.49). However, it is important to consider that 
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although in our reasoning, one thing has always followed the other, e.g. C has always caused 
E in our past experience, this does not always have to be true. It is not an a priori fact that this 
association exists, in fact, there is always the possibility that this cause and effect does not 
occur.  
Now I will introduce the notion of necessary connection. This is relevant to my thesis because 
it involves the search for the source of the idea of a philosophically important yet perplexing 
idea, that of causation. Below we will see that Hume goes on a similar search with respect to a 
similarly important yet perplexing idea, that of the self. In Hume’s Treatise he starts by 
searching for the impression of necessary connection. The reason why he feels the need to find 
the source of necessary connection is because causation is a mysterious notion. We must look 
at the content of the idea of causation when we say something causes something else to occur. 
The cause comes before the effect or it is next to it, but this is not enough; we think that the 
effect must occur; it necessarily must occur. Necessary connection forms an intrinsic part of 
causation. For example;  
“When a brick causes a window to smash, we do not just have an 
impression of the trajectory of the brick followed by an impression of 
breaking glass; we also think of the brick causing or bringing about the 
shattering. Given the weight and path of the brick we believe, not just 
that the glass will break but that it must” (Bailey and O’Brien, 2006, 
p.97). 
When we say there is a causal connection between the flying brick and breaking glass, this 
means there is a necessary connection which connects to the idea of custom or habit. Hume 
states it is this kind of thinking that starts with the impression of the cause, to the belief that the 
effect will follow. In this process, the mind considers past experience that we are aware of, 
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where this constant conjunction between cause and effect has been illustrated before. But, as 
said, we also have an idea of necessary connection: something causes the effect so we have an 
impression that it must occur. What experiences, though, do I have that reveal to me that one 
thing makes the other thing happen.Relating this back to my earlier discussion of impressions 
in section 1, there are two types of impressions; those of sensation and those of reflection. The 
impression of necessary connection is an impression of reflection. In the case of the two billiard 
balls, we do not see the cause, we just see one ball hitting the other ball. The idea of the billiard 
ball hitting the other one gives our mind the feeling that one causes another one to move. We 
project the idea onto the world because we have seen the ball move the same way so many 
times. The movement is objective, but we project the necessity onto it.  
Causal reasoning generates belief about unobserved matters of fact and this belief does not 
necessarily mean there is a justified conclusion; that is, that we are justified in thinking E will 
come next, we just do think this.  “What we have in his list of three associative principles are 
three mechanical principles that bring about their effects without being directed or guided by 
any form of intelligent understanding of the world” (Bailey and O’Brien, 2006, p.46). This 
means that we do not need any type of understanding of the world in order to utilise the three 
associative principles, but what is meant by “understanding of the world”? (Bailey and 
O’Brien, 2006, p.46).  According to the rationalists, the human mind can know, without even 
seeing a billiard table, how things move before they are hit. Beebee and Craig characterise such 
as view as holding that we are “little Gods” (Beebee, 2006, and Craig, 1987) where we have 
insight as to what happens before it will. Craig states that if God made us in an image of himself 
then we “…meet the suggestion that as regards quantity (extension) of knowledge and power 
God is infinitely superior to man; but that qualitatively (intensively) man can occasionally rise 
to the same level” (Craig, 1987, p.58). They do not agree with this view of human beings, 
indeed they are criticising it and showing how Hume is opposed to it. Craig postulates that the 
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‘insight idea’ aims to find its place in the theory of knowledge by suggesting that a “certain 
type of deeply insightful and secure knowledge is attainable by human beings” (Craig, 1987, 
p.68). Craig sketches the view to which Hume is opposed, this being, that even though we are 
made in God’s image, we are lacking in achieving perfection because we are not infinite or 
infallible. However, our minds and God’s mind “are the same kinds of thing in the sense that 
the qualities of our minds that are self-evidently good - reason and virtue, for example - are 
imperfect versions of the qualities possessed by God” (Beebee, 2006, p.2). In Craig’s view the 
propositions of the Insight Ideal come naturally from the Image of God doctrine, so the human 
mind “…can in principle have access to true beliefs in a way that is analogous to the way in 
which God can; for that is part of what it is for man to be made in God’s image” (Beebee, 2006, 
p.2). Hume rejects the Insight Ideal. He makes it clear that “causal reasoning is not a product 
of any special faculty of reason, and so does not generate certain knowledge of the world” 
(Beebee, 2006, p.7). We are empiricists: we must experience regularities before we can form a 
belief as to what will happen next. Hume argues that we are not little Gods, but sophisticated 
animals. Hume’s view of our position in the world contrasts with the traditional view that we 
have a higher level of understanding of the world compared to animals. Hume believes that we 
as humans do not have a rational or cognitive insight into the world. Hume believes that we are 
not made in the image of God and we certainly are not given divine powers of reasoning that 
place us above animals in the hierarchy of living organisms.  
“We are just another part of the natural world - another mechanism 
within it - and the difference between animal and human is one of 
degree. We may be a highly developed species of animal but we are 
animals nonetheless, and we can be studied as other animals using the 
scientific experimental method. God-like rational insight is replaced by 
cognitive processes under the control of mechanistically conceived 
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imagination, the kind of processes that also govern animal thinking” 
(Bailey and O’Brien, 2006, p.97). 
Hume is confident that animals and humans are more similar in terms of behaviour and 
cognitive capacities than the traditional view would postulate. Animals also have feelings, they 
experience love and hatred and contrary to some traditional views, animals are also able to 
reason. This claim is supported by the view that animals “clearly learn from experience and 
their expectations are conditioned by past constant conjunctions” (Bailey and O’Brien, 2006, 
p.97). In the same way that humans derive constant conjunctions from past experiences, so do 
animals; highlighting Hume’s view that we are indeed not Little Gods but sophisticated 
animals. 
At this point of the chapter I have outlined three main components of Hume’s theory of the 
mind. Starting with the foundations in his ideas and impressions, it was necessary to determine 
how the perceptions in our mind are divided. I then showed how Hume defines the passions 
and their role. The copy principle dissected ideas and impressions to identify their relationship 
and counterexamples to Hume’s general maxim showed how all impressions need not 
necessarily precede ideas. Further detail was then provided concerning how we receive ideas 
from impressions. I outlined the principles of association through which we come to have 
knowledge of ideas. Additionally, causation is important because it considers the influence of 
past experience and its connection to future events. I have now introduced the key components 
of Hume’s Philosophy of Mind. Next, I shall start to look at the notion of personal identity 
through a very influential account; that of John Locke.  
 
5. The Lockean Memory Account  
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In this section I will outline Locke’s account of personal identity as it is thought that Hume’s 
account is developed in response to that of Locke. Firstly, I will outline the psychological 
details of Locke’s account, followed by his denial of substance. Next, I will explore ‘gappy 
memory’ through consideration of dementia. Lastly, I will turn to the role of responsibility and 
concernment in Locke’s account of personal identity. Although there are quite a few 
similarities between their ideas, it seems that they also differ in their approaches.  
Rooted in consciousness and memory, Locke defines an individual as;   
“….a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places” (Locke, 1689, Book II,  XXVII. 9). 
Locke views consciousness as inseparable from thinking and our identity only extends as far 
back as the individual’s consciousness of their past actions and thoughts. It is this 
consciousness that separates humans from other thinking things and “as far as this 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the 
identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this 
present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 
9). It seems the body does not play a role here because for Locke, thoughts are able to define a 
person in a way that the body could not do. Sheridan sees this reliance on the memory as 
helping us to understand “…what it means for someone to be the author of her thoughts and 
actions” (Sheridan, 2010, p.72). The use of the term “author” here alludes to the narrative 
structure of the self, which I shall discuss in more detail in chapter 4.  Locke’s account seems 
to depend solely on the person themselves and their own memories. There is a noticeable 
contrast here to the Humean account because Hume’s understanding of the self is dependent 
on others via the mechanism of sympathy and the emotion of pride. I will further discuss this 
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aspect of Hume’s theory in chapters 2 and 3. For Locke, the self is comprised of present 
empirical evidence of our actions and awareness of our past experiences and the times and 
places they took place: “…It is the same self now as it was then; and it is by the same self with 
this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done” (Locke, 1689, Book II, 
XXVII. 9).  
An illustration of the Lockean memory account can be shown through the disease of dementia.  
Would a person who has a family member suffer from dementia wish to say that they no longer 
remain the same person because they have suffered a tragic interruption of consciousness that 
has weakened or in some cases completely destroyed the crux that is holding up Locke’s 
account; this being memory? Locke mentions gappy memory; there are many thoughts and 
actions that we do not remember and are not in our conscious mind, do we then lose our identity 
during these gaps in our memory? Also, does this mean that I am not the same person as my 6-
year-old self because I do not share a continuous conscious trajectory? Thomas Reid formulates 
an argument in response to the Lockean memory account with a story:  
“…A general who remembers his actions as an officer, but not what 
happened to him when he was a boy at school (where he was flogged 
for robbing an orchard), although when an officer he did remember his 
boyhood experience. Now on Locke’s theory, the officer is the same 
person as the boy and the general the same person as the officer, but 
the general is not the same person as the boy, because there is no link 
of consciousness here” (Thiel, 2011, p.212).  
Reid highlights that if we use the Lockean approach, we could not say that the general is the 
same person as the boy even though logically we believe he is “because if the boy and the 
officer and the officer and the general are the same person then the general and the boy are the 
same person” (Thiel, 2011, p.212). Due to the lack of consciousness extending back to his past 
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actions as a boy, he cannot be the same person as he is in the present day. Locke does 
understand that we cannot simply remember every moment in our lives: 
 “But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this 
consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being 
no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past 
actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing 
the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another.” (Locke, 1689, 
Book II, XXVII. 10)  
Locke does allude to something which can be likened to dementia. 
“Absolute oblivion separates what is thus forgotten from the person, 
but not from the man. But yet possibly it will still be objected — 
Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a 
possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious 
of them again; yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had 
those thoughts that I once was conscious of, though I have now forgot 
them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the word 
I is applied to; which, in this case, is the man only. And the same man 
being presumed to be the same person, I, is easily here supposed to 
stand also for the same person” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 20).  
The lack of consciousness of one’s past actions shows the difference between a man and a 
person for Locke. He distinguishes persons from substance, spirit, man or human being and 
says man and person bring about different abstract ideas. He states that “if it be possible for the 
same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt 
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the same man would at different times make different persons” (Locke, 1689, Essay II. XXVII. 
20). Thiel explains this quote in more detail: 
“In other words, it is possible for a (at time t) to be identical with b (at 
time t+n) with respect to the notion of man, but not in regard to the 
notion of person, even though both notions may be applied to both a 
and b” (Thiel, 2011,  p.108).  
 Locke is not saying that man and person are two distinct things, he says the use of the terms 
man and person are different abstract ideas applied to the human subject. So, the dementia 
patient remains the same man but due to a lack of consciousness of past actions, he cannot be 
the same person because personal identity lies in consciousness for Locke.5 Thiel says this 
latter interpretation is “confirmed by the moral and legal dimensions of Locke’s theory which 
show that the concept of a person comes close to the notion of person as moral quality” (Thiel, 
2011, p.108).  
                                                          
5 Tony Hope discusses a case of a dementia patient in his paper ‘Personal Identity and Psychiatric Illness’. He 
highlights the difference between psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. The first suggests 
that there are certain criteria which need to remain in order for the person at different points to be considered the 
same, these include certain personality traits, memories, desires and beliefs, although this understanding is 
questioned. “The difference is this: connectedness focuses on a comparison of the psychological features in 
common between D1 and D2. Continuity focuses on the path from D1 to D2.If psychological continuity is a key 
feature then one could put forward an argument for the identity of D1 and D2 based on the fact that in Alzheimer’s 
disease there is generally a smooth change, so that if we consider each day, there would be a great deal of 




I now will outline the Lockean and Humean understanding of substance.  The reason why it is 
important is because they both deny that the self is based on a non-physical immaterial 
substance; that being the soul.   
 
5.1 Substance 
Cottingham defines substance as something that does not depend on anything else for its 
existence. Substance can exist in material and immaterial form. “A substance, as understood in 
the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition in which Descartes grew up, is, in the first place, simply a 
subject of predication, a bearer of attributes. But the term also carries the connotation of 
something which has independent existence, which can stand or subsist on its own” 
(Cottingham, 1986, p.84). Substance is therefore a thing that exists in a way whereby it need 
not depend on anything else for its existence.  
For Locke, there is no immortal, immaterial component that comprises the self, rather the self 
is determined by one’s personal psychology, i.e. memories. Personal identity does not reside 
in the sameness of substance: 
“Consciousness alone unites remote existences into one person. 
Nothing but consciousness can unite remote existences into the same 
person: the identity of substance will not do it; for whatever substance 
there is, however framed, without consciousness there is no person: and 
a carcass may be a person, as well as any sort of substance be so, 
without consciousness” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 23). 
“The sameness of substance does not make man to be himself, the 
personal identity lies only in “the same consciousness uniting those 
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distant actions into the same person, whatever substances contributed 
to their production” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 10). 
Similarly, Hume finds issue with not only the immateriality of the soul, but he also asks 
philosophers to clarify the very definition of substance itself: “I know no better method, than 
to ask these philosophers in a few words, What they mean by substance?” (THN 1.4.5.2; SBN 
232). Their answer, Hume suggests, is that the “definition of a substance is something which 
may exist by itself; and that this definition ought to satisfy us: “Shou'd this be said, I shou'd 
observe, that this definition agrees to every thing, that can possibly be conceiv'd; and never 
will serve to distinguish substance from accident, or the soul from its perceptions.” (THN 
1.4.5.5; SBN 233). As Cottingham stated above, substance does not depend on anything for its 
existence. So, properties like redness or mass aren’t substances because they depend on 
something else that has such properties—some lump of physical matter that’s red or heavy. 
Similarly, individual thoughts aren’t substances since they depend on there being a mind to 
have them. Individual minds, though, and physical matter are seen to be substances. Hume, 
though, thinks that all perceptions can just exist on their own. This follows from his 
conceivability principle. If something is conceivable, it is possible. He claims it’s conceivable 
for there just to be a perception without a body and therefore the perception can exist on its 
own. Consequently, all perceptions—according to the traditional definition—are substances, 
but this means the notion of a substance cannot play the role that it’s traditionally seen to have.  
So, if we have no idea what substance is, it cannot possibly be the thing that makes a person 
the same across time.  
Hume argues against other theorists who see substance as essential to personal identity, such 
as dualists and also those that state the self consists in physical substance. Simply put, his 
argument here relies on the copy principle, the claim that all ideas are derived from 
impressions. Hume rejects the idea of substance:  
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As every idea is deriv'd from a precedent impression, had we any idea 
of the substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of it; 
which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceiv'd. For how can 
an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? 
And how can an impression resemble a substance, since, according to 
this philosophy, it is not a substance, and has none of the peculiar 
qualities or characteristics of a substance?” (THN 1.4.5.3; SBN 232-
3). 
Hume states that philosophers cannot identify the impression that produces the idea of 
substance, much less the object from which it derives. If an impression is identified, he asks if 
it is one of reflection or sensation and what causes does it have. A reason to deny the existence 
of substance is, in his words; 
“Thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas, nor by means of 
a definition are we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance; 
which seems to me a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that 
dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul, and 
makes me absolutely condemn even the question itself. We have no 
perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A substance is entirely 
different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance”  
(THN 1.4.5.6; SBN 234). 
Now although both Locke and Hume think that substance does not satisfy their definition of 
personal identity; they both have different replacements for the notion itself. Locke postulates 
that the importance lies in the sameness of consciousness and memories and denies the notion 
of substance. Hume argues that we have no idea of what a substance could be and so this notion 
cannot underpin personal identity. He seems to deny the very existence of the self. Later, 
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though, he puts forward a positive account in which he finds the self; I will discuss his 
scepticism in section 6 of this chapter and his positive account in chapter 3.  
If immaterial substance has been denied by Locke, then he needs to ensure that his memory 
account is a strong enough counterargument in the face of other thinkers. However, the issue 
of gappy memory proves to question the strength of the role of memory. Now that I have 
explored the gaps in memory, I wish to look to responsibility and whether one takes 
accountability for an action that they do not remember? Additionally I will explore the concern 
we have for others and ourselves as agents.  
 
5.2 Responsibility and Concernment  
Locke considers ‘person’ to be a forensic term, one focusing on one’s actions, moral 
responsibility and concern for oneself.  
“It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to 
intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery. This personality extends 
itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness — whereby it 
becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon 
the same ground and for the same reason as it does the present” (Locke, 1689, Book II, 
XXVII. 26). 
When he describes person as a forensic term, Locke highlights the importance of morality and 
law in his definition of personal identity. To say that one committed an action is to 
automatically take responsibility and accountability for it.  
As memory is a necessary condition of personal identity, then a person who commits a crime 
may claim amnesia and the moments of interrupted consciousness will act as a justification for 
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it. But does this give permission to everyone who has committed a crime to claim amnesia as 
a defence. In short, the answer is no; well, that is if you are applying Locke’s theory correctly. 
Yes, it is true that, for Locke, if something is gone from memory then that episode of time is 
not you, but, simultaneously, he does not think that claiming amnesia is right. Locke claims 
that we should punish someone even if we do not know whether their claims of amnesia are 
right or wrong.  
“… human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man’s 
actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did — thereby making 
them two persons: which is somewhat explained by our way of 
speaking in English when we say one is “not himself,” or is “beside 
himself”; in which phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or at 
least first used them, thought that self was changed; the self same 
person was no longer in that man” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 20). 
The cases whereby the person is said to have become a different person are usually used to 
describe crimes of passion. “Crimes of passion….are tried on the assumption that the person 
was not in her right state of mind. In this case, we are relying on a notion of identity that 
involves a continuity of consciousness” (Sheridan, 2010, p.74). So, it seems that the crime of 
passion creates a different type of interruption of consciousness, one where the person’s state 
of mind is taken over by an emotional storm that is not usually attributed to the character of 
that person.  But this abstract understanding turns into practical consequences once punishment 
is mentioned.  
The key point that we must remember in Locke is that punishment should still be applied; he 
is not paving the way for people to claim amnesia and be excused of crimes, he understands 
the danger that this could cause. So to be sure, as we cannot tell whether someone really 
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remembers a past crime, or whether they’re pretending not to remember, it’s better, practically, 
for the security of society, to err on the side of caution and assume that they can remember and 
thus that they are responsible and that they should be punished. Some people will inevitably be 
punished unjustly, since they cannot remember acting and are not therefore the same person, 
but the benefits to society outweigh the injustice in these cases and the justification lies in 
consciousness itself.  
“But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? why else is he 
punished for the crime he commits when drunk, though he be never 
afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person as a man that 
walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same person, and is 
answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both, 
with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge; — because, in these 
cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit: 
and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. 
For, though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to 
consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he 
did, yet human judicatures justly punish him; because the fact is proved 
against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him” 
(Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 22). 
Noonan explains the role of punishment for the Lockean self;  
“Persons are not thinking substances, he insists, even though when a 
person thinks it is a thinking substance that does the thinking for it; and 
men are not persons, or when man is no longer conscious of a past 
action he is not the same person as the one who committed the actions, 
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though he remains the same man (human courts, in punishing him, treat 
him as if he is the same person)” (Noonan, 1989, p33-34). 
 
Genuine memory includes accountability but he acknowledges that it is difficult to apply his 
theory in the world today. He does, however, see a day where the true Lockean approach shall 
be applied;  
 “But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid 
open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for 
what he knows nothing of, but shall receive his doom, his conscience 
accusing or excusing him” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 22). 
Locke seems to think that there will be rewards and punishments in the afterlife and he uses 
this in answering the problem concerning justice on Earth.;  
“….It is vitally important to Locke to be able to say that persons at the 
Day of Judgement can be identical with persons here on earth, and 
justly punished or rewarded for their actions. Now if the identity of 
persons overtime is constituted by genuine memory, then on the 
proposed analysis there must be causal connections between memories 
of people at the Day of judgement and the original actions on earth 
which they recall” (Jolley, 1999, p.114).   
To think in this manner, we must be committed to the view that a memory experience needs to 
be “causally related to an original action which was performed not only in a different world 
but a different body which has ceased to exist” (Jolley, 1999, p.114). This line of argument can 
be difficult to follow and causes question for moral responsibility in the afterlife which I will 
not investigate further in this thesis.   
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Now, to take responsibility for actions that we have committed in the past means that we 
simultaneously have concern for what we did, this concern is for the well-being of our past and 
selves. Locke attempts to 
“….make sense of the importance the concept of personal identity has 
in our lives, and the special concern we have for our own pasts and 
futures” (Noonan, 1989, p. 48).  
As outlined, the Lockean self depends on consciousness and is “conscious of pleasure and pain, 
capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness 
extends” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 17). Locke believes that one of the benefits of his own 
account is that “it makes comprehensible the way in which our concern about our own pasts 
and futures is different from the concern we have about those of other people - it explains why 
personal identity matters” (Noonan, 1989, p.32). Locke’s theory allows us to realise that we 
cannot simply dismiss the things we did in the past or greet the things that will happen in the 
future with indifference. This, of course, is different to the acts that others commit, we can feel 
indifferent and unconcerned for them. To summarize Locke’s account we will now discuss 
Galen Strawson’s interpretation of Lockean Concernment, with respect to three distinctive 
features.  
Firstly, there is the field of consciousness. Locke saw the person as an agent capable of 
happiness and misery. By placing importance on consciousness, he states that the identity of 
the person is dependent on how far the consciousness of a rational being can be extended 
backwards to any past action or thought. Secondly, is the field of responsibility: an individual’s 
personal identity depends on the moral and legal responsibility for their actions at that time. 
So, the Lockean account focuses on forensics, that is, on when we should be seen as responsible 
for our actions, and this, according to him, is when we remember the actions that were 
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performed.  This moral aspect of knowing right from wrong is what separates us from other 
sentient beings that act with no consequences attached (Strawson, 2011, p. 24-28). Thirdly, 
Locke thinks that the field of concernment is a vital aspect of his approach. Concernment is 
concern for one’s own pleasure and pain considered entirely independently of moral and legal 
matters. For example, I may be concerned with my own well-being when I blame someone else 
for not completing a task at work when I know I hindered the process. This ensures that I do 
not get any blame but it is also morally wrong to lie for my own benefit.  
Locke states the being or extent of a subject of experience’s personhood or personal identity 
isn’t reduced to just concernment; consciousness and responsibility help complete the picture.   
 “All of which is founded in a concern for the happiness, the 
unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that which is conscious of 
pleasure and pain, desiring that the self that is conscious should be 
happy” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII 26). 
The aim for Locke is to show that our concern for the well-being of our self influences the way 
we act because we consciously act in a way that will positively affect our self. Reiterating the 
importance of consciousness, Locke shows a link between the past, present and future self and 
how this is intertwined with consciousness: 
“This every intelligent being, sensible of happiness or misery, must 
grant — that there is something that is himself, that he is concerned for, 
and would have happy; that this self has existed in a continued duration 
more than one instant, and therefore it is possible may exist, as it has 
done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be set 
to its duration; and may be the same self, by the same consciousness 
continued on for the future. And thus, by this consciousness he finds 
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himself to be the same self which did such and such an action some 
years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now (Locke, 
1689, Book II, XXVII. 25). 
So, although both Locke and Hume deny the existence of substance, Locke places importance 
on the role of memory in personal identity. I will now end my detour into the Lockean account 
by questioning the very existence of the self and personal identity through Hume’s scepticism.   
 
6. Scepticism with Respect to the Self 
Hume argues that belief in a self is contrary to experience. As we have established in the 
previous sections of this chapter, all ideas must have their source in simple impressions. The 
common strategy that Hume employs when he finds something philosophically contentious, as 
we saw with the idea of causation and necessary connection, is that he applies the copy 
principle. Our idea of cause is confused and to work out what we mean by ‘cause’ we have to 
find the impression of cause which is the source of our idea. As there is a similar controversy 
with regards to the self, Hume tries to find an impression of the self in order to clear up the 
confusion. Hume, however, says we do not have an impression of the self. 
“To produce an impression of the self would be to invite contradiction, 
since it would have to remain the same throughout our life, while there 
is no constant and invariable impression. The impression of our self is 
not of an enduring self but of a bundle of varying perceptions, so it 




Since he has already established that we need an impression of something in order to have an 
idea of it, the self would need a constant impression, but we are not aware of any such 
impression. The best that Hume can agree to if we cannot have an impression of the self is that 
we are a bundle of perceptions:  
“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 
at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but 
the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by 
sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said 
not to exist” (THN 1.4.6.3; SBN 252). 
These perceptions are in a perpetual flux and rapid succession because when we introspect we 
find ourselves faced with an array of thoughts, feelings, and perceptions that pass through our 
minds much like different actors enter and leave the stage in a theatre. In this flux, there is no 
identity over time. Hume therefore rejects the picture in which the self has perfect simplicity 
and identity.  
Hume differentiates between objects that have perfect identity and those that just have 
continuity overtime.  He uses the example of a mass of particles; 
“Such a mass becomes a different entity when and only when particles 
are subtracted from the mass or added to it. Whether they are simple or 
complex, whether made up of bits of matter or composed of something 
immaterial, only those beings whose composition remains unchanged 




Hume does not think this label of ‘perfect identity’ can be attributed to the self because it has 
the kind of identity that changes across time. The parts change overtime, as they do for other 
objects such as animals and plants. The parts that we have succeed one another in a perpetual 
flux. Swain claims that Hume’s view that we are a bundle of perceptions can be misleading. In 
particular, with respect to the term ‘bundle’ which can be a synonym of ‘heap’ and this can be 
seen as a meaningless pile of parts. Swain believes, however, that the bundle theory should be 
understood as a causal theory of the self. For example, my bundle of experiences is tied together 
causally. My desire for coffee causes me to desire to go to the coffee shop, both of these desires 
are part of my bundle. So causal connections help constitute my bundle. It is interpreted that 
Hume “adopts the bundle theory as a position that represents an ontological truth about the 
nature of the mind” (Theil, 2011, p.388).  
To ascribe personal identity to humans is fictitious yet Hume says humans still do this. We 
have a need to ascribe identity to our self across time and Hume believed this line of thinking 
is deeply flawed but he still acknowledges it. Hume states that although we should be sceptical 
of the enduring self, we still have a belief in its existence, and he explains why we have this 
belief, as we shall see in the last section of this chapter. 
 
6.1 Hume’s Associationist Account of False Belief in the Self  
Hume postulates that this belief that I am an unchanging being through time is simply false. 
“The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious 
one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and 
animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must 
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proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects” 
(THN 1.4.6.15; SBN 259). 
However, it seems that we do talk of the self in our everyday lives without hesitation as if it is 
an established identity. He acknowledges that we think we have selves even though we do not 
because we like to think we are continuous beings with identity across time. Hume is not aiming 
for a rationalist approach to personal identity; i.e. the view that we are somehow sure of the 
existence of our personal identity through a priori reasoning. Hume “…attacks the view that 
we have immediate inner experience or feeling of our simplicity or diachronic identity, and for 
that reason, no proof of personal identity is required” (Thiel, 2011, p. 386). For Hume and his 
bundle theory, the most that our inner experiences can give us is a multiplicity of different 
perceptions rather than evidence of the self.  
“Thus for Hume, the genetic problem of accounting for our false belief 
in the existence of enduring persons is just a part of the wider genetic 
problem of accounting for our false belief in the identity over time of 
changing things in general” (Noonan, 2012, p.169). 
The mechanism that generates this belief in the fictitious personal identity, is the same one that 
the mind uses to ascribe identity to distinct but related perceptions of things other than the self, 
however interrupted and invariable.  
“Hume indicates here how general is the application of the mechanism 
of the imagination by which we are led to identify distinct, but related, 
perceptions: it not only generates the fiction of personal identity and 
our belief in an external world, it also generates belief in our identity 
over time of such visibly changeable things as plants and animals, and 
is the explanation of our regarding things (ourselves included) as 
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substances possessing qualities, rather than a mere collection of 
qualities” (Noonan, 1999, p.191). 
Noonan states that we have a propensity to identify distinct perceptions whilst simultaneously 
ascribing an identity to them and calling them invariable and uninterrupted through time. We 
live our lives trying to justify the ascription of identity to distinct perceptions and we make new 
principles that connect objects together and presents their interruption or variation. For 
example, we do this with everyday objects: we believe the mountain remains the same even if 
it has changed due to a destruction of one side due to large amounts of rocks falling off.  
For Hume, the belief that we are enduring persons over time is the product of the same 
mechanism that accounts for the false belief we have in the identity of things in general over 
time. “The mechanism which generates the belief in the fiction of personal identity (the identity 
we ascribe to ‘the mind of man’) is the operation by which the mind is led to ascribe an identity 
to distinct perceptions however interrupted or variable” (Noonan, 1999, p.190). This is an issue 
for Hume because there is no uninterrupted or invariable entity which we can call the self, yet 
we still want to identify perceptions in such a manner because we want to apply a real 
connection between them that will make them a part of a single mind. We also look to the three 
associative relations that have been discussed in section 4, to potentially find some relations 
that we can link to the self. Barry Stroud states that: 
“Since our attributions of identity result only from the easy transition 
of the mind from one perception to another, and since resemblance and 
causation are the only relations that in this case can facilitate such a 
transition, it follows that resemblance and causation alone must be 
enough to produce in us the ‘fiction’ or ‘mistake’ of a continuously 
existing self or mind” (Stroud, 1977, p.122).  
57 
 
So, as our minds do not change drastically from moment to moment, we assume, as with the 
mountain, they remain numerically identical.  
Although the main focus of my thesis is Hume’s positive account of the self, to outline this 
negative account was necessary. This is because it is vital to understand Hume’s operations of 
the mind and his reasons behind his sceptical beliefs before we then look to his positive account 
of the self.6 In the rest of the thesis we shall see how Hume explains a self that is intertwined 
with the passions, the discovery of which is through the mechanism of sympathy. The 
sympathetic mechanism will form the crux from which to understand Hume’s positive account 
of the self, constructed through the emotion of pride. The next chapter will be an investigation 








                                                          
6 Noted in the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume found himself questioning his sceptical stance: “….he declares 
himself wholly dissatisfied with his treatment of the topic in the main body of the Treatise, but confesses that he 
now finds the whole matter a ‘labyrinth’ and that he knows neither how to correct his former opinions nor how to 
render them consistent” (Noonan, 1999, p. 187). Noonan highlights that Hume did not make his recantation clear 
because he does not pin-point what he is questioning and there is a struggle amongst commentators to find a 





As shown in chapter 1, Hume's account of the self in Book One of his Treatise of Human 
Nature (1739) is infamous for its scepticism, the claim that we have no self and are merely a 
bundle of perceptions. However, this ‘no self’ theory is overturned when he introduces the 
passions. I will further investigate Hume’s positive account of the self by exploring sympathy, 
the mechanism by which we feel the approval of others. This is the vital first step into 
understanding the positive account because it leads to pride. 
 
1. Sympathy 
Sympathy is the mechanism by which we feel the approval of others. This leads us to feel pride 
which plays a fundamental role in the construction of the self. I will outline pride in chapter 3, 
but first I will discuss sympathy in more detail.  
Firstly, we must establish a definition of sympathy because it does not match the everyday use 
of the word today. It is not the act of feeling concern or compassion for others, in fact the 
Humean use of the word has a closer link to how we would use the word ‘empathy’. 
“‘Sympathy’ should be taken in a technical sense: it refers to associative processes by which 
we come to share the emotions and beliefs of others” (O’ Brien, 2017, p.2). The way in which 
we can feel another person’s passion is dependent on whether we have the ability to conceive 
of the passion because “it is an idea of the passion that the mechanism of sympathy converts 
into the passion itself” (Baier and Waldow, 2008, p.63). This is according to the idea-mediated 
account of sympathy to which we shall come below. However this does not mean that we need 
to have felt that specific passion that the individual is feeling, for example, if someone is feeling 
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joy at passing their driving test but I have never driven in my life, I can still feel their joy 
because I have had experiences that brought me joy in the past. The sympathy can still take 
place. Waldow presents the process in the following manner;  
“…one can say that the ideas that are required for our emotional 
responses to other persons are the after-images of emotions that we 
have once felt ourselves, after-images, however, that enable us to 
understand emotions that we sometimes do not know from our own 
experience, in the exact form another has had them” (Baier and 
Waldow, 2008, pp. 63-64). 
Hume presents sympathy as a psychological account and it is the mechanism through which 
we can empathise with others’ emotions.  
 “The Minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they 
reflect each other’s emotions but also because those rays of passions, 
sentiments and opinions may often be reverberated, and may decay by 
insensible degrees” (THN 2.2.5.21; SBN 365). 
There are two ways in which he describes sympathy; in terms of contagion and in terms of the 
idea-mediated account. In the next section, I will outline both accounts of the mechanism of 
sympathy.  
 
1.1 The Mechanisms of Sympathy: Contagion and Idea-mediated Accounts 
Both the idea-mediated account and the contagion account are psychological accounts detailing 
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the role of sympathy. In the contagion account,7 when we look at the behaviour of another 
person we have a ‘presensation’ (THN 2.2.1.9; SBN 331-2) of how the other person is feeling 
at that point in time. Waldow sees this presentation as a Humean impression. This suggests that 
we can directly acquire the emotions of others through perception.  
Hume talks of the contagious nature of the emotions; “Inference is not involved, nor are the 
principles of association constitutive of the Humean imagination; emotions, rather are 
propagated or caught from others” (O’Brien, 2017, p. 3). The idea that emotions are something 
that are caught from others is something that fits the experience we have of the emotional life 
we share with others: often someone’s negative mood may simultaneously dampen the mood 
of others.  “A cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; 
as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me” (THN 2.1.11.2; SBN 316-7).   
Baier suggests that we see sympathy as “more than just thinking of a familiar feeling, when 
observing another’s expressive behaviour, behaviour which is believed to be the effect of such 
a feeling, and attributing that feeling to another” (Baier and Waldow, 2008, p.65-66). Baier 
uses an example of a torturer who can understand the pain he is delivering to his victim but this 
is certainly not though the sympathetic mechanism. 
At this point, I will move onto the traditional problem of other minds and how we can have 
knowledge of other minds through the mechanism of sympathy. This will underpin the idea-
mediated account of sympathy. Hume states that we become aware of human nature through 
careful observation of one another, their behaviours and their expressions. But Waldow asks if 
Hume’s method of accurately figuring our human nature is based on observation then “how 
                                                          
7 Contagion can also be known as ‘mimicry’ (O’Brien, 2017, p.3) and the view that we can ‘catch’ emotions from 
others is a process often called ‘mirroring’. From a neuroscientific perspective, sympathy can occur through mirror 
neurons. We feel sympathy because we have neurons that mirror emotion in others.   
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can he declare that the minds of men resemble each other?” (Waldow, 2009, p.119). The reason 
why Waldow proposes this question is because if Hume is to rely on observation of other 
minds, then he must also assume that our minds are similar in that our mental states cause the 
same kind of observable behaviour. Hume, though, does not experience this.    
“The experience of mind different from one’s own thus seems to be 
barred; all one can perceive are bodily effects (or causes) of other 
person’s mental events, but not the events themselves: No passion of 
another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible 
of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion” (Waldow, 
2009, p.119-120). 
Waldow considers whether knowledge of other minds can be grounded in an argument from 
analogy. The similarity of minds is known through the physical representation of similarities 
in behaviour. He believes in the existence of other minds because; 
“…by the perception of himself it is discoverable that passions and 
other mental occurrences are connected to bodily movements as their 
effects, while it appears as an undeniable fact that all humans behave 
in relatively similar ways” (Waldow, 2009, p.121). 
The idea that people often react similarly through their behavioural expressions when they feel 
certain passions follows his line of thought that the same causes have the same effects. From 
this, Waldow states that this proposition leads to the conclusion that the mental events that 
cause the bodily expressions exist in the same way in others as well and thus Hume would 
“…thereby meet the objection that his experimental method prevents the possibility of 
accepting the existence of minds as mirrors of each other” (Waldow, 2009, p.121). His 
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conclusion would depend on the inference he gets from the experience of his own mind and 
the way he relates his own mental states to his corresponding behavioural expressions.8 
In Hume’s idea-mediated account, from an analysis of a person’s way of speaking or in the 
expression on their face, I can infer that the individual is feeling a certain passion. The 
connecting aspect between seeing the expression and inferring the passion are the principles of 
association at work. They allow me to have an impression of the other person’s behaviour 
which then causes an idea of the passion that the other person is feeling. The way in which we 
can infer these passions is through reflecting on our past experiences. These enable us to 
conclude what kind of emotions and passions cause the associated bodily responses and facial 
expressions. When we observe physical behaviours, we then assume they originate from the 
passion with which we associate the behaviours. For example, in the past if I have lost a family 
member and I have felt sadness, cried uncontrollably, and struggled to talk about it without 
getting emotional, and I then see this same behaviour in someone else, I will infer that that 
individual is also feeling the passion of sadness.  
                                                          
8 For criticism of such an interpretation (that is, seeing Hume as basing his knowledge of other minds on an 
argument from analogy ), see Pitson (2002, 151). He argues that we cannot have experience of constant 
conjunctions between mental states and behaviour because we cannot be directly aware of the mental states of 
others. Waldow (2009, 73–79, 122), though, has a persuasive response. Given that my mental states and those of 
others are of the same kind the constant conjunctions I have experienced in my own case suffice to enable me to 
infer that the mental states of others are regular in the same way: “For when by any clear experiment we have 
discover’d the causes or effects of any phenomenon, we immediately extend our observation to every 
phenomenon of the same kind, without waiting for that constant repetition, from which the first idea of this 
relation is deriv’d” (THN 1.3.15.6; SBN 173-4). This analogical interpretation is also supported by what Hume 
says about our belief in animal minds: “'Tis from the resemblance of the external actions of animals to those we 
ourselves perform, that we judge their internal likewise to resemble ours; and the same principle of reasoning, 
carry'd one step farther, will make us conclude that since our internal actions resemble each other, the causes, 




We associate certain behaviours with certain passions so when we identify these behaviours, 
we assume the origin is that associated passion. Consequently, if we were to watch an interview 
of parents who have a missing child and they are not displaying the usual behavioural cues that 
are associated with the passion of sadness (such as lack of crying; referring to the child as a 
‘missing persons case’ rather than a loved one being lost) then, we, as observers of the persons 
become sceptical of the origin of their behaviours and whether they represent the passion we 
think they should be feeling.  
Baier and Waldow (2008) discuss how our sympathy with others’ emotions is dependent on 
their behavioural cues, expressions and the situation. Baier responds to Waldow and suggests 
that her interpretation may rely too much on referencing our own experiences. She suggests 
that we may be able to identify certain behaviours within ourselves that are responses to certain 
emotions. For example, I know that when I am scared or nervous, I talk at a much faster speed 
and use the work ‘like’ a lot because I have noticed this whenever I deliver presentations. Baier 
acknowledges that we can be aware of our behavioural expressions in such a manner, but we 
are not aware of our involuntary expressions because “unless we are Narcissus, we do not know 
our expressions as others see or hear them” (Baier and Waldow, 2008, p. 65). I may be aware 
of my speech speed and tone of voice but I am not aware of the fact that I twist my hair 
continuously whilst I am talking as well, this is something my classmates note when evaluating 
my presentations.  This is an example of how we are not always aware of our behavioural 
expressions and therefore it might not be the most reliable methodology to look back to our 
own experiences when we are trying to determine what passion could be the reason for another 
person’s behavioural cues. We could, however, have learnt through pictures and education to 
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know what certain facial expressions mean so that means that we do not understand the 
passions of others from our own experiences alone.9   
I have now discussed how we come to have the idea of or understand the emotions that another 
is feeling. Sympathy, though, involves not just understanding but also feeling the emotions of 
others. I will now explain the mechanism underlying this feature of his account.  
“When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only 
by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and 
conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently 
converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and 
vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal 
emotion, as any original affection. However instantaneous this change 
of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views 
and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a 
philosopher, tho' they may the person himself, who makes them” (THN 
2.1.11.3; SBN 317). 
 
 
                                                          
9 Baier presents examples contrary to the idea that sympathy is always a positive exchange, she suggests that we 
may dislike the person who is undergoing a time of suffering, consequently, we do not feel any sympathy because 
we are thinking about our own situation the entire time. However, it seems here that Baier is talking about 
sympathy in a different sense - one which is based on a sense of compassion, rather than in the sense of the 
mechanism by which we feel the emotions of others. Therefore, her view that sympathy is not always a positive 




First the idea is acquired and then this is converted into an impression. This is then enlivened 
by force and vivacity and then consequently becomes the passion itself. This produces the 
emotion that is likened to the original emotion.  
 “An idea is enlivened; its vivacity is increased so as to be become ‘the 
emotion itself’ or a belief, and in both accounts this extra vivacity has 
its source in an impression. …for our sympathetic response to the 
emotions of others, the source is the impression of the self. It is the 
principles of association that modulate the vivacity of ideas and 
impressions, transferring vivacity between them; in the case of 
emotions, vivacity is transferred from the impression of the self to the 
ideas we have of the emotions of others” (O’Brien, 2017, p.6).  
Through vivacity transfer the idea of another’s emotion becomes more vivid and becomes the 
emotion itself. It is through this we can feel the emotions of others. We can acquire emotions 
from others through the transfer of vivacity that comes from the impression of the self. The 
impression of self has lots of vivacity and some of this is transferred to our idea of another 
person’s emotions, thus increasing its vivacity. But there seems to be a problem with this 
account because Hume has argued that such an impression of the self does not exist, as 
discussed in chapter 1. As the thesis progresses, though, we shall start to see Hume’s positive 
account of the self.  
First though, let us consider how vivacity is transferred from the impression of the self. This is 
through the principles of association of causation and resemblance. The principle of association 
by way of causation is involved in our coming to infer which passions are felt by another. 
66 
 
Second the principle of association by way of resemblance mediates vivacity transfer between 
the impression of the self and the ideas we have of the mental states of others.  
It seems that we sympathize more with people in our own community and country, when 
something happens far away or a long time ago. Also, there are more specific resemblances 
such as those that share our culture, sex, age and character.  
“Accordingly we find, that where, beside the general resemblance of 
our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or 
character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. The 
stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more 
easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the 
related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the 
idea of our own person” (THN 2.1.11.5; SBN 318).  
The role of resemblance is vital, we sympathise more with those that resemble us and the closer 
the resemblance the more we are able to sympathise with their emotions.  
“Sympathy therefore involves positive feedback. Resemblance leads, 
via sympathy, to the sharing of emotions and beliefs, and this has the 
consequence that we come more closely to resemble those with whom 
we sympathise - sympathy, in turn, encouraged by closer resemblance” 
(O’ Brien, 2017, p.7). 
It is important to remember the resemblance is between people and not ideas, between the 
person and the one with whom one sympathises. O’Brien states that “The principles of 
association regulate the flow of vivacity from impressions to ideas, as if controlling valves 
(O’Brien, 2017, p.7). If the resemblance is distant, then the flow of vivacity is restricted and if 
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the resemblance is close then the vivacity flows with ease and the idea of the emotion that we 
acquire from another person becomes enlivened.  
“All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or 
consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or 
passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and 
most lively manner” (THN 2.1.11.6; SBN 318).  
Hume states that the principle of resemblance is a vital part of sympathy but Waldow thinks 
his understanding is too general because there can still be resemblances between individuals 
even if they have different shaped and sized bodies. According to Waldow, the imagination 
can provide general ideas which can bridge the differences in the appearance of human beings.  
It helps explain that another person’s behaviour comes to mind because it resembles our own 
behavioural conduct. Waldow believes the imagination can help us to focus on the ideas of a 
more general character which makes it easier to spot the resemblance. In this situation, “two 
entirely different performances appeared to resemble one another” (Waldow, 2009, p.127). For 
example, if one person is performing a ballet dance and another person is performing street 
dance. Instead of seeing this as two different kinds of dance, the performances are seen as a 
physical expression of art, this way, the resemblance is now clearer. This then leads to the 
association of our behaviour and that of others.  
Waldow considers that Hume may not wish to give such importance to the process of 
imagination because he argues that sympathy is something that occurs spontaneously and is 
based on the observation of another person’s behaviour; there need not be a process of 
determining whether the mind of the other is similar to one’s own. Waldow acknowledges this 
and says that the process of imagination “need not be conceived as a deliberate operation of 
the mind” (Waldow, 2009,  p.128) and could be seen in associationist terms..  
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I have now outlined one way in which we can acquire the emotions of others, now it is 
necessary to highlight how comparison combined with sympathy can help us to gain knowledge 
of the emotions of others. Gerald Postema suggests the key to unlocking the mystery of the 
human passions according to Hume, “lay in the interaction between two fundamental 
psychological mechanisms or principles; sympathy and comparison” (Postema, 2005, p.249). 
Hume believes that we often judge objects by comparison rather than by the intrinsic value 
they possess and when it comes to the self, comparison is contrary to sympathy: 
“But no comparison is more obvious than that with ourselves; and 
hence it is that on all occasions it takes place, and mixes with most of 
our passions. This kind of comparison is directly contrary to sympathy 
in its operation, as we have observ'd in treating of compassion and 
malice. In all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive 
from another, to which it is compar'd, a sensation contrary to what 
arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey” (THN 3.3.2.4;  
SBN 593-4). 
Baier interprets Hume as saying that even when we lose a competition, we, perhaps for a brief 
moment, feel the other person’s pleasure in their win, with the pain or envy only coming into 
the picture when we compare the person’s success to our own failure. So, on the one hand, the 
process of sympathy, in the eyes of Baier, can be a survey of the other person’s behavioural 
expressions leading to an understanding of the passion that caused those expressions. On the 
other hand, if I am pre-occupied with my own personal state, the principle of comparison 
overtakes the usual sympathetic response. In this sense, it could be argued that some people 
may be more sympathetic than others. There may be people who cannot be fully sympathetic 
because, as mentioned above, they become too pre-occupied with their own state and start 
comparing themselves to the other person. I shall return to comparison in this chapter section 
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6. So far, I have outlined the Humean idea of sympathy as well as its place alongside the 
principles of association. In the next section, I want to briefly outline the relationship between 
sympathy, character and morality.  
 
1.2 Character and Morality  
               Hume believes that Human beings have several natural endowments that work together with 
self-interest in our moral decisions; sympathy is one of them.10 When analysing the relationship 
between sympathy and morality, sympathy is involved in our judging whether something is a 
virtue or a vice hence judging someone’s character which becomes the object of moral 
evaluation. “….Character, the quality or motive from which someone acted, has an influence 
on our moral responses to the person independently of the consequences of her action” (Taylor, 
J. 2006, p.278). 
The reason why someone acts in a certain manner is considered a reflection of their character 
traits, namely the motives and intentions matter greatly in this respect. For example, if someone 
were to help me out financially and emotionally during a time of need with the expectation that 
I owe them something. In comparison, someone who helps me because they are genuinely 
concerned about my well-being shows the moral difference between the individuals even if 
they help me in the same manner. The first individual is helping with a focus on self-interest, 
they ask themselves what is there to gain from supporting me, it should have some benefit to 
them. The second individual has no ulterior motive and is acting out of genuine concern. Each 
                                                          
10  Another is that of benevolence and Hume describes this as humanity or fellow feeling, this principle in human 
nature is considered natural, it is something that we can observe but cannot necessarily explain. As human beings 




intention and not the act itself reflects their character. Hume acknowledges that it is common 
practice for us to judge positively those that bring us benefit and negatively those who bring us 
harm. Often, we become so blinded with such judgements that we may find ourselves refusing 
to acknowledge the good character of someone who has previously brought harm upon us.  
Hume uses historical examples so often he uses terms such as enemies and allies;  he says that 
we may sometimes deny the good character of a leader, the benefits he brings to those under 
his jurisdiction, purely because they are considered an enemy. “The good qualities of an enemy 
are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem and respect. 'Tis only when a character is 
considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling 
or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil. 'Tis true, those sentiments, from interest 
and morals, are apt to be confounded, and naturally run into one another” (THN 3.1.2.4; SBN 
471-2). 
Intention also plays a role here because someone may have intentionally caused harm to us, for 
example, if someone was rude when I first met them, the response of anger is automatic. Hume 
says we then purposely look for other reasons that will justify our dislike of that person. 
However if the behaviour of that individual was not directed to me, it was because they had 
lost a loved one that day and the stress was causing them to become short-tempered, their 
intention was not to be rude to me, they were just at the mercy of their emotions on that day. 
Some may then change their opinion of that individual and realise that they did not intentionally 
mean to bring them harm. On the other hand, Hume does leave room for those individuals that 
would continue to see that person in a negative light despite their intention, for them it is the 
action and not the character that matters. I will expand on this relationship between single acts 
and character in chapter 5, section 3.1. Additionally, there are passions that he considers 
character traits such as kindness, anger and hopefulness. These passions can become 
“established ways of responding to situations or other people” (Taylor, J. 2006, p.279). Moving 
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away from a single act, Hume states these passions can become durable and extend over time, 
over the entirety of the person’s character  “…we feel bad about breaking promises or betraying 
friends, or in being blamed and shunned, whereas the slightest mark of approval of our deeds 
or character never fails to delight us” (Alanen, L. 2006, pp. 195-196).  
Actions can be signs of character traits but Hume highlights the importance of motive; 
“'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the 
motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or 
indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external 
performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral 
quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on 
actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as 
signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the 
motive, that produc'd them” (T HN 3.2.1.2; SBN 477). 
               This focus on motive is accentuated when he states that if a person does not act in the manner 
that we wish, if they have the motive still strong in their mind, “we retract our blame, and have 
the same esteem for him, as if he had actually perform’d the action, which we require of him” 
(THN 3.3.1.5; SBN 575).In the same way that we look to the responses of others to feel pride, 
do we look to the responses of others to form our own opinions? For example, if somebody has 
a reputation of being rude and disrespectful then this may influence my judgement towards that 
person. Our judgment then is not influenced by their actions or the entirety of that person’s 
character, it is influenced by how others view him and the reputation he made for himself.   
Approval and disapproval is not just concerned with the effects  on the individual making the 
moral judgement; the role of virtue and vice is also considered within society.  “Human beings 
possess traits that are beneficial to themselves and others” (Bailey and O’Brien, 2012,  p.288). 
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It is important to acknowledge that sympathy can be biased, and we must be conscious of the 
fact that we have internal biases which should not be implemented when judging whether 
something is a virtue or a vice. “Judgements, however, concerning his character should be 
independent of my own weaknesses, interests, mood or circumstances” (Bailey and O’Brien, 
2012, p.290). We can overcome this bias, via sympathizing with the emotions of the narrow 
circle, which is the common point of view away from the attachment of these biases. At this 
point of the thesis I will not explore the narrow circle in detail until chapter 5, section 3. I 
thought it important to note here due to its relation to moral judgement. According to Hume, 
we take the role of the spectator and from this perspective, we contemplate our own character 
traits and those of others. When we approve of another person’s character, we feel pleasure on 
their appearance, actions or behaviour. To disapprove of someone’s character, we feel pain or 
a sense of uneasiness as a reaction to that person. “The pain and pleasure, therefore being the 
primary cause of vice and virtue” (THN 2.1.7.5 SBN; 296).   
 “…when considering actions in terms of virtue, we do not think of 
them in isolation from the agent performing them, we think of them as 
being caused by him or her and by aspects of his or her character” 
(Bailey and O’Brien, 2012, p.290). 
The fact that we have a moral compass is likened to having a sense of virtue because it means 
that we have the propensity to “feel a particular kind of satisfaction from the contemplation of 
a character and it is this feeling which constitutes the moral judgment of praise or blame” 
(Alanen, 2006, p.196). This praise or blame comes from the reactions of others and this is 
important to us because we care about how we are viewed in another’s eyes. The other person 
need not necessarily say anything, but we can read their bodily expressions and attitudes.   
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“When excessive, disorderly and contradictory emotions threaten to 
submerge us, their disapproval will help bring consistency in our 
emotional life and their approval sustains our moral, governing 
sentiments” (Alanen, 2006, p.197).  
Hume sees approval and disapproval of others as something that comes naturally to us and can 
ultimately help us decide who is a productive member of society.  
“This presumption must become a certainty, when we find that most of 
those qualities, which we naturally approve of, have actually that 
tendency, and render a man a proper member of society: While the 
qualities, which we naturally disapprove of, have a contrary tendency, 
and render any intercourse with the person dangerous or disagreeable” 
(THN 3.3.1.10; SBN 577-8). 
It is important to mention that Hume is a relativist about character traits and believes that they 
can change throughout history. Some traits may be more useful to society at a certain time; for 
example, being courageous is desirable during times of war but perhaps not so much during 
peace time. Virtues and vices were first introduced in the Treatise as subjects of pride and 
humility.  
“Virtue and Vice are stable features of one’s character which produce 
pleasure or uneasiness, when one reflects on them. One’s virtuous 
characteristics produce pleasure and pride, and one’s vices cause 
uneasiness and shame.” (Wright. J. P. 2009, p.200) 
However, virtues are not intrinsically or naturally pleasurable and this link between virtues 
causing pleasure and vices causing pain may not always be true. Wright (2009) states that vices 
may actually be a source of pleasure for the individual, for example promiscuity may cause 
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them pleasure instead of uneasiness, the pleasure resides in the selfish nature of the vice. 
Afterall, being selfless, which is considered a virtue, may not always bring pleasure to the 
possessor because the altruistic nature of it may not benefit the possessor in any way. He claims 
that often we have to restrict our natural selfish nature in order to act virtuously. Hume states 
that selfish passions are inherently pleasurable and altruistic ones are inherently painful.  
“In treating virtue and vice as sources of pride and humility Hume 
brings morality down to earth and makes it a regular part of our general 
psychological makeup” (Wright, J. P. 2009, p.202).  
Sympathy thus plays a part in judging whether something is a virtue or a vice. The reactions of 
others giving us praise enable us to feel the passion of pride once we ascribe the virtuous act 
to ourselves;  I will explain this in more detail in chapter 3 when discussing pride. Now that 
the relationship between sympathy and morality has been outlined, I will move onto Adam 
Smith’s understanding of sympathy as a way that we can place ourselves in another’s shoes.  
 
1.3 Adam Smith and Sympathy    
Smith considers the concept of approval and disapproval, but he references sympathy in a 
different way to Hume. He states that in moral approval, we must first approve of the opinions 
of others. He states that when we approve of these opinions, we simultaneously adopt these 
opinions. “According to Smith, then, we approve of someone’s sentiments when we recognise 
that we sympathise with their sentiments, that is, that we share their sentiment (perhaps, though 
not necessarily, as a result of putting ourselves in their place.) What matters to approval is the 
recognition of fellow-feeling, not the process by which we can come to share the same feeling” 
(McCord, 2013, pp.21-22).  Geoffrey Sayre-McCord in his paper ‘Hume and Smith on 
Sympathy, Approbation and Moral Judgment’ compares the similarities and differences in 
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Hume’s And Smith’s understanding of sympathy. Firstly, he identifies that both theorists refuse 
to have a moral theory that focuses on just reason, it must also appeal to sentiments. 
Additionally, our ability to sympathise with other persons’ sentiments is a necessary 
component of moral thought and practice. McCord highlights the two roles of sympathy that 
both theorists agree to;  
“First, sympathy with the plight of others engages our concern and 
prompts our actions in ways that are, they hold, morally important, 
crucial for constituting and sustaining a community, and more 
generally mutually advantageous. Second, sympathy is essential, as 
they see it, to our capacity to approve (or disapprove) of actions, 
motives, and characters as moral or not and, because of that, to our 
capacity to judge actions, motives and characters as moral or not” 
(McCord, 2013, p.2).  
This shows the importance of the role of sympathy because without it, society would be morally 
inept. Hume and Smith argue that moral judgements are vital in “….strengthening and 
supporting the bonds of community that sympathy makes possible” (McCord, 2013, p.2). 
McCord claims both theorists have an account of moral judgement that appeals to a “privileged 
point of view” (McCord, 2013, p.3) and from this view, we have the standards for our moral 
judgments. This appropriate point of view is where we judge what is worthy of moral approval 
and disapproval.  
Hume wrote to Smith in July 1759 asking about the ideas in his book The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments; one being that “…sympathy consists of imagining oneself in others’ shoes, as long 
as those shoes are respectably clean, and the other person sufficiently stoical” (Baier and 
Waldow, 2008, p.78). Smith says all sympathy is agreeable in terms of giving and receiving 
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sympathy but if someone were to show an emotion such as anger or sadness without sufficient 
reason, sympathy would not occur. Anik Waldow postulates that “…the origin of these ideas 
of passions, however, does not prevent them from representing things that we have not 
experienced ourselves” (Waldow and Baier, 2008, p.71). Waldow furthers this by saying that 
Hume would agree with Smith when he states that it is possible for a man to sympathise with 
a woman’s pain that she feels during childbirth. She continues:  
“He would only need to accept that men sympathise not by forming an 
exactly similar idea of the pain in question, for men just lack of 
experience of what it feels like to be in what Smith calls child-bed, but 
by entertaining any idea of pain which is a copy of one of their own 
previous pains and can represent the pain of a woman” (Baier and 
Waldow, 2008, p.71). 
Although Baier mentions that it is not always the behavioural expressions that lead us to feel 
sympathy for the other person, in fact she suggests that in “cases when, say her face is stoically 
silent, we can infer what she will be feeling, from our knowledge of what we would feel in her 
circumstances?” (Baier and Waldow, 2008, p.71). Baier says we can call this a kind of 
‘Smithian Sympathy’.  
Smith’s understanding of sympathy focuses on the role of imagination; when we feel a certain 
way because another is feeling that way, we simultaneously “imagine ourselves (more or less 
successfully) in the other’s place” (McCord, 2013, p.9). Whereas for Hume, we do not 
necessarily imagine ourselves in another person’s place, we come to feel their emotions 
through the mechanism of sympathy. The way in which one imagines themselves in the other 
person’s place questions how much of ourselves and our character needs to be moved onto 
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another state. Smith goes as far as to say that we use our imagination to take on their character 
traits. Smith also considers another option of how we would feel sympathy:  
“In other cases, though, we are sympathizing not with how people 
actually feel, nor even with how we imagine they feel, but with how 
we would feel, with certain of our capacities in place, were we (perhaps 
per impossible) in their place” (McCord, 2013, p.10). 
I think this latter scenario that Smith talks of, can be both positive and negative. I will use an 
example of a missing child, I use this example because I want to show how we do not always 
sympathise with how people are actually feeling, instead we may sympathise we how we 
imagine they are feeling if we were in their position. If there was a small community that 
recently reported a small child missing, then a parent with a child who is the same age will 
automatically think “that could have been my child!”. The sympathy is felt due to the fact the 
missing child was in the same community and same class as their own child. It could be argued 
that the parent is not imagining how the other parent is feeling, nor are they feeling how they 
are feeling. In fact, they are just imagining how awful it would be if they found themselves in 
the same situation. This could be perhaps what I would call selfish sympathy because it is not 
taking into account what the other person is going through; it is focused on me rather than 
another. For Hume, the focus must be on the reactions of the other, it is through this that we 
achieve sympathy, it cannot be focused on me. It is through the other than I understand the self. 
The following response to the missing child case, however, would be a Smithian response. It 
is as follows, when the parent realised it could have beem their child in the terrible situation, 
they can then use this imagined scenario to be actively involved in helping the other parent. As 
this is a situation that could have easily happened to one parent rather than the other, the parent 
makes it their goal to help the other parent find their child. Therefore, it could be argued that 
when a person feels sympathy because they imagine themselves in the other persons’ place, it 
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is more likely to create a closer connection to the persons involved. Smith would agree because 
he says that indeed our “conception of the circumstances matters significantly more than the 
idea of the passion itself” (McCord, 2013, p.10). As a result of this kind of thinking, Smith 
states that we can even sympathize with the dead even though we know they do not feel 
anything. Smith argues that some passions intrinsically create a sympathetic response; these 
are situations when the passion is strongly illustrated in the person’s behavioural expressions. 
Other types of emotion need us to gain an understanding of the circumstances that led to the 
emotion, in order for there to be a sympathetic response. This can be illustrated through the 
following example; if I am working as a cashier and I experience a customer who is completely 
unresponsive to my conversation-starters and does not acknowledge my being there, I 
immediately think this customer is extremely rude and I do not wish to interact with them much 
further. However, when I find out the reason they are not speaking to me or smiling is because 
they lost a loved one on that day and are feeling extremely sad, this then makes me sympathetic 
to the customer because I have now become aware of the circumstances that have led to their 
behaviour. The behavioural expressions, which would have been zero eye contact and no smile, 
are not the indicators that elicit a behavioural response as shown in Smith’s first type of 
emotion. Instead, the sympathetic response manifests when the individual becomes aware of 
the circumstances that led to the person feeling that emotion. This section relates to  the 
narrative approach because it is the idea that we cannot possibly judge someone and their 
actions unless we ‘know their story.’ I will talk more of narrative in chapter 4. In the next 
section, though, I shall further explore the relation of Hume’s and Smith’s account of sympathy 
to how we come to understand the minds of others.  
 
1.4 Sympathy and Psychoanalysis 
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At this point of the thesis, this section may seem to be quite an unexpected detour in my 
exploration of the Humean self, but I feel that there is an important link that needs further 
investigation. I have explored how we come to know the emotions of others, and how sympathy 
is involved in moral judgement, and now I would like to consider how sympathy may be 
involved in the role of the psychoanalyst to come to seek knowledge of another mind in a 
therapeutic setting.   The psychoanalyst uses sympathy but must be conscious of not allowing 
imagination to let her slip into that other person’s shoes; the psychoanalyst must be able to use 
the right amount of sympathetic engagement in order to gain insight into the other mind but 
also remain detached. In her paper ‘Scottish Sympathy, Reading Emotion, and Therapeutic 
Change in Psychoanalysis’, Louise Braddock aims to explore the role of sympathy in a 
psychoanalytic setting using Hume and Smith. In this context, sympathy is not just a 
mechanism that helps us to understand the sentiments of others; it acts as a route toward self-
understanding.  
“It presupposes what cannot be given here, the psychoanalytic 
explanation of the distortion of emotional experience away from self-
conception that can be lived in a rational, integrated, authentic way.”  
(Braddock, n.d, p.1)  
In a therapeutic environment, there is a drive towards helping the individual find a self-
conception through understanding their own emotional experiences. Psychoanalysis is defined 
as a “theory of unconscious motivation by emotion, feeling and imagining” (Braddock, n.d, 
p.1). Now, at first glance, it may not seem obvious why Hume is related to Braddock, because 
Hume straightforwardly states that we are necessarily aware of our mental states. However, I 
am confident that her interpretation of bringing these unconscious states into the conscious 
mind through the sympathetic therapeutic process is something that has not been explored 
before and certainly adds another level to the Humean Self. Braddock likens the role of 
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emotional communication in sympathy to the process of countertransference in psychoanalysis 
and she aims to show that this aspect of philosophy can help better describe and analyse the 
psychoanalytic process. In this comparison between philosophical sympathy and 
psychoanalytic countertransference, Braddock postulates that the psychoanalyst’s sympathetic 
response to her patient is a vital aspect of interpersonal communication between both the 
therapist and the patient. Whilst Braddock focuses on the therapeutic session, I believe that this 
kind of sympathetic response can be expanded to everyday social interactions and even to the 
philosophical issue concerning the knowledge of other minds.  
Braddock uses the term ‘Scottish Sympathy’ because she sees a general agreement between 
Hume and Smith and their understanding of sympathy.11 For both theorists, sympathy is a 
natural mechanism through which the mind of another individual becomes known to us through 
the medium of behavioural expression or way of speaking. Smith says that sympathy includes 
direct experiential responses, for example, synaesthesia and motor mimicry. We conceive or 
become affected by what the other person is feeling. We might find ourselves in situations 
where we mimic the behavioural expressions of others. Braddock says that both Hume’s and 
Smith’s accounts of sympathy show that the observing person can also have a similar feeling 
as an immediate response to the observation of the other person.) Further, according to Smith, 
we can also have a mediated reflective response when we adopt the other person’s situation 
through imaginative processes Braddock interprets Hume and Smith as having a shared view 
“we could see the first observational component as either a stimulus to 
the second component or as a confirmation of it; the imagination 
situates this immediate experience as knowledge of the other when we 
put ourselves counterfactually into the other’s ‘case’ by assuming their 
                                                          
11 She only focuses on the agreements in her paper and says the disagreements are irrelevant to her paper 
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character and history12, form an idea of what they would feel, come to 
feel something like it for ourselves and acquire knowledge through a 
fellow-feeling with them.” (Braddock, n.d, p.3) 
Braddock states that an explanation of how this fellow-feeling is felt is not very clear in Hume 
and Smith, and to make this clearer Braddock introduces the notion of ‘projection’, that is, the 
“….imaginative relocation of the sympathiser’s (subject’s) point of view in the other’s position 
(e.g. perspective-shifting.)” (Braddock, n.d, p.3). Braddock acknowledges that this is more in 
line with Smith’s account of sympathy, than with that of Hume.  
The idea of projection can be understood as attributing a subjective state, be it an emotion or 
sentiment, to another person. Although Hume does not look at projection in psychoanalytic 
terms, Braddock makes it clear that one does not need to be an expert psychoanalyst or have a 
Humean background to be aware that we often attribute an unwanted emotion or belief onto 
another person because we refuse to acknowledge that the emotion is indeed ours. For example, 
I may become short-tempered with a family member because I am feeling agitated and angry 
due to my workload. My family may realise this and acknowledge that I am being rude not 
because I mean my hurtful words, it is because I am stressed with my workload. Without an 
expert understanding of psychoanalysis, my family is aware of my behaviour and its source.  
There is a distinction between simple and complex projection.  
a.  Simple: Braddock labels this as roughly Humean: “the subject’s own feeling is 
attributed to the other person  (Braddock, n.d, p.4)    
                                                          
12 I find it interesting that the term ‘history’ was used in Braddock’s quote above because this brings to light the 
idea that we understand the self through narrative, though understanding aspects of a person’s past and the story 
they present of themselves. I will talk more about the narrative self theory in chapter 4.  
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Braddock insists that the projection may result in the subject being treated and viewed 
differently, the recipient may not even be aware of the process taking place and therefore the 
projection does not directly affect them.  
b. Complex: “…the recipient is implicated; she (unconsciously) responds in a 
corresponding or complementary way.” (Braddock, n.d, p.4)  
Braddock uses the example of anxiety in her example of complex projection, it is presented as 
follows: 
Firstly, subject A projects her anxiety onto person B by behaving in an anxious manner, 
describing fears and worries she is feeling. Consequently, person B has an anxious response to 
this situation either through the immediate or mediated form of sympathy (discussed above). 
“A registers consciously or unconsciously that B feels anxious. In this interaction sympathy 
comes into play in both the recipient (B) and the projector (A) for whom it was a defensive 
function” (Braddock, n.d, p.4). This interaction illustrates Braddock’s understanding of 
practical imagination because during this process A is sympathetically imagining how B’s 
mental states are evolving and how it will affect B’s actions. A’s projection helps to understand 
this and consequently a process of ‘dumping’ one’s feelings is involved and A may feel some 
weight lifted off her shoulders and subsequently feel less anxious. This example shows a 
defensive function projection from A, coupled with B’s sympathetic response to A, followed 
by A noticing B’s response sympathetically. Braddock acknowledges that this process can be 
done unconsciously but there are situations whereby A notices this pattern and uses it in a 
negative manner. For example, if A realises that putting her own stress onto B makes her feel 
better, she may purposely carry out this projection for her own selfish needs. Braddock states 
that in an ideal world, B would be aware that the anxiety A is feeling is not something that B 
herself is feeling so it does not make sense for B to feel any such anxiety. However, sympathy 
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is something that comes naturally to us and we cannot help but fall into projection at times.  
Braddock now moves onto understanding this correspondence in a therapeutic setting.I In the 
same way it can be difficult to determine that one’s projected emotion need not be one’s own, 
the psychoanalyst must also differentiate between his own response and the patient’s 
contribution. The person feels sympathy toward the other person but realises the emotion is not 
theirs.  
Braddock now introduces the term ‘Countertransference’ which is the psychoanalyst’s 
response to the patient’s transference (the analyst’s countertransference). This “instantiates 
sympathy as the analyst’s route to ‘knowing’ the patient’s mind by interpreting his 
communications” (Braddock, n.d, p.5). This is how the patient-analyst communication takes 
place in a therapeutic setting; firstly, in the process of transference the patient reproduces  their 
unconscious thoughts and feelings towards their parental figures in the way they communicate 
it verbally and also in their behavioural expressions; the patient is thus unconsciously eliciting 
a response from the analyst. The analyst is focusing on what the patient is trying to 
unconsciously communicate as clues to what she is saying during transference. The analyst’s 
self-awareness makes him aware of the patient affecting his own consciousness, for example, 
if an emotion comes into his mind, the analyst may find that the feeling the patient wants the 
analyst to feel actually “corresponds to what he himself is unconsciously feeling at that moment 
in the transference” (Braddock, n.d, p.5). The behaviour of the patient has this aim, but when 
the analyst is aware of this, he then tells the patient what he has interpreted from the patient’s 
communication. In a therapeutic situation if the patient is feeling angry and frustrated due to 
circumstances in their life, this emotion may be transferred onto the therapist who through 
multiple failed attempts at interpretation, may feel frustrated and angry at their lack of ability 
to give a successful interpretation of the patient. The analyst may eventually become aware 
that now the patient is becoming frustrated at the analyst’s frustration. The job of the analyst is 
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to differentiate between their patient’s frustration and anger which originally stemmed from 
their relationship with their family and the frustration the analyst himself feels at his 
professional incompetence. In helping the patient achieve a level of self-awareness by 
interpreting his own emotions, the analyst in countertransference may find himself analysing 
his sense of self by interpreting and understanding his own emotions first. In 
countertransference, the analyst goes through sympathetic imagination but also may find 
themselves having unconnected thoughts and emotions which they later conclude are a result 
of the patient’s transference.  
“Recasting the psychoanalytic process in terms of sympathy provides 
the theoretical ground needed for the psychoanalytic explanation of the 
therapeutic outcome.” (Braddock, n.d, p.6) 
Now it is thought that in the analytic process and in a successful therapy session, the patient 
should be able to gain a reflective capacity where the patient becomes his own self-analyst. 
The patient eventually sees herself through the analyst’s eyes, the patient gains knowledge of 
the analyst’s mind. Braddock thinks it is important to explain “…how the patient gets into a 
position from which what the analyst sees is also what he sees; how he can see himself as what 
the analyst sees, and see it for himself” (Braddock, n.d, p.7). This is therapeutic change. 
Braddock says the patient is actually being trained to self-observe and not self-interpret as he 
observes the exchanges between analyst and himself. The patient recognises movements and 
associates them to emotions and ways of verbalising emotions. Consequently, this leads to a 
level of self-knowledge where the patient becomes aware of the workings of her own mind, for 
example which instances lead her to go into a defensive mode. In countertransference the 
analyst is able to see and understand thoughts and emotions that the patient herself may be 
unconscious of. In this sense the patient is able to see that she made the analyst feel what she 
wanted her to feel. Braddock suggests that this form of imagining actually produces a real 
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feeling according to Smith and Hume. “The patient knows from his own experience what his 
analyst has experienced in response to his communication with her. Since his own feeling has 
been up until now unconscious - unavailable because projected into the analyst - what he 
experiences through this imagining may be quite new to him” (Braddock, n.d, p.9). These 
unconscious emotions may not fit with his own view of himself, the analyst therefore is not a 
mirror of the emotion. He has in fact identified the unconscious feeling of the patient and helped 
him to bring this feeling to the conscious mind; “when she finds his experience of her in his 
mind, sympathetically, she can see herself as he sees her, for herself” (Braddock, n.d, p.9). 
Sympathy is working in the countertransference which allows for the analyst to give 
transformative interpretations to the patient and therefore brings to light the patient’s ability to 
feel sympathy. Braddock states that sympathy and countertransference are “manifestations of 
the same range of psychological imaginative capabilities. And it may be that psychoanalytic 
observation has something to offer the theory of sympathy, if we see the latter through a 
psychoanalytic ‘lens.’” (Braddock, n.d, p.9) 
Additionally, sympathy can also be used to explain therapeutic change in the session: 
“The philosophical analysis of the sympathy-projection interaction can 
be used to elucidate the therapeutic action of interpretation in 
interrupting the defensive function and reinstating the patient’s own 
capacity for sympathy.” (Braddock, n.d, p.2) 
This quote reflects the importance of sympathy for Braddock because the interpretation of the 
projection stops it being used as a defence mechanism and therefore the patient is able to see 
the importance of sympathy. This reinstating of sympathy highlights the mutual sympathy 
between patient and psychoanalyst, and through this the patient is able to achieve self- 
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knowledge. So, sympathy not only reduces defensive projection but achieves mutuality. This 
is how the philosophical understanding of psychoanalysis is achieved.  
Braddock states  that in therapy the aim is not to fall back into the past or focus on what is 
going to happen in that person's future, the focus is now, the present, and she states that 
therapists often just help the patient to paint a picture of their lives, to bring to life the events 
of their lives in their imagination. The therapist sees the person as a present being but at the 
same time is aware of the influences of the past and the future and perhaps it is this awareness 
of these influences that allows us to feel sympathy for our past and future selves? Narrative is 
alive and very prominent in therapeutic experience even though it may not always be directly 
acknowledged, the person is seen as a story and therapy is the retelling of that story whether 
the patient willingly or unwillingly presents their own narrative. I will talk of narrative in more 
detail in chapter 4. Braddock comments on her colleague’s patient exhibiting signs of distress 
by showing anger which was in fact rooted in deep sadness. I feel the emotions can bring the 
person’s story to life. From this perspective, the person can become the story itself and perhaps 
often the easiest way to explain who we are presently is to reference our story, to move to 
narrative thinking and into a public expression of our narrative, to bring the unconscious 
thoughts into consciousness and unravel your story as you are speaking.  
Hume highlights the beauty of being able to sympathise with others, he postulates;  
“No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in 
its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with 
others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and 
sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own” 
(THN 2.1.11.2; SBN 316-7).  
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It can be a very rewarding experience when we find others who understand us and can 
sympathise with our emotions. In fact, Hume says that “we sympathise with each others’ 
sympathy for us, so the transfer of sentiments need not be one-sided” (Baier and Waldow, 2008, 
p.68). The relations we have with one another matter in terms of the intensity of our sympathetic 
responses to them.13  
I hope that it has now become clearer as to why I took a detour into psychoanalysis. 
Psychological therapeutic technique has been criticised on the grounds of its lack of scientific 
methodology. However, I wanted to show how if we are sympathetic beings according to 
Hume, then the therapist would find themselves needing to find a balance between the 
sympathetic mechanism and a level of professionalism that would allow them to support their 
patient. We also found that projection can exist outside of the therapeutic setting and we are 
not always conscious of the processes that are taking place during social interaction. Seeing 
psychoanalysis through the Humean lens and  in light of Hume’s thoughts on sympathy may 
help make it more respectable, with Hume supplying plausible mechanisms for how 
psychoanalysis might proceed. I will now move to the next part of the story concerning the 
positive account of the Humean self: I will show how pride plays a role in constituting the self 
and how the emotions are integral in this process.  
 
 
                                                          
13 Hume also thinks we can sympathise with the beliefs and opinions of others, see O’Brien, D. 






PRIDE AND SELF 
Firstly, in this chapter, I will describe the indirect passion of pride, followed by the mechanism 
of the double relation of ideas and impressions that leads to the creation of the self. Once I 
show how the self is constructed, I will show the sources of pride, explain why Hume sees 
pride as a virtue, and discuss the role of pride as a motivational force. Lastly, I will explore 
whether we can feel pride in others the role of comparison, and the distinction between 
authentic and inauthentic pride.  
 
1. The Indirect Passion of Pride  
For Hume, the passions are impressions and not ideas; impressions are vivid and ideas are feint. 
Now, the impressions can be further subdivided into impressions of sense - including our 
sensations and perceptions of pleasure and pain caused by objects outside of ourselves – and 
impressions of reflection, including our passions and sentiments. Impressions of sense are our 
direct engagement with the world,14 whereas impressions of reflection have a more complex 
causal origin. The impression of necessary connection, for example, is an impression of 
reflection, and this is caused to appear in the mind by the constant conjunction of the ideas we 
have of events regularly following other events. Hume distinguishes between those perceptions 
                                                          
14 Hume is sceptical about the external world, but for the purposes of this thesis I will not explore this in detail. “I 
assert, that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means, we utterly annihilate all these 




which enter with most force and violence into the soul (impressions) and the fe2int images of 
these in thinking and reasoning (ideas).  
Harold Noonan states  
“Thus the difference between impressions and ideas for Hume is not a 
difference in kind but a difference in degree; a difference between 
lively, vivid or forceful perceptions and those which are fainter, less 
lively, vivid or forceful” (Noonan, 1999, p.60). 
The passions of pride and humility are reflexive impressions; if we take pride, for example, it 
involves a reflex to another’s pleasure.  In other words, judgements concerning oneself are 
reinforced by others’ esteem. These reflexive impressions do not require any form of 
intellectual or logical processing, in fact all they need is a ‘reactive sentiment’; they just need 
an emotional reaction. 
In chapter 1, section 2, I outlined the direct and indirect passions, and pride and humility are 
examples of indirect passions.  
When Hume is discussing the indirect passions of pride and humility, he separates their objects 
from their cause. “In the cause itself he distinguishes between what he calls the subject and the 
quality (property) of that subject” (Wright, 2009, p.193). For example, we would call a 
beautiful home an object of pride but for Hume this would be the subject of pride.  
“'Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho' directly contrary, have yet 
the same object. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas 
and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and 
consciousness. Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the 
mind, they are always consider'd with a view to ourselves; otherwise 
they wou'd never be able either to excite these passions, or produce the 
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smallest encrease or diminution of them. When self enters not into the 
consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility” (THN 
2.1.2.2; SBN 277).  
For Hume, the natural or original object of both of these passions is the self and the objects are 
considered with reference to the self, without this reference the passions of pride and humility 
could not be felt. Now, as these passions are contrary to one another, it cannot be that one feels 
pride and humility simultaneously. It is either the case that one feels each passion alternately 
with consideration of the reasons for feeling the passions, or one passion eliminates the other. 
The latter, however, is something that cannot occur with pride and humility according to Hume: 
one passion is not more superior than the other because “supposing it to be the view only of 
our self, which excited them, that being perfectly indifferent to either, must produce both in the 
very same proportion; or in other words, can produce neither. To excite any passion, and at the 
same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and 
must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent” (THN 2.1.2.3; SBN 277-8). 
Now we might think it is obvious that the self is the object of these passions because how can 
one feel pride or humility without ascribing them to the self? For Hume, 
“The passion of pride and the self are two distinct perceptions. Just as 
we can discover that the object of hunger is always food or of thirst is 
drink, so we discover that whenever we feel the passions of pride and 
humility arise in us then we think of ourselves” (Wright, 2009, p.194). 
When Hume says these passions have the self as the object by “original property” (THN 
2.1.2.2; SBN 227) he means that the “connection between these passions and the self is built 




The self that is the object of the indirect passions of pride and humility is a self that is “without 
any true identity or simplicity” (Wright, 2009, p.194). Hume has previously argued that there 
is no self; there is just “the succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an 
intimate memory or consciousness” (T.2.1.2.2; SBN 277). This is the self that I presented in 
chapter 1. In searching for the self, Hume only finds a bundle of perceptions and no identity 
across time. When the passions of pride and humility are felt, our idea of the self is “more or 
less advantageous”. This means that there are different successions in each passion. Wright 
uses this example;  
“Consider the different memories which flood into your mind when 
you are proud and when you are ashamed. We might even think of two 
different selves as appearing to us, one constituting the proud memories 
and one constituting the memories of things of which we are ashamed. 
Each is constituted by a different set of successive impressions and 
ideas” (Wright, 2009, p. 194). 
The succession of ideas and impressions fall within the double relation which I shall now 
outline in detail. This mechanism will show the construction of the self through impressions 
and ideas. 
 
2. The Double Relation of Ideas and Impressions 
Pleasure or pain in the observer is vital to the process that leads to pride and to the creation of 
the self. The act or item itself may cause pleasure, for example if I am a good singer, the 
audience is moved by my voice and appreciate the beauty of it; it is not the fact that I have this 
voice, it is the voice itself that intrinsically causes pleasure in the audience.  
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 “In order to produce pride or humility, the subjects must independently 
produce pleasure or uneasiness in any observer or spectator of them. 
The ability to produce pleasure or uneasiness is another necessary 
condition for the production of pride and humility” (Wright, 2009, 
p.196).   
The fact that the subject can produce pleasure and pain independently of the relation to the self 
is a vital step in producing pride and humility. Therefore, from this reasoning we can determine 
that anything that intrinsically causes pleasure in an observer and is additionally related to the 
self can consequently produce pride. Also, anything that intrinsically causes pain or uneasiness 
and is related to the self can cause humility and shame. It is here that Hume determines that 
these passions originate in a “double relation of ideas and impressions” (THN 2.1.5.5; SBN 
286).15   
Jane McIntyre explains this: 
“The underlying mechanism is a ‘double association of impressions 
and ideas.’ The pleasure caused by something related to me is 
                                                          
15 There is a debate concerning the intentionality of emotions because Hume describes the passions “as having 
both intentionality and qualitative character – that is, he views the passions as having both a directedness and a 
phenomenological feel. At the same time, he holds that the passions are simple impressions, which is to say that 
they ‘admit of no distinction nor separation’ (THN 2.2.1.1; SBN 329). However, reconciling these views is 
problematic in light of his Separability Principle (THN 1.1.7.3; SBN 18–19), which states that anything 
distinguishable is separable by the thought and imagination. Since the intentionality and qualitative character of 
the passions are distinguishable, these qualities are therefore separable; thus, the passions possess separable 
qualities, and so admit of separation. This result seemingly contradicts their simplicity, leading to an interpretive 




associated with the pleasurable feeling of pride; the cause itself is 
related to the idea of the self. These two associations reinforce each 
other, generating the feeling of pride and turning my attention towards 
myself” (McIntyre, 1989, p.551) 
In order to illustrate what Hume meant by the passions originating in the double relation 
between ideas and impressions, I will use the example of the beautiful house and further dissect 
it in terms of its double relation. 
“Suppose it is a beautiful house, one which would produce pleasure in 
any spectator. Then if the house happens to be mine, the pleasure is 
transferred from the thought of my house to the thought of myself. 
Moreover, since the pleasure is a feeling related to the emotion of pride 
- the feelings resemble each other in respect of their pleasantness - then 
the passion which is produced when my thoughts turn to myself is 
pride” (Wright, 2009, p.196).  
The house itself intrinsically causes pleasure in other people. In her paper, ‘Powers and 
Mechanisms of the Passions,’ Lilli Alanen emphasises that we would not be proud of the house, 
had it not been for some of its individual properties, for example, the location, the clean 
surroundings, the aesthetically pleasing front garden. These properties are something that I find 
would give me pleasure independently. The pride is only felt when the properties are related to 
myself; the level of pleasure the properties give me cannot alone be enough to make me feel 
pride. This leads to the next step in the process: the thoughts turn from the house to me and this 
is where the subject (the house) is related to the object (self)  and consequently I feel the passion 
of pride. Wright also looks at the other side of the example: 
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“On the other hand, if the house is broken down and dilapidated it 
would cause pain or uneasiness, and therefore shame through the same 
mechanism. Pleasure and uneasiness cause these different passions by 
being transfused along the relation of ideas. The house that I own 
makes me think of myself, and the pleasure or uneasiness that it 
produces is transformed into the appropriate passion related to the self 
- whether it be pride or shame.” (Wright, 2009, p.126)  
Hume differentiates between the “…natural and original quality that ties pride to the self as its 
object from the natural but non-original quality that limits its causes to those related to oneself 
in the right manner, and his talk of an ‘original’ determination might be taken as a recognition 
that the tie between pride and its object is special.” (Baier, 1978, p. 29)  
Now that the mechanism of the double relation has been outlined, I will look at how the self is 
created through this mechanism.  
 
3. The Mutual Construction of Pride and Self 
As we saw in the previous section the feeling of the self and the idea of the self are both 
produced by the double relation of ideas and impressions. But which comes first: pride or the 
self? Hume says: 
 “That we may comprehend this the better, we must suppose, that nature has given to 
the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar 
impression or emotion, which we call pride: To this emotion she has assign'd a certain 
idea, viz. that of self, which it never fails to produce.” (THN 2.1.5.9; SBN 288) 
When Hume says pride produces the idea of self we cannot take this to mean that there is a 
metaphysical linear relationship between the two. If we did take his words literally then pride 
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would have to exist in an independent form, prior to the existence of the self. This would be an 
issue because pride alone, in its nature, is a self-directed passion. The self would need to exist 
in order to feel pride. Also, though, the self cannot exist prior to feelings of pride because, in 
Treatise Book One, Hume argued against finding the impression of the self. Instead, Hume’s 
words should be interpreted as there being a relationship of mutual construction between pride 
and the self. Pauline Chazan (1992) states that pride produces the idea of self: one cannot have 
pride without having an idea of self simultaneously manifesting; each constructs the other. 
Chazan considers why Hume did not say ‘self produces the idea of pride’; she argues that this 
would have created the assumption that the self is somehow given and, for Hume, this is not 
the case; this was evident through his scepticism. Neither self nor pride are given; they are 
mutually constructed.  
 “for Hume, pride and the idea of self come into being simultaneously; 
pride and the idea of self will be shown on Hume’s view, to the joint 
effects of a certain train of perceptions” (Chazan, 1992, p.46). 
She argues that we must stop pre-supposing a linear relationship between pride and self and 
instead adopt the view that pride and self can simultaneously come together.   
Hume’s account of the self rests on pride and humility and the properties of these passions are 
dependent on pleasure and pain. This pleasure and pain must be caused by a perception that 
something is related to us or a dependence on our capacity to transform another’s pleasure or 
pain into something related to us, so that it is felt by us as pride or humility. Chazan outlined 
the importance of this reactive sentiment on our overall sense of self-worth:  
“According to Hume, we sustain our pride, and so our self-
consciousness of who we are and what we are, by means of a continued 
perception of qualities and attributes related to the self, perceptions 
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which are reflected back to us by means of the attentions, regards and 
esteem of others” (Chazan, 1992, p.48).  
My sense of self is constituted by certain attributes I ascribe to myself which are reflected back 
to me by other people. For example, I may want to consider myself an honest person and at a 
later date, a friend thanking me for my honesty reinforces the perception I had of this quality. 
Pride and humility, for Hume, are indirect passions which are felt depending on the 
circumstance that person finds themselves in.  The perception of an admirable quality causes 
pleasure, but we only feel pride when that quality is attributed to the self. It is important to 
know that the quality must independently cause pleasure and pain independently of it being 
attributed to the self.   For example, the beauty or deformity of something must cause pleasure 
and pain independently of it being attributed to the self.  
When an admirable quality is perceived, the feeling of pleasure that it causes is not strictly 
related to the self. It is also related to others that perceive this admirable or even loathsome 
quality. So, let us say that I am frequently rude to people, other people will look upon me with 
a feeling of hate. Other people in the world are objects of love and hate but pride and humility 
can only be directed towards the object, that being one’s own self.  
“We extrapolate from Hume’s account that pride, in order to be 
sustained, depends on a continued perception of qualities and attributes 
related to the self. And it is on such a continued perception that the idea 
of self depends in order for it to be sustained” (Chazan, 1992, p.49).   
Hume’s passion of pride comes from a continued perception of qualities related to the self and 
this continued perception is depended on by the self. Without the continuousness of these 
perceptions and attributes, we would never experience the succession of related ideas and 
impressions of which we have intimate memory and consciousness. Consequently, the idea of 
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self together with the passion of pride would fade away. We do not, though, need to exist in a 
world of constant self-reflection, because other minds serve as mirrors, helping us reflect on 
our own qualities. Chazan (1992) comments on the sustainability of pride: 
“For pride to endure, we need, not constant self-inspection, but 
constant feeding, and we get this from the impressions of pleasure and 
esteem others have on perceiving our admirable qualities and attributes 
which are then reflected back to ourselves. If feeding is not available, 
comparison with others’ envy of our qualities, attributes and 
possessions can also sustain pride” (Chazan, 1992, p.49).   
This does not mean that we must constantly be highlighting our positive qualities and attribute 
them to the self in order for pride to be sustained. But there must be a level of feeding that we 
receive through the pleasure from others in the social world. These responses we receive from 
others is what maintains our sense of self. Therefore, this is why Chazan is postulating the self 
would fade away because without such feedback pride cannot be sustained. Consequently, if 
pride cannot be sustained, neither can the self as we are already aware that the self cannot stand 
alone according to Hume.  
The envy that others may feel over certain qualities we have can also sustain pride. Neither 
pride nor humility will sustain themselves without the opinions and sentiments of others 
seconding them. The social world plays a large role in Hume’s account of the self. It is not 
necessary that the other person tells me that they felt pleasure because I am the possessor of a 
certain quality. In fact, all that is needed is for the other person to express pleasure because of 
a quality that is connected to me through the principles of association; causation, resemblance 
and contiguity. From this, I feel that the other person’s pleasure lies in me because I am the 
possessor of it, so I attribute it to myself.  
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In order to feel pride in the subject, it needs to be the case that the subject is strongly related to 
us. It might be that a subject just produces pleasure in us and no passion of pride. It might be 
that we attend a birthday party where the cake gives us pleasure and joy, however the person 
who made the cake is the one that feels pride and not me; I simply just feel the pleasure because 
the subject does not have a strong relation to me. Hume presents such an example where joy 
can be felt but it does not extend to the passion of pride: 
 
“We may feel joy upon being present at a feast, where our senses are 
regal'd with delicacies of every kind: But 'tis only the master of the 
feast, who, beside the same joy, has the additional passion of self-
applause and vanity. 'Tis true, men sometimes boast of a great 
entertainment, at which they have only been present; and by so small a 
relation convert their pleasure into pride: But however, this must in 
general be own'd, that joy arises from a more inconsiderable relation 
than vanity, and that many things, which are too foreign to produce 
pride, are yet able to give us a delight and pleasure” (THN 2.1.6.2; SBN 
290-1). 
This example is the first limitation to pride that Hume outlines in his Treatise.In response to 
the example, Hume adds “that where agreeable objects bear not a very close relation to 
ourselves, they commonly do to some other person; and this latter relation not only excels, but 
even diminishes, and sometimes destroys the former, as we shall see afterwards” (THN 2.1.6.2; 
SBN 290-1).  
The second limitation of pride that Hume highlights is that we usually take pride in things that 
are “peculiar” to ourselves or at least “common with a few persons” (THN 2.1.6.4; SBN 291-
2) and pride does not arise when we have something that everyone else also has.  For example, 
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I do not take pride in my jacket that I bought from Primark since many people have this jacket, 
but I may take pride in my rare antiques. Hume says that if we become  “overly accustomed” 
to a subject it “loses values in our eyes” (Wright, 2009, p.199).   
 
“These qualities of the mind have an effect upon joy as well as pride; 
and 'tis remarkable, that goods, which are common to all mankind, and 
have become familiar to us by custom, give us little satisfaction; tho' 
perhaps of a more excellent kind, than those on which, for their 
singularity, we set a much higher value”  (THN 2.1.6.4; SBN 291-2).  
Additionally, Hume postulates that we judge the pleasure felt in objects less from their intrinsic 
worth and more from their comparison to others. So, when I feel pride in something that I have, 
this feeling is intensified if others do not have it; this increases my pleasure because it is unique 
and therefore I feel pride. Also, we do not just compare materialistic items, we often compare 
character traits: we may believe that we have more compassion than someone else and therefore 
feel pleasure and pride at this observation.  
 
Lastly, I would like to take a detour to a different kind of account of the construction of the self 
in relation to pride. In chapter 1, section 5,  I spoke about dementia in the context of the Lockean 
memory account. If one’s memory were to be lost due to the disease of dementia then, for 
Locke, the conscious trajectory has been interrupted, therefore the person is no longer the same 
self. This is because they are not able to consciously remember actions in their past. In response 
to this proposition, I would like to see how the Humean self and pride can provide a potential 
resolution to this problem and how it can pave a way to re-create the self.  Former journalist 
Jay Newton-Small (2011) created a new way of treating people with dementia, so effective that 
it completely transformed their care. Instead of filling out a twenty-page questionnaire about 
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general problems with her father, she instead filled it with personal things about his life in 
anecdotal form, such as the fact that he was a part-time driver for Winston Churchill and that 
he had a favourite spot to take a walk. These details gave the carer trigger points and references 
that made her father happy. The article did not mention the term ‘pride’, but I believe that what 
she wrote about included actions that the patient felt proud of.  This experience was so 
influential that she began making stories for others with the illness, using photos, videos and 
recordings through her organisation ‘Memory Well.’ Research showed that the aggressive 
behaviour in certain patients decreased because of the carers knowing about their family history 
so they felt more comfortable around them.  In one instance, the patient was scared of the 
lunchtime bell and would stand up in panic; this did not make sense until they found out he 
used to be a firefighter. The lifestyle director of St. Paul’s Hospital commented that these 
stories are:  
“…. More digestible to read and it makes the person almost more 
human; it paints a portrait of who they were in their former life versus 
the forms given out by social services that give a picture of who they 
are now” (Bahrampour, 2016). 
It is evident that at least in some cases, if the dementia patient is introduced to memories that 
produce pleasure, then this transforms to pride due to the reactions of the person talking to 
them. My suggestion, then, is that this could perhaps be seen as a reconstruction of the practical 
self. Additionally, this understanding involves narrative descriptions of the lives of people  and 
I will continue to look at the self as narrative in chapter 4.   
In this section, I have talked about the mutual construction of pride and self.  But from what 




4. Sources of Pride  
Now that we have established that the self is the object of these passions, the subject “which 
causes these passions is not originally or innately connected with the passions.” (Wright, 2009, 
p.195) It is not innately built into us to feel proud of something we have done or even shame 
for something that has happened. Hume does say that pride and humility have general features 
that we discover through experience. Firstly, I would like to outline the sources of pride and 
then the potential expectations of what we should feel proud of. I wish to explore the many 
different forms that the passion of pride can potentially take. We may feel proud of qualities of 
our mind or qualities of our bodies;  
 “A man may be proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mein, 
address in dancing, riding, fencing, and of his dexterity in any manual 
business or manufacture. But this is not all. The passions looking 
farther, comprehend whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related 
to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, 
horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride 
or of humility” (THN 2.1.2.5; SBN 278-9).  
We can feel pride in our behaviours, how we react to situations as well as our looks and physical 
capabilities and relationships but the main aspect is, is that trait needs to be related to us. Hume 
admired that there are practical skills such as business acumen, courage, understanding and 
even characteristics such as sound reasoning as desired quality. Furthermore, physical 
characteristics are considered sources of pride;   
“Beauty, consider'd merely as such, unless plac'd upon something 
related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest 
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relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as 
little influence on that passion” (THN 2.1.2.6; SBN 279). 
We may also feel proud of what we have done;  
“Thus the first mechanic, that invented a fine scritoure, produc'd pride 
in him, who became possest of it, by principles different from those, 
which made him proud of handsome chairs and tables. As this appears 
evidently ridiculous, we must conclude, that each cause of pride and 
humility is not adapted to the passions by a distinct original quality; but 
that there are some one or more circumstances common to all of them, 
on which their efficacy depends” (THN 2.1.3.5; SBN 281-2).  
There are general qualities that have aspects in common that make us feel proud.  Reminding 
ourselves of the role of sympathy in the chapter 2, I described how people approve of our 
virtues and feel pleasure in the virtuous things we do. We, in turn, sympathize with their 
pleasure and approval. But then he also states that there can be separate pleasures caused by 
causes of pride.  
“Thus the beauty of our person, of itself, and by its very appearance, 
gives pleasure, as well as pride; and its deformity, pain as well as 
humility. A magnificent feast delights us, and a sordid one displeases. 
What I discover to be true in some instances, I suppose to be so in all; 
and take it for granted at present, without any farther proof, that every 
cause of pride, by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate pleasure, 
and of humility a separate uneasiness” (THN 2.1.5.1; SBN 285). 
There is no doubt that Hume would update this list today, with people feeling pride in their 
electronics and cars. The features that we feel proud of or feel ashamed of may be different but 
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the thing they have in common is that they are related to the self. The relation is through the 
principles of association that were mentioned in chapter 1 section 4, that of; resemblance, 
continuity and causal relations. For example, owning something, being the parent of a gifted 
child are sources of pride through causal relations. Each of these relations provides an 
association of ideas in our minds. “When I think of my fellow philosophers (resemblance), my 
neighbours (spatial proximity), and the essay I wrote (causality), each of these thoughts is 
connected with the thought of myself” (Wright, 2009, p.195). 
There may be no innately built thoughts within us that would indicate what we should feel 
proud of or ashamed of, but we can conclude that through experience that there are certain 
things that we should be proud of or feel ashamed by. This could be the result of our experience 
and this would vary between different communities. For example, in one community, perhaps 
people feel proud of their achievements in school and in another community, people may feel 
proud of their material items.  
“ 'Tis necessary, therefore, to know our rank and station in the world, 
whether it be fix'd by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or 
reputation. 'Tis necessary to feel the sentiment and passion of pride in 
conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly. And shou'd it 
be said, that prudence may suffice to regulate our actions in this 
particular, without any real pride.” (THN 3.3.2.11; SBN 598-9). 
Hume is saying that we must know our position in the world in order to regulate our emotions 
according to them. At first glance this may seem like a nicer way of saying that only people of 
certain status are able to feel pride but if we think of it more thoroughly we can see that if you 
are a person of certain talents, birth, wealth and reputation then of course you will be exposed 
to situations whereby the level of pride will be “regulated accordingly” (THN 3.3.2.11; SBN 
598-9). Referencing my statement above that perhaps our community, culture and upbringing 
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can teach us what we should feel proud of, in the same way, the environment we are raised in 
will only allow us to feel certain kinds of pride. If I am raised in a community where people 
leave school to start work then I will be less likely to be exposed to the pride that one feels in 
a higher education achievement. An aristocrat may feel prude in his estate whereas a peasant 
may feel pride in the vegetables that he grows. In order to feel such pride, though, Hume’s 
claim is that one must know one’s position in society and what’s expected of someone in that 
position. It wouldn’t be right, for example, for an aristocrat to feel pride in growing a few 
vegetables - well according to societal expectations anyway. Although Hume claims that there 
can be some consistency across cultures;   
“If we cast our eye upon human nature, and consider that in all nations 
and ages, the same objects still give rise to pride and humility; and that 
upon the view even of a possible stranger, we can know pretty nearly, 
what will either encrease or diminish his passions of this kind. If there 
be any variation in this particular, it proceeds from nothing but a 
difference in the tempers and complexions of men; and is besides very 
inconsiderable. Can we imagine it, that while human nature remains 
the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power, 
riches, beauty or personal merit, and that their pride and vanity will not 
be affected by these advantages?” (THN 2.1.3.4; SBN 280-1)  
 
Here I would like to present a potential criticism of the Humean account that could question 
our position in the world; do people have personal levels of pride? Perhaps societal expectation 
could be overcome by a personal hierarchy of pride?  There may be a way in which we create 
our own expectations that do not reflect the societal ones but for others this may seem like 
something that should not create the passion of pride? Interestingly, a social media influencer 
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who created videos on YouTube Amberlynn Reid, who is morbidly obese said she was proud 
of herself for walking for more than 3 minutes. To her viewers, this was not something to feel 
pride in, without the pleasurable reactions from her viewers, she still genuinely felt pride. The 
question, is this still pride if there are no positive feedback to then create pride? I will look at 
societal expectations of pride in chapter 5 section 1 and the link between social media and pride 
in more detail, in chapter 5 section 2.  
Another example that I would like to include is one which deals with to what extent pride 
contributes to our self-conception and whether this is dependent on who we get the impression 
from, the person who is making us feel proud is important and I will call this example; Grades. 
If my parents were really impressed with my dissertation, I will certainly feel proud. But would 
I somehow feel’ prouder if I got a high mark and excellent comments from my tutor because 
he is an expert in the field. Do we look to the credibility of the person feeling pleasure from 
our qualities to feel pride? The answer to this is that I wouldn’t feel more proud because for 
that tutor, anyone who writes in the same way would get the same comments, it has nothing to 
do with me personally, I could still feel proud but not because it was specifically my individual 
achievement. But my parents are proud because I did it, they are proud of me as an individual 
so that is why I attribute to my self.  
Pride influences agency because the subject will aim to continue acting in ways in which they 
are proud of. The reflection that one has on their behaviours (looking at the cause of pride) is 
a key factor in the motivational hierarchy in an individual. Perhaps if we tried to apply the 
Humean theory, we could say that we naturally feel sympathetic towards those that are closest 
to us, i.e. family, we so naturally feel pride from their responses. Or it could also work the other 
way and we may not feel as proud when a family member comments on our work because we 
know they would give a pleasurable response regardless of the quality. Whether we feel 
prouder because they are closest to us is a question that Hume would say is perhaps irrelevant, 
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because either way we feel pride, there is not a matter of degree of pride for him. Overall, it 
seems we would feel proud if our parents like our work, but there’s a sense in which we 
shouldn’t because they’re not experts. Reflecting back to the sympathy chapter 2, we seem 
sympathize more with family members. Hume could bring more objectivity into the account in 
many ways. Firstly, we should not just sympathize with those closest to us, we should adopt 
the general point of view. So, if I work hard, I would sympathize with what the narrow circle 
think, and this is wider than just my family. Secondly, Hume also speaks of standard of taste 
with respect to judging the aesthetic value of things, Hume says there are ‘True Judges’, those 
who have more delicacy of taste. It is their approval with which we would sympathize, Hume 
states that multiple judges join together to make a verdict on their preferences. Let us move 
from the dissertation to a PhD thesis, the true judges will join together and moderate as a matter 
of fact, whether they think it is worthy of passing.  “One way to determine the standard of taste 
might be to observe what the true judges do, which works of art they like to contemplate and 
void, and then decide that these preferences determine what is worth looking at and what is 
not?” (Rowe, 2012. p.360). Thirdly, there could be a possibility in the case with the parents 
that I would feel a conflict of passions, leading to the confused idea that I feel pride from their 
response. What I mean by this is that there is some pride felt, but the high level of emotion 
could be also because of, for example, the love for your parents. An additional thought here is 
whether the pride I feel is because of the underlying expectations that I feel my parents had for 
me and that I should feel proud of this achievement because it is what they expect from me?  
Pleasure can sometimes be felt just in the performance itself but for the agent to feel proud, she 
must see the viewer’s pleasure as being caused, not just by his performances as stand-alone 
performances but as a performance by her. Highlighting the previous point about taste, my 
tutor may have the delicacy of taste when it comes to writing skills and so in turn becomes a 
better judge. The writing is still mine because it is related to me via causation and so is 
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something related to the self and certainly something that I should feel proud of and this is a 
positive experience. At this point, I want to explore the idea that rather than being a sin that 
one should avoid, pride is a virtue.  
 
5. Pride as a Virtue  
Hume says pride is a feeling but also that it is a virtue and he sees virtue as character traits. 
These are usually considered to be behavioural dispositions. So, courage is a virtue and 
consists in the disposition to be brave. Pride, then, if seen as a behavioural disposition, must 
be something like the disposition to act proudly. He highlights that usually when philosophers 
are criticising pride as a vice or a sin then they are thinking of pride as a character trait, Hume 
talks about pride in both ways. First, when he is speaking about self-construction, he is 
alluding to pride as a feeling. This is not necessarily a momentary experience; I could feel 
pride for long stretches of time if I’m driving my Ferrari for example. Secondly, when talking 
as pride as a virtue, though, it is the behavioural disposition he’s talking about. Seeing pride 
in both ways does not create a hindrance to his account. Similarly, I can be angry, that is, I 
feel anger (on certain occasions and perhaps for longer periods), but I can also be an angry 
person, that is, disposed to feel angry and act in certain angry ways. Now that I have 
highlighted the ways in which Hume speaks of pride, I would like to address the religious 
labelling of pride as a sin, followed by how Hume overcomes this.  
Hume recognised the religious labelling of pride as a vice because; “By being proud one gives 
excessive importance to oneself, to the point of neglecting God. Because of that, pride 
represents the root of all the other vices” (Greco, 2019, p.101). By having pride, one is wrongly 
confident in a non-existent self-sufficiency and one forgets the reliance on God in a detrimental 
manner. Humility is questioned by Hume as; 
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“Christianity also promotes humility, pride being the first of the seven 
cardinal sins. This is often applauded as a positive injunction, even by 
critics of religion. Not so, however, for Hume: for him, humility can be 
a vice and pride is his first natural virtue” (O’Brien, 2012, p.297).  
Virtues are character traits that are useful and agreeable whilst vices are not useful and 
unpleasant. Pride falls in the first. Humility can be, seen as a vice because it is not useful to 
society. Dan O’Brien highlights the difference between modesty and humility and states that 
modesty exists as a socially orientated virtue, it is about how we present ourselves to one 
another whereas humility focuses on a lack of self-worth. It is not a virtue because it can cause 
low self-esteem and lack of self-confidence which are not good for your wellbeing.  
 
It seems that rather than being a virtue, this religious trait is not productive or an emotion that 
would have positive psychological effects on oneself and others.  
 
“Accordingly we find, that many religious declaimers decry those 
virtues as purely pagan and natural, and represent to us the excellency 
of the Christian religion, which places humility in the rank of virtues, 
and corrects the judgment of the world, and even of philosophers, who 
so generally admire all the efforts of pride and ambition” (THN 
3.3.2.13; SBN 599-600). 
Hume’s reaction to this was to label pride as a virtue in the face of religious teachings, Dan 
O’Brien this through the ‘Monkish Virtues.’ He notices that although Hume accentuates virtues 
such as prudence, politeness and discretion, amongst others,  in the History of England, there 
is a lack of virtues such as faith hope and charity. These virtues are typically traits that religious 
believers are seem to practice and preach. Now, Hume would sooner label these traits as vice, 
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than actually consider them as virtues that we should aspire to have. Hume focuses on the 
monkish virtues of mortification (defined as great embarrassment and shame), humility and 
passive suffering. He believes that these character traits are not beneficial to us in any way.  
Both Dan and Hume mention the heroic virtues that are seen in Hume’s History of England. I 
will talk more of individual cases in chapter 4 section 4 but for now the key traits that are most 
valued in leaders are courage, greatness, love of glory which Hume sees as, “either nothing but 
a steady and well-establish'd pride and self-esteem, or partakes largely of that passion. Courage, 
intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind, 
have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from 
that origin” (THN 3.3.2.13; SBN 599-600). Pride and self-esteem provide the foundation for 
the character traits that are necessary for great leaders to develop and nourish. On the other 
hand, Hume acknowledges that those with deep-set religious beliefs see the need for humility 
even in such great leaders in history. The issue between Hume and religion does not lie in just 
the virtues and vices themselves but also in the source from which virtue is grounded in. “The 
church sees vice as bringing (illicit) pleasure, Hume, however, sees virtues as grounded in 
pleasure and utility” (O’Brien. D 2012 p.298).  
The result of this is that Hume rejects the monkish/ religious virtues and morality and instead 
he offers an “alternative, secular, naturalistic account of virtue, one based on social and 
personal interested and grounded in our sympathetic responses to others. For Hume, “religious 
morality can be vicious, perverse and even comical” (O’Brien, 2012, p.298) He is adamant that 
the sense of virtue that is received from religion is deluded due to its moral failings.  
In his paper; ‘On Pride’ Lorenzo Greco also acknowledges the Christian view of pride as a sin 
and he intends to show how Hume sees pride as beneficial to the flourishing of society whilst 
simultaneously affecting the agent;  
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“Pride stabilizes the virtuous agent by creating a virtuous circle  
between  our  desire  for  self-appraisal  and  our  aspiration  to  act  
morally. When seen through the Humean lens, pride reveals itself to be 
valuable both for the individual and for the community, hence 
qualifying as a virtue to all intents and purposes.” (Greco, 2019, p.120). 
 
A note on motivation, pride is useful for us because it acts as a motivation to act, for example 
to work hard, to be a good virtuous person in various ways. Another way that one understands 
pride is that it provides a motivation to continue to work towards actions that are valued by the 
others. It is thought that proud individuals have more leadership skills. The idea is that pride 
has adaptive ends, it motivates people to act in certain ways in order to illicit the same reactions. 
“…the success of a peer or an in-group represents a unique situation in which an individual can 
engage in behaviours that benefit the group or peer and themselves.” (Davies and Williams, 
2017, p.43)   
Now feeling pride has been outlined, I want to introduce the question as to whether we can feel 
proud of other people. How would Hume feel about the phrase ‘I am so proud of you,’ does 
the mechanism allow for us to feel pride in another person if they act cannot be ascribed to our 
own self?  
 
6. Pride in Others  
If a parent is proud of their child, are they feeling pride in their child’s achievements or their 
own parenting skills? If the passion of pride is so inextricably linked to the self, as Hume would 
suggest, then does it make sense to state that I am proud of the achievements/ actions of others? 
Perhaps if we were to state that raising a good child reflects my parenting skills, so in fact, I 
am directly linked to the success of my child. Then, the issue arises; do what extent do we 
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influence the actions of others and do they contribute to our sense of self? A key point of 
relevance here is to realise that Hume thinks it is ok to feel pride in something so long as there 
is a connection-via the principle of association- with the self. So, parents and children are 
connected via causation (they are the cause of their children coming into existence) and also 
perhaps via resemblance (children are like their parents) and contiguity (they may live 
together.) However, there are cases whereby the connecting factor is less clear.  
Often parents are incredibly proud of their child for achieving something because they think 
their parenting skills are the cause of their child’s behaviour. For example, in one case, if a 
child is exceeding in their academic study, it is the result of the parents’ strict study regiment 
and emphasis on the importance of studying. If we look at it from the other end of the spectrum, 
there may be parents who do not wish to have their parenting style associated with their child’s 
shameful and disrespectful behaviour. They do not want to be seen as the cause of the child’s 
behaviour. So perhaps, in this respect, they want to stay away from the association. The shame 
they feel may also contribute to their self-conception. Pride and humility both are involved in 
the construction of the self. They come to see themselves as poor parents. I think we should 
differentiate between parents who are proud of their children for what they have achieved of 
their own accord and parents who actively and directly impacted their child’s behaviours. This 
could be an instance where the child perhaps does not even want to be included in the activity, 
they may do it for the public image. A recent example is when wealthy celebrity parents Lori 
Looughlin amd Mossimo Giannuli paid a substantial amount of money and made their 
daughters Olivia Jade and Isabella Rose pose for fake photos of them playing sports in order 
to get them into a prestigious university even though they did not qualify. This is because in 
their circle of friends, it was frowned upon if your child did not attend a top university, in order 
to appease them they acted in a way so they would feel pride in their child’s achievements even 
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if they are grounded in lies. In relation to this example, Anti Kauppinen (2016) postulates a 
type of pride that tells a story.  
“The shape of the story, roughly, is that there was something 
challenging that needed to be done to promote or protect some good, 
and I did it. Sometimes the story is true and the pride warranted, and 
sometimes it’s not. Either way, someone who feels proud of what she’s 
done thereby regards her life as having been at least somewhat 
meaningful. Her pride motivates her to keep doing the same sort of 
thing” (Kauppinen, 2016, p.169). 
Kaupinnen’s view mirrors that which I expressed earlier in the section 3 of this chapter; the 
pride integrates into a story form, the memories and the results from the pride simultaneously 
work as a motivational force. Whilst Hume believes that pride constitutes the self, it is 
interesting to explore the realm of pride beyond the self and this is what Lisa Williams and Joel 
Davies talk of in their paper: Pride Felt in Relation to Others. Pride cannot just be related to 
the self as the paper begins;  
“…. Viewing pride in reference to only the self fails to capture the full 
range of pride. In fact, it is not just ‘proud of me’, but also ‘proud of 
you’ and ‘proud of us’ that characterizes the family of pride 
experiences. As we argue herein pride is not simply self-orientated it 
can also take other-oriented forms” (Davies and Williams, 2017, p.43). 
They highlight that pride is seen as social emotion and the fact that it cannot be restricted to 
the self, highlights this idea. The social emotions encapsulate the present, past and future. They 
look to two key ‘other-oriented’ forms of pride: Vicarious Pride and Group-Level Pride:   
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a. Vicarious Pride: “arises in response to the success of a close other such as family 
member, romantic partner or close friend” (Davies and Williams, 2017, p.43). 
b. Group- level Pride: “arises when a social group to which one belongs or with which 
one affiliates achieves a success” (Davies and Williams, 2017, p.43). 
Williams and Davies use functionalist approaches to emotion to show how these other forms 
of pride produce adaptive social outcomes. This account sees emotions as “responses to 
environmental challenges and opportunities that promote functional, adaptive outcomes that 
serve to meet these challenges and take advantage of those opportunities” (Davies and 
Williams, 2017, p.44). Studies have shown that emotions serve social functions and 
communication through expression of one’s feelings is vital to serve ones’ social needs.  
Success of a political party or sports team you may support are examples of group-level pride 
and this is prominent in most people. This focus on the group can lead to group-oriented 
decisions. The group level pride seems to have aspects of resemblance because even if you are 
not part of that group, like a sports team, it seems to be the extent to which you identify with 
that group which plays a role in feeling pride.  Even though the pride we may feel for a political 
party could be stronger because we may have contributed to the success with our votes, 
however there is an increased level of pride in sports teams for example and the person is need 
not have necessarily directly contributed to their success, except maybe through support. 
“Sports fans, who only claim to have contributed to their team’s win in 
the most abstract of senses claim the win as their own (‘We 
Won’)…..The subjective sense of having contributed, regardless of 
objective contribution, is like the active ingredient in eliciting group-
level pride” (Davies and Williams, 2017, p.49).  
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Now that group-level pride has been discussed, it is important to introduce ‘Vicarious Pride’ 
which means that “most people are likely to have the subjective experience of feeling proud of 
another person’s achievements” (Davies and Williams, 2017, p.51) The emotions that are 
experienced by the self are also experienced in response to the behaviours of others, whether 
this be pride or shame. For example, in a strict religious community, a family may feel shame 
over the wrongdoing of one of their family members and similarly feel pride in the achievement 
of another family member.  
Interesting Williams and Davies three psychological processes that can be considered as 
antecedents of pride; they are empathy, social comparisons and liking.  Now the term empathy 
and its description is just a repeat of the Humean sympathetic response through an emotional 
contagion. They recognise that a self-conscious emotion need not necessarily be felt in order 
to feel the emotion of another. “This idea is not far-fetched: if you ever watched a televised 
talent show, you will have likely experienced vicarious embarrassment when watching a 
performer who was failing miserably but has no awareness of just how bad their performance 
really was (and therefore feels no embarrassment herself)” (Davies and Williams, 2017, p.52). 
The second process includes social comparisons which “involve the evaluation of one’s own 
abilities and performance relative to another’s abilities and performance” (Davies and 
Williams, 2017, p.52). In the social comparisons, we could do better or worse than the 
individual we are comparing ourselves to and this can ultimately illicit a positive or a negative 
response.  
An example that Davies and Williams use encapsulates 4 key processes that we find during 
comparison; Reflection, Shared fate, perspective-taking and contrast.   
“To illustrate, consider a married couple, John and Sarah. In response to John’s Steller 
performance at a marathon, Sarah may feel that others view her more positively because of her 
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association with an athletic person (reflection.) In response to Sarah’s work promotion and 
associated pay raise, John may see the benefit to shared finances (shared-fate) or might imagine 
Sarah’s joy at receiving the promotion (perspective-taking.) All three of these cases would lead 
to relatively positive affective responses. Alternatively, if self-evaluation contrast occurs, John 
may feel inferiority concerning his own career success and Sarah her athletic ability, hence 
leading to the experience of relatively negative emotions.” (Davies. J, Williams. L 2017 p.53)  
Following on with Hume’s limitations on Pride that I have mentioned in section 3 of this 
chapter, I will use the second limitation alongside Pauline Chazan’s example of the acrobat to 
show the importance Hume sees in comparison.  
7. Pride and Comparison  
Hume acknowledges that things that may not produce pride, may still produce in us joy and 
pleasure. So, things that are agreeable and disagreeable to us do not necessarily produce pride 
and humility in us. The second limitation that Hume presents is that we; 
“ We likewise judge of objects from comparison than from their real 
and intrinsic merit; and where we cannot by some contrast enhance 
their value, we are apt to overlook even what is essentially good in 
them” (THN 2.1.6.4; SBN 291-2). 
These qualities of the mind produce a limitation to pride and like I mentioned previously above 
these have become familiar to us through custom. 
One key example to illustrate pride in action is one of the acrobat:    
An audience watching an acrobat perform will cause them pleasure by viewing her skill, 
suppleness and agility. The acrobat’s perception of this will cause her to feel proud. However, 
one must consider that the pleasure may just be a result of the audience admiring the suppleness 
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and agility displayed as a skill alone and not something that is necessarily related to that 
particular acrobat. One asks then, is the acrobat’s pride justified if the audience would have the 
same response to any other acrobat displaying the same performance? Perhaps the situation 
would be different if there was a special sentimental story attached to that particular acrobat. 
For example, if she was injured in such a way whereby an acrobatic performance would have 
required an immense amount of dedication and hard work, then there would be a connection 
between the beauty of the agility and that person. In the case at hand, the skills could be 
performed by anyone and that would still leave the audience in awe and feeling pleasure. The 
acrobat feels proud of herself as one who is supple and agile, showing a skill that most people 
do not have, her pride is possessive.  
The audience’s reaction becomes essential to her sense of self, because in her imagination, she 
now has a picture of herself as someone who is supple and agile. Her capacity to make an 
audience feel an amount of pleasure also becomes part of her self-conception. In turn, if the 
self-worth she gets from this experience is high then the value she places on the audience will 
also be high.  On Hume’s view, the acrobat’s self-conception is not prior to her pride, the 
audience’s pleasure is not taken as pleasure directed at a self that already exists before these 
feelings of pride. The pride comes into being as the self comes into being, a simultaneous 
manifestation. One of these does not precede the other. There exists between these two, 
according to Chazan a kind of ‘mutual construction.’   
Chazan’s reconstruction of Hume shows both self and pride as dependent on a ‘psychological 
contingency.’  
   “The pleasure is ‘taken as’ or ‘seen as’ pleasure directed at her 
self……in making the object of the pleasure her self, the acrobat 
simultaneously constructs this object.” (Chazan, 1992, p.51)   
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The pleasure only turns into pride because the acrobat is taken the audience’s response in a 
certain way. The reaction, in itself, does not create pride. In Chazan’s reconstruction, the idea 
of self always accompanies pride: the idea of myself as having certain qualities and pride and 
simultaneous constructs. Even though we cannot have pride or self without one another, neither 
one of these is a ‘given.’ What is actually known is that the acrobat’s pride from the audience’s 
pleasure which might not correspond to the reality of the reason for the pleasure. Hume’s 
account of virtue and vice allows for physical attributes to count as virtues, he is also aware 
things like beauty and broad shoulders as being virtuous; a proposition that is not popular 
among virtue theorists.  Her capacity to make an audience feel an amount of pleasure also 
becomes essential to her self-conception. The acrobat’s self-conception is not prior to her pride, 
the audience’s pleasure is not taken as pleasure directed at a self that already exists before these 
feelings of pride.  Although it could be argued, on Hume’s account, that the acrobat will have 
a sense of self before the performance that is derived from previous instances of her feeling 
pride. This could include other performances in the past. The pride comes into being as the self 
comes into being, a simultaneous manifestation. One of these does not precede the other. There 
exists between these two, according to Chazan a kind of mutual construction.   
“The pleasure is ‘taken as’ or ‘seen as’ pleasure directed at her 
self……in making the object of the pleasure her self, the acrobat 
simultaneously constructs this object” (Chazan, 1992, p.51).  
The idea that she is the possessor of suppleness and agility becomes part of her self-conception, 
this pride reinforces the idea of herself as a self with such and such qualities. It is both the idea 
of herself and her pride are “systematic effects of the system of perceptions: neither can be 
separated from the other; nor can they be separated from the system.” (Chazan, 1992, p.53)  
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However, one must consider that the pleasure may just be a result of the audience admiring the 
suppleness and agility displayed as a skill in itself and not something that is necessarily related 
to that particular acrobat. One asks then, is the acrobat right in feeling pride,  if the audience 
would have the same response to any other acrobat displaying the same performance? Perhaps 
the situation would be different if there was a special sentimental story attached to that 
particular acrobat. For example, if she was injured in such a way whereby an acrobatic 
performance would have required an immense amount of dedication and hard work, then there 
would be a connection between the beauty of the agility and that person. In the case at hand, 
the skills could be performed by anyone and that would still leave the audience in awe and 
feeling pleasure. Granted this would be a special case and the audience would perhaps feel 
more pleasure in this case, however, Hume would maintain the acrobat can still feel pride.  The 
acrobat feels proud of herself as one who is supple and agile, showing a skill that most people 
do not have, her pride is possessive.  
 The pleasure only turns into pride because the acrobat takes the audience’s response in a 
certain way. The reaction, in itself, does not create pride. In Chazan’s reconstruction, the idea 
of self always accompanies pride: the idea of myself as having certain qualities and pride are 
simultaneous constructs. Even though we cannot have pride or self without one another, neither 
one of these is a ‘given.’ What is actually known is that the acrobat’s pride from the audience’s 
pleasure, might not correspond to the reality of the reason for the pleasure. The acrobat’s pride 
and self are both her own constructs. The acrobat’s performance is  a praiseworthy achievement 
for Kauppinen because it is completely caused, and it must show a particular skill that took 
effort and just a result of a burst of good luck. What the acrobat has achieved is something that 
was a challenge and took hard work to practice, this would be an example of agential pride and 
it is justified in this instance because the “…skilful performance meets tough authoritative 
standards either as a result of free choice or character” (Kauppinen, 2016, p.170). By agential 
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pride, Kauppinen means a praiseworthy achievement ; I will explain this in further detail in the 
next section, 7. 
The example of the acrobat shows the role of pride and comparison and mutual construction. 
There are types of pride that can be considered authentic or inauthentic and Kauppinen 
highlights this in his paper.  
 
8. Well-grounded Pride  
Kauppinen suggests that there are types of pride that are well-deserved; these being those with 
‘paradigmatic objects of pride” (Kauppinen, 2016, p.169). If the object of pride is something 
that we consider deserves praise due to it being a kind of achievement, it should be considered 
‘agential pride.’ Agential pride, which is defined as a praiseworthy achievement requires a 
level of hard work and challenge and not every achievement should be considered praiseworthy 
as they do not necessarily result in good outcomes.. “Praise is merited when we meet or exceed 
challenging and authoritative standards for an activity we are engaged in.” (Kauppinen. A 2016 
p.170) 
Hume also considers that some cases of pride are more well-grounded that others:   
“'Tis necessary to feel the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity 
to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly. And shou'd it be said, that 
prudence may suffice to regulate our actions in this particular, without 
any real pride, I wou'd observe, that here the object of prudence is to 
conform our actions to the general usage and custom; and that 'tis 
impossible those tacit airs of superiority shou'd ever have been 
establish'd and authoriz'd by custom, unless men were generally proud, 
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and unless that passion were generally approv'd, when well-grounded”  
(THN 3.3.2.11; SBN 598-9). 
I want to explore agential pride in detail, noting its two varieties. First, in authentic pride  a 
praiseworthy achievement is the result of a choice I made that I am responsible for. This 
achievement reflects my ‘thin self’ because I see myself as “the subject of free choice and 
undetermined by my inclinations, characteristics, or situation” (Kauppinen, 2016, p.169).  
Secondly, there is ‘hubristic pride’ where I am proud of bringing about something good and 
this is attributed to a lasting trait I have or an ability. This achievement represents the ‘thick 
self’ which is “my personality, character, which I need not regard as being up to me” and which, 
because I feel proud, I think of as “somehow superior to others.” (Kauppinen, 2016, p.170)    
 Authentic pride is illustrated by the phrase that “someone is proud of X”; X represents 
something that someone has done. Kauppinen dissects Authentic pride into the following: the 
characteristic expression which is “I’m proud of A”, and then the presentational content: “A is 
a praiseworthy achievement of mine, and specific efforts or choices I made play a significant 
role in explaining A.” Further, there is motivational content, which is “to continue to make 
efforts and choices resulting in A-like outcomes, to highlight my role in bringing about A” 
(Kauppinen, 2016, p.174).  Kauppinen emphasises that in the case of authentic pride it makes 
sense to state that I am proud of the achievement itself (i.e. getting a good grade on the 
mathematics exam). This feeling of pride then motivates me to do more of the same sort of 
thing that would bring about this feeling again. Without even mentioning Hume, I recognise 
him in Kauppinen’s theory because he draws attention to the relation between the self, pride 
and motivation. Kauppinen reminds us that authentic pride is indeed a self-conscious emotion, 
the achievement will always reflect the self, a self that is autonomous. “The aspect of the self 
that is reflected in the good thing is the self as the subject of will or power to make choices” 
(Kauppinen, 2016, p.174). 
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The second type of pride is illustrated when a person is “proud of herself” due to achieving 
something. This is considered the positive counterpart of shame which “similarly focuses on 
the whole self, even if it is occasioned by an individual act” (Kauppinen, 2016, p.2). Kauppinen 
further dissects  hubristic pride: the  characteristic expression is ‘I’m proud of myself’ or ‘I’m 
proud of my honesty.’ The presentational content is as follows: “A is a praiseworthy 
achievement of mine and my superior traits and abilities play a significant role in explaining 
A.” Alternatively: I have traits or abilities that (most) other people lack, and those abilities are 
conducive to praiseworthy achievements. The motivational aim is to express, develop, maintain 
and advertise the traits I’m proud of to stay who I am and to demand acknowledgment and 
deference on this kind of nature” (Kauppinen, 2016, p.175).  
This explains why pride is seen as hubristic in a negative sense, because there is no hard work 
behind the ability, it comes naturally to the individual. One could feel proud of things that are 
the result of having a certain character. Through hubristic pride, even if we feel proud of a 
specific achievement, we still look at it through the lens of our lasting character traits or talents 
that would enable something to be achieved. These character traits are described to define the 
type of person I am, these traits may also be considered as being those that would bring about 
achievements. If this is how Kauppinen defines hubristic pride then I think this the closest we 
have to the Humean understanding of pride. However, Hume would not agree entirely with the 
definition; for Kauppinen, hubristic pride implies that we are not responsible for the 
achievements because there was no hard work behind them. So, if I am born artistic, then 
creating great art is something that just comes naturally, and so, in a sense I’m not responsible 
for it, and therefore my pride is not well-grounded. According, though, to Hume’s compatibilist 
account of responsibility I am responsible for my artistic ability if it’s the result of an enduring 
character trait of mine. The fact that I am born with the ability, does not matter.  On the other 
hand, hubristic pride is the kind that focuses on the entire self, one that is focused on character 
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traits, my personality traits. This kind of pride does therefore seem to have the most 
resemblance to that implicated in Hume’s constructive account of the self which states that we 
should not judge an individual based on a single act, but on their character traits. I will say 
more about the relation between action and character in chapter 5, section 3.1. One could say 
this is an odd term, though, since “Hubris” is usually used negatively meaning something like 
excessive pride.  
Let us consider some examples of the two kinds of agential pride. An example of authentic 
pride would be myself achieving a B grade in mathematics despite the fact my practice tests 
were not a pass grade. I am proud of this achievement because it took a lot of effort, a tutor and 
extra studying in order to be able to achieve this grade. In this case, the success is the result of 
something that we could have easily chosen not to have done. Now looking at an example of 
hubristic pride, I have been chosen for a job interview because of a friend suggesting that I 
would be an asset to the company due to my talent and natural personality during customer 
service. This is considered pride because it is the result of my character traits and abilities, 
something that I cannot change and comes naturally to me because it is a part of me. If we were 
to look at these types of pride manifesting themselves today, authentic pride is also often 
associated with highly successful individuals trying to keep up a social status. It encourages 
people to continue to carry out other acts that would lead to achievements that are socially 
valued. Hubristic pride, though, has its dangers, since it may involve evaluating oneself as 
somehow better than others and this may motivate behaviours such as dominance and 
aggression.  
So even though, in both cases of pride, I have done something that reflects on my self, the path 
is different in the two cases: one reflects a choice and one reflects a lasting character trait. I 
suggest, though, that these kinds of cases can overlap. Even if in the case of authentic pride, 
we carry out an act that is worthy of pride because it took effort and hard work, the level of 
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determination and drive that I had during this process could be considered a direct result of my 
character traits or personality. For example, the fact that even though I vehemently disliked a 
subject I still worked really hard to achieve a good grade because as part of my character and 
integrity I do not want to give up once something proves too difficult. Sometimes, then, 
authentic pride can overlap with hubristic pride. Kauppinen would most likely characterize 
such hybrid cases as hubristic pride because of the role played by enduring character traits, and 
would thus not see this as deserved pride. Hume, however, would have no problem in crediting 
my success to my enduring character traits. I would be responsible for them and therefore justly 
proud.16 It seems also that hubristic pride can also have a narrative structure: 
“The story it tells is that I am an excellent fellow, who can be expected 
to be more successful when faced with challenges, and that the specific 
achievement that occasions the feeling is an indication or corroboration 
of this view of myself.” (Kauppinen, A. 2016, p.175) 
Could the use of the term ‘corroborate’ be problematic here: what if someone achieves 
something that does not accurately represent the personality traits, talents or abilities that one 
thought they already had which reflected their view of themselves? If someone acts ‘out of 
character’ it need not always be negative. For example, I may achieve a sports award which 
does not reflect any character traits that I would ascribe to myself, since I do not feel that I have 
                                                          
16 There is also a role to play for how we interpret the reactions of others. After a conversation with a customer 
at my job at the charity shop I work at, I see pleasure in her smile and tone of voice towards me. I feel pride 
because I assumed she felt pleasure from our conversation in which I said I study and work another job which is 
challenging but worth it.  However, she actually found pleasure in the fact that young people are getting more 
involved in charity work. Nevertheless, I still feel pride, which adds to my sense of self. The reaction from our 
conversation did not alone create this, rather it is how I interpreted her pleasurable response that turned the 
pleasure into pride. 
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dedication, endurance, and discipline. Despite this, though, I achieve the award. Would this be 
an instance of authentic pride? It is not clear for Hume whether one is responsible for actions 
that are out of character. Hume thinks that we are only responsible for things that are in 
character and thus it is only these that we should feel proud of. For Hume we can only feel 
proud of enduring things; character traits, for Hume, are enduring behavioural dispositions.  
“We foresee and anticipate its change by the imagination; which makes 
us little satisfy'd with the thing: We compare it to ourselves, whose 
existence is more durable; by which means its inconstancy appears still 
greater. It seems ridiculous to infer an excellency in ourselves from an 
object, which is of so much shorter duration, and attends us during so 
small a part of our existence. 'Twill be easy to comprehend the reason, 
why this cause operates not with the same force in joy as in pride; since 
the idea of self is not so essential to the former passion as to the latter” 
(THN 2.1.6.7; SBN 292-3). 
 
For Hume, we can only feel pride of enduring things, character traits for Hume are enduring 
behavioural dispositions.  After exploring the psychological mechanisms that constructs pride 
and self, there can be another level added here. The sources of pride and consequently being 
proud of our achievements can be compiled into a story. This would be a way for us to 
understand actions in our lives that we have felt pride in; we can share this information with 
others and create a narrative. For example, part of the acrobat’s narrative of her self is being a 
flexible dancer. To understand how one speaks of themselves in a story-like structure, how 
moments of pride can build a self, I will in the next chapter explore the notion that Hume could 




THE NARRATIVE SELF 
So far in the thesis, I have explained Hume’s negative and positive accounts of the self and 
now I will explore how Hume’s account relates to contemporary narrative theories of the self. 
We must appreciate the links between the Humean self and the narrative self because when we 
remember moments in our lives that we felt pride in, they become part of the story of our self. 
In this section I will look at each part of the spectrum of views taken by narrative theorists, 
Goldie, Schechtman and Strawson. Schechtman usefully articulates two distinct questions that 
are asked about the self. These are the reidentification and characterisation questions. I will 
discuss how these are relevant to Hume’s negative and positive accounts of the self. Strawson 
believes that the self cannot be narrative in structure and criticises Schechtman. Bringing the 
circle back to Hume, Greco analyses Hume and sees him as a narrative theorist which enables 
me to connect the Humean self and integrate with the narrative self. I will first start with Goldie 
and his introduction to the different kinds of narrative theory.  
 
1. Introduction to Narrative Theory   
Peter Goldie presents an introduction to narrative theory in general in his book The Mess 
Inside: Narrative, Emotion and the Mind. He immediately acknowledges that there are 
different positions in the narrative debate and for this I coin the term ‘Narrative Spectrum’. 
On one end of the spectrum, “our lives are, in some sense, lived narratives of which we are 
authors. Our lives are somehow only comprehensible through narrative explanatory 
structure” (Goldie, 2012 p.1). Our narratives are similar to the narratives of those in literature 
and this narrative is a vital part of our sense of self. On the other end of the spectrum, the role 
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of narratives is not significant at all; they are “fundamentally perspectival, and can be deeply 
distorting of reality, of truth, of objectivity, and of what it is to be a person” (Goldie, 2012, 
p.1). On this end, narratives cannot come close to defining a person. I see Goldie as lying 
between the two ends of the spectrum because he disagrees with the anti-narrativists but does 
not agree with the pro-narrativists described above. He argues that “….narrative has a very 
important role in our lives; in our thinking about our own past and about our plans for the 
future; in our thinking about how things might have been” (Goldie, 2012, p.1). Although 
Goldie does not believe the self is a narrative but does believe that narrative is an aspect of 
our lives.  We have narratives in our lives but this is not related to the metaphysical question 
of personal identity over time. 
 
Peter Goldie’s definition of narrative is as follows:  
 “A narrative or story is something that can be told or narrated, or just 
thought through in narrative thinking. It is more than just bare annal or 
chronicle or list of a sequence of events, but a representation of those 
events which shaped, organised and coloured, presenting those events, 
and the people involved in them, from a certain perspective or 
perspectives, and thereby giving narrative structure - coherence, 
meaningfulness, and evaluative and emotional import - to what is 
related.” (Goldie, 2012, p.2) 
There are two understandings of narrative, one is to see narrative as a product, the product is 
the content of what is narrated – the story that is told. If my chosen narrative is the tragic love 
story of Romeo and Juliet, the content of the narrative is the main focus.  The second is to 
understand it as a process, the process of producing a certain narrative. For example, we may 
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say the narrative of Romeo and Juliet was being told in too much detail and was taking too 
long. Goldie finds that we often focus on the product which can be better understood as 
narrative structure and also imply there is a narrator. However, he talks of films, dramas and 
plays which do not always present a narrator.  Another misconception Goldie points out is that 
narrative is necessarily for the public, that is must be written or spoken, but for Goldie this 
concept is narrow and this misconception does not take narrative thinking into account. This 
involves our thoughts and it does not have to be followed by communication of this thinking, 
so it does not have to be narrated to the public. Now it may seem that these thoughts occur 
sporadically, however, Goldie believes that narrative thinking actually helps us think through 
our narrative and the thoughts, feelings and imagination actually have a distinct narrative 
structure. For example, if I was walking alone one night and someone starts to follow me until 
I am able to lose them by running, I will get home and repeat the details of the incident in my 
own head. Goldie states that we often ‘rehearse’ a series of events in order to find a way to 
relay them to someone else, in the most accurate way or even perhaps in a more embellished 
way. The narrative already exists in my narrative thinking, the communication is based on a 
solid foundation. “Narrative thinking is narratable, communicable, but need not be publicly 
narrated or communicated to another person” (Goldie, 2012, p.4).  
The difference between narratives that remain in thought and those that are publicly narrated 
is that the first are indeterminate because they have no distinct beginning, middle and end. 
Thoughts might flip from one to another and there is no undisrupted trajectory, one minute I 
may be thinking about a problem at work whilst at the same time I am making lunch, then as I 
am thinking through the problem, I may hear the sound of the microwave which breaks this 
trajectory, meaning I have to return to think about it later.  The thoughts have not fully formed 
and they may have more substance once they are expressed out loud, but this may not always 
be the case.  
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This is the moment narrative becomes integrated with the self. Identity results from our life 
experiences being integrated into an internalized story that is constantly evolving. This is where 
the self is rooted; this story of the self not only forms our identity but it also gives us unity and 
purpose in life.  
Narrative Structure= Reconstructed past + Perceived present + Imagined future  
 [Beginning]                 [Middle]                       [End]  
 
The term story can seem to open too much room for imagination, however narrative theorists 
do believe one’s narrative has characters, episodes, a plot and themes, just like a traditional 
story structure. The key notion of the narrative theorist, as Goldie describes, is as follows: What 
makes an action, experience or psychological characteristic properly attributable to some 
person (and thus a proper part of his or her true self) is its correct incorporation into the self-
told story of his or her life. 
Emotions play a key role in the story we tell about ourselves. For example, If I am telling the 
story of someone following me in the dark, I will also comment on how scared I was feeling, 
how my heart began to beat faster, what I thought would happen to me. Goldie does comment 
on this.  Narrative thinking can take place in many different ways: usually we remember past 
events episodically, we may even hypothesise what will happen to us in the future. Goldie says 
we may “visualize what might happen; thinking through an episode of events coolly with little 
or no emotional engagement; thinking through the episode vividly and highly emotionally; 
thinking of ‘that terrible quarter of an hour when I thought that all was lost’; thinking through 
how things might have turned out differently if I hadn’t made that terrible mistake; and in lots 
of other ways, many of which cross-cut with each other” (Goldie, 2012, p.4). Consequently, in 
narrative thinking, the person can either be deeply emotionally connected or disconnected from 
the episode, and this may affect the way in which it is then narrated to someone else. The other 
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person will be aware of how influential this episode was and this can only be done through the 
emotional tone of the narrator: are they focusing more on how they felt rather than on the details 
of the event, i.e. I felt so scared that I could not remember what my stalker was wearing.  
Goldie, however, states that our lives are not identical to narratives, but this does not mean that 
our narrative does not play a part in how we live our lives.    
“We think, talk, and write about our lives by narrating or thinking 
through narratives, and how we do this can profoundly affect our lives 
as such. What emerges, then, is that our narratives of our lives, or of 
segments of our lives, can be embedded in the lives that we lead, which 
themselves are not narratives” (Goldie, 2012, p.6). 
For Goldie, a narrative is more of an aspect of our lives that is embedded in it rather than a 
description of the whole of our lives or something that constitutes our self. He believes that it 
is important to keep apart two things, that is; “a sequence of events; and a narrative or story of 
the events” (Goldie, 2012, p.7). He uses the example of when we talk to somebody about our 
holiday: the information we tell our friend is narrative in form and the friend that is listening is 
engaging in a narrative. However, the events that took place are not in themselves narrative in 
form, they are just a sequence of events. Consequently, we cannot say that our lives are 
inherently narrative in structure, but we can say that narratives are a part of our lives. 
Interestingly, when Goldie talks of personal identity, he says that the relationship between the 
narrative sense of self and personal identity is not simple. “One’s narrative sense of self as I 
conceive it really has no direct connection with the metaphysical question of one’s identity 
overtime” (Goldie, 2012, p. 117). I shall argue, though, that for Hume the narrative sense of 
self does have a connection with this metaphysical question and the self is narrative in structure. 
At the end of chapter 3, I discussed the case of the acrobat and how she can feel proud of her 
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acrobatic performance and she can think of herself over time and in terms of a narrative. This 
is because she sees the entire picture; the narrative does not just involve the performance itself 
but also the dedication to training and discipline along the way. Because of this narrative, she 
will see herself as a certain kind of acrobat; one with a specific story to tell. Thus, it seems that 
Hume is a narrative theorist in a strong sense;  I will discuss this claim in more detail in section 
4 of this chapter, when I consider why he should be seen as a narrative theorist. Now, though, 
I will move onto Marya Schechtman’s view. 
 
2.  Schechtman’s Narrative Account  
In this section, I explore Marya Schechtman’s Narrative theory. First, I need to establish her 
foundations that lie in the reidentification and characterization question. Then I will move onto 
her Narrative self-constitution view in her first book The constitution of selves (1996) and the 
revised version in her new book  Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns and the 
Unity of a Life (2014).  
Schechtman presents two kinds of narrative view that are considered two sides of the same 
coin. First, our sense of self must be narrative, and the lives of selves are narrative in structure.  
“Selves, on this view, are beings who lead their lives rather than 
merely having a history and leading the life of a self is taken 
inherently to involve understanding one’s life as a narrative and 




Further divisions of the narrative approach include the protagonist approach, where we see 
ourselves as the main character in a story we weave. The second division proposes that selfhood 
involves the ability to think in terms of narrative, rather than having a story of one’s whole life.  
“….focus on the story of a life, identifying the self with a character in 
that story, but rather on the fact that selves employ the kind of logic 
found in stories when they describe, explain and choose their own 
behaviour” (Schechtman, 2011, p.398). 
In the first distinction, seeing ourselves as the main character in a story, our narratives are 
stories told to an audience. In the second distinction, the ability to think about our lives in terms 
of narrative, selfhood is considered as the journey to good and in this instance, we must be 
conscious of the direction of our lives. Therefore, our story must at least be told to ourselves. 
Schechtman believes that we have values that underlie our lives as a whole and we use these 
to explain ourselves to others. Thus, our narratives can be told to others as well.  
 
2.1 The Reidentification Question  
When exploring personal identity, the first question we ask is what makes a person the same 
from point A to point B. The aim is to provide a criterion of personal identity over time. It is 
not just a question of how we know we are one and the same person but also what makes 
someone the same person at different times. To answer this question, the reidentification 
theorists need to focus on temporal segments of the person’s life and to determine how these 
segments are related to one another.  
“The problem of personal identity is thus generally described as the 
problem of determining what relation must hold between two ‘person-
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stages’17 to make them stages or slices of the same person” 
(Schechtman, 1996, p.8). 
The term “person-stages” needs more explanation, e.g. what is the duration of each person-
stage? Are they large sections of a person’s history or are they a moment? Person-stages are 
considered momentary in one sense and in this instance I find they can be likened to the 
Humean bundle of perceptions discussed in chapter 1, section 6. These perceptions are also 
passing and momentary. But, very quickly Schechtman identifies issues with calling person-
stages momentary as person-stages are also supposed to be identifiable stages of a person, and 
one must remember that Hume does not think bundles of perceptions  constitute personal 
identity over time. In the same way person-stages are not considered persons alone. This does 
not reflect the term person-stage. Schechtman agrees; “…They are supposed to be recognizable 
stages of a person and so are supposed to be subjects; that is, they are supposed to take actions 
and have beliefs, desires, goals, intentions and so on” (Schechtman, 1996 p.9). Hume denies 
that these passing perceptions are person-like in nature. In fact, even the bundle does not 
constitute the self. The issue here is that person-stages are too momentary to be considered 
persons, since “Beliefs, values, desires, intentions, actions and characteristics are things that 
cannot take place in an instant” (Schechtman, 1996, p.9). Even though single person-stages are 
not considered persons as they stand alone, they still need to have enough duration to show 
person-like characteristics. The problem with the reidentification question is that it aims to give 
a general criterion of identity over time using necessary and sufficient conditions to identify 
how two person-stages are stages of the same person. However, it needs to go further and 
identify what makes a person at one instant the same person at any other instant. When we 
speak of identity in everyday life, we talk of much larger time slices and temporal stages of a 
                                                          
17 She also uses the term “Person time-slices” interchangeably. 
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person.. In the next section, then, we turn to the psychological continuity theorists’ attempt to 
help us gain a better understanding of what the reidentification theorist aims to show. 
 
2.2 The Psychological Continuity Theory and the Four Features  
The aim of the reidentification theorist is to provide a criterion of personal identity that details 
the necessary and sufficient conditions to determine that different person-stages (at point A and 
point B for example) are indeed one and the same person. Schectman believes this has led to 
debate between the bodily and psychological continuity approaches to personal identity. 
Should personal identity be defined by the continuity of a single body or a single psychological 
life? At face value, bodily continuity is how we identify persons, for example, someone may 
be asked to pick out the person who robbed them in a police line-up. In this instance the person 
identifies on the basis that the person who robbed them and the one standing in front of number 
2 in the line-up is the same person; this human body is the same one that was in the past 
incident. Schechtman still believes there is another set of intuitions which are not influenced 
by the bodily continuity theory. She states that a fundamental feature of persons is that “…facts 
about their identities have deeply significant practical implications” (Schechtman, 1996, p.14).  
Schechtman says these facts have a basic role in our everyday lives and this is where the four 
features come into play. I will outline them as follows; first, moral responsibility is when a 
person can only be held responsible for their own actions. Secondly, self-interested concern is 
when there is a different kind of interest that we only have for our own future. Thirdly, 
compensation; a person can be compensated for their sacrifices by benefits that happen to them. 
Finally, survival is when I care whether I will still be alive in the future. Schechtman believes 
that these facts about identity are vital to our understanding of identity in general. 
Consequently, personal identity must be defined in terms of psychological continuity instead 
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of bodily continuity because of the practical importance of identity. Schechtman admits that 
arguments supporting psychological continuity theories tend to be hypothetical and they tend 
to be outlined in such a way where the psychological and bodily criteria are placed against each 
other and we are asked to pick the one that would define personal identity. We often assume 
that the individual will go with the psychological continuity criterion. For example, Person A 
and Person B swap psychological lives (including character, emotions, memories, past actions); 
Person A now has the psychological life of Person B and therefore they are not the same person 
even if they are in the same body. In this instance, we conclude that personal identity goes 
along with psychological continuity (Williams, 2008, p.179).   It seems that even though bodily 
continuity is used to identify persons at different times, once it is presented alongside 
psychological continuity, we tend to favour the latter account.18 
Schechtman states that when we look at thought experiments in detail, we see that identity is 
based on judgments that revolve around practical importance. Take the Lockean thought 
experiment of ‘The Prince and The Cobbler’.  
“For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of 
the prince’s past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon 
as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same 
person with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions: but 
who would say it was the same man? The body too goes to the making 
the man, and would, I guess, to every body determine the man in this 
case; wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not 
make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to every one 
besides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same 
                                                          
18 I do not go into detail on the bodily theory in this thesis but there are materials on this theory in Perry. J (2008)  
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person, and the same man, stand for one and the same thing. And 
indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and 
to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change 
them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will inquire what makes 
the same spirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or 
person in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean 
by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, 
when it is the same, and when not.” (Locke, 1689, Book II, XXVII. 15) 
She postulates that this is a case influenced by the four features.  She identifies the feature of 
moral responsibility in this case;  
“Locke tells us that we will all see that the cobbler-body is the same 
person as the prince, but that is because he is accountable for the 
prince’s actions. …we know that persons are responsible for their own 
actions; we note that in the prince and the cobbler case it seems 
appropriate to hold the cobbler responsible for what the erstwhile 
prince did and so we conclude that he is the same person as the prince” 
(Schechtman, 1996, p.17).  
Even though they are used extensively, using thought experiments is something that Kathleen 
Wilkes says we should avoid using in the philosophy of personal identity. She finds the ‘what 
if?’ scenarios bizarre and advocates that questions of identity cannot be solved ‘in thought’.. 
However, Wilkes does say that there can be credible thought experiments that are not based on 
ignorance.. We should question whether we have “successfully sketched a possible world” 
(Wilkes, 1988, p.32) or just an imaginary world whose existence is not possible. If scientific 
realities are not taken into consideration, then even; 
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“…the most imaginatively agile thought-experimenter would regard 
the hypothesis rather as science fantasy - a fairy story - than as a 
philosophically useful ‘what if….?’ question, a theoretical possibility” 
(Wilkes, 1988, pp.35-36).  
So, in the future, perhaps philosophical thought experiments should be more considerate of 
realistic possibilities.19 
For Schechtman, self-interested concern comes into play for a case where we may be 
questioning how to act and how it would affect our future self. Integrated with survival, we 
may also question whether we will be there in the future to face consequences or reap benefits 
from our actions.  Schechtman acknowledges that it is not uncommon for us to think in this 
manner and that these “considerations about affect and practical results are not drawn as 
consequences of our judgments of identity when these cases are described, instead, they 
provide the basis for those judgements, and it is assumed that in each case the judgment will 
favour the psychological continuity theory” (Schechtman, 1996, p.17).  
I would now like to move onto to Schechtman’s second main question which furthers the 
definition of identity by delving into the question of character.  
 
2.3 The Characterization Question  
Some reidentification theorists have concluded that to have a definition of identity which also 
includes the four features is illusionary; Schechtman disagrees. The question asks “….which 
                                                          
19 Wilkes (1988) delves into detail in her book Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments as to 




actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on20 are attributed to a 
given person” (Schechtman, 1996, p.73). Whilst the reidentification theorists answers the 
question as to what makes a person the same from point A to point B, the characterization 
question answers the question of what it means to attribute a characteristic to a person. This is 
where the history of a person makes an appearance; there is also an issue of what makes a 
characteristic in a person’s history truly theirs or even which characteristics are a part of that 
person’s history at all. The characterization question is something that we may ask more often 
than we think: we may see a loved one commit a crime that seems completely ‘out of character’ 
which can make us question the characteristics that we attribute to that person. History plays 
an important role in Schechtman’s approach as she emphasises that “…a given characteristic 
can be attributed to a person to a greater or lesser extent - from merely appearing in history to 
defining who he is” (Schechtman, 1996, pp.76-77). The question of what makes a characteristic 
a part of a person’s history and what makes it truly hers, are one and the same question, with 
numerous answers.  So, a person needs to be able to know which characteristics are part of 
their history but also what role they play in her history. This means that a person must determine 
which characteristics existing in her history are ones that have contributed to their identity and 
which are misleading. This veers into a narrative approach as Schechtman states the 
characterization question also asks: 
“….which characteristics are part of the story of a person’s life, and 
what role do they play in that story” (Schechtman, 1996, p.77).  
Schechtman tries to steer away from the fact that we often have an almost ‘all or nothing’ 
response to questions of personal identity; we either define persons through their bodies or 
through their psychological lives and these two possibilities are placed against each other. She 
                                                          
20 She abbreviates this as “characteristics”. 
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says that rather than being different answers to the same question, these two intuitions are 
indeed different answers to different questions. “According to this approach, our inclination to 
identify persons with their bodies arises primarily within the context of the reidentification 
question and the inclination to identify them with their psyches arises primarily in response to 
questions of characterization” (Schectman, 1996, p.68). However, if there is a biological and 
psychological question, the first thing we would think is that there is a conflict. The way 
Schechtman attempts to resolve this is by suggesting a seemingly contradictory statement that 
the questions are independent but interconnected, additionally they provide different 
perspectives on identity.21 
“I defend reidentifying persons via their bodies constrains (but does not 
determine) the kind of psychological configurations that can constitute 
a single psychological subject. On this view facts about the 
reidentification of bodies are indeed acknowledged to provide 
information crucial to settling issues about the four features and about 
identity in the sense at issue in the characterization question” 
(Schechtman, 1996, p.69). 
Schechtman does not choose sides and does not have issue with the bodily continuity theory 
reidentifying persons, but it cannot determine the psychological components that are necessary 
to constitute a single subject, i.e. the self. The characterization question however is where the 
                                                          
21 Amy Kind in her book Persons and Personal Identity believes that the reidentification question has to 
simultaneously consider three approaches; the psychological, physical and non-reductionist approaches whereas 
the characterisation question focuses on narrativity. “On this general approach, the characteristics that make a 




link between the four features and identity is highlighted and this is where Schechtman believes 
our thinking about personal identity should be focused.  
Now that I have outlined the answer to the two main identity questions, it is important to now 
describe the narrative self-constitution view as a response to the characterisation question.  
 
2.4 The Narrative Self Constitution View 
Schechtman originally put forward the Narrative Self-Constitution view as a response to the 
characterization question. This is based on the view that persons are self-creating beings and 
their lives are narrative in form. Schechtman’s view is based on the view that a person creates 
their own identity by forming an autobiographical narrative. 22 So, the self can be translated to 
literally mean “A story of my life”. This view wishes to steer away from the psychological 
continuity theory because it integrates the four features; survival, moral responsibility, self-
interested concern and compensation. Schechtman believes there is a difference between 
persons and other individuals (sentient creatures) and this is based on how the individuals 
organise their experiences, this means that persons think of themselves as persisting subjects  
Additionally, the individuals ascribe experiences to themselves; they acknowledge the 
experiences are theirs.  
“On this view a person’s identity (in the sense at issue in the 
characterization question) is constituted by the content of her self-
                                                          
22 Schechtman suggests a few theorists that also ascribe to this view, one being Jonathan Glover (1998) in The 
Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity.  
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narrative, and the traits, actions, and experiences included in it are, by 
virtue of that inclusion, hers” (Schechtman, 1996, p.94).   
In order to make sure that the self-creating persons do not construct a fake narrative or story,  
there are constraints on the narrative self-constitution view.  Schechtman sees personhood as 
an intrinsically social concept so “one needs a self-concept that is basically in synch with the 
view of one held by others” (Schechtman, 1996, p.95). The idea of the social concept of the 
self reminds me of the Humean line of thinking here. This is because the role of the ‘other’ is 
significant. The opinions held by other people in society are vital in constituting the Humean 
self. For Schechtman, the person needs to grasp the concept of a person that exists in that 
culture and “to be identity-defining an individual’s self-narrative must confirm in certain 
crucial respects to the narrative others tell of his life” (Schechtman, 1996, p.95). This also 
relates to Jackie Taylor’s claim that the pride we feel is relative to our place in society; I will 
talk of Hume and society is more detail in chapter 5, section 1.  
Why should see our lives as narrative in form, what makes theorists like Schechtman come to 
this conclusion? After all, the first thing that comes to mind when we see persons as self-
creating is the assumption that persons may fabricate their own story by painting events that 
never happened. This is not to say that all persons are deliberately weaving fake narratives, 
they could simply be mistaken about their own actions and characteristics. Now to think of 
identity as narrative in form, this does not mean that we constantly and consciously narrate a 
literal story of our lives. 23  There is also a line of thinking in narrative theory that suggests a 
                                                          
23 What if the stories we tell are influenced by our unconscious thoughts? There may be certain beliefs and 
characteristics that do not allow themselves to appear in the conscious mind or behaviour and then when they 
suddenly do appear, e.g. anger, we find that the person is acting ‘out of character’ but perhaps it was just a 
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character trait should be coherent with my experiences and that it is how we can attribute it to 
ourselves. But when I see this requirement, I wonder what criterion  we use to determine 
whether something is coherent with our experiences? The fact that something is coherent 
withother aspects of ourselves may mean that it is part of constituting our personal identity. On 
the other hand, just because something is incoherent with our experiences and character traits 
does not mean that it is not a part of our personal identity. Perhaps the traits that others see as 
‘out of character’ and ‘incoherent’ are in fact true features of our selves. If someone you 
thought you knew well, commits a horrible crime, that act may represent character traits that 
are more reflective of that person’s true identity.  
Schechtman suggests two intuitions that lead to the narrative self-constitution view.  
a. “One needs a particular kind of subjectivity and orientation towards one’s life 
(Schechtman, 1996, p.95).   
b. One’s self-conception must cohere with what might be called the “objective” account 
of her life- roughly the story that those around her would tell” (Schechtman, 1996, 
p.95).   
“There is no single narrative which is the objective story of a person’s life. Different people 
narrate a person’s life in different ways and so the “objective” narrative as I use the term is not 
monolith.” (Schechtman, 1996, p.95).   
I will now move onto Schechtman’s most recent revision of the narrative self-constitution view 
because I want to show how Schechtman’s views have evolved.   
                                                          
character trait that we were unable to see? For more information on this question, see Glover (1998) The 





2.5 The Narrative Self-Constitution View Revised  
Schechtman begins this revised account by stating that she stands “by a great deal of what I 
said when originally defending the view, I now believe that the narrative self-constitution view 
is more limited in scope than I originally thought and is also guilty of conflating questions 
about the identity of the moral self with questions about the identity of the forensic unit” 
(Schechtman, 2014, p.99). In this revised edition of the narrative self-constitution view, the 
aim is to find an alternative to the psychological continuity theory, this theory is what was 
being discussed in the characterization question. The psychological continuity theory is that 
personal identity is defined in terms of a single psychological life instead of a single human 
body. This revision also seeks to include the Lockean account whilst avoiding the criticism 
from the extreme claim: 
The Extreme Claim: “…objection raised against psychological 
continuity theories is the complaint that they cannot explain the 
practical importance we attribute to personal identity. If identity is 
defined as those theories define it, the objection goes, it does not make 
sense to hold people responsible for their past actions and there is no 
reason for a person to care about her own future well-being in a 
different way than she cares about the well-being of others” 
(Schechtman, 2014, p.35). 
This narrative self-constitution view is considered Lockean and defines personhood through 
forensic capabilities. The reason why there is an argument against psychological continuity 
theories is because they misunderstand what psychological continuity is. This is because they 
are “forced to this misinterpretation because they frame the question of personal identity as a 
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question about the reidentification of an object” (Schechtman, 1996, p100). They take identity 
to be the relation different time slices have to each other. This is incorrect because this leads to 
thinking in terms of slices of time, and these slices are in one sense seen as momentary which 
does not accurately represent what the psychological continuity theorist wished to achieve. 
Therefore Schechtman believes we should see identity in terms of narrative instead of 
psychological unity or connectedness.  
“We constitute ourselves as persons, on this view, by developing and 
operating with (mostly implicit) autobiographical narrative which acts 
as a lens through which we experience the world” (Schechtman, 2014, 
p.100).  
Persons experience the world as flowing from the past and into the future and it is in this way 
that we see the present that changes the character of experience. This narrative flow  represents 
the diachronic nature and the unity of self-consciousness. This diachronic nature is something 
that is not available in psychological continuity theories. Now it may seem that narrative 
understanding also has the time slices of the psychological continuity theories (past, present 
and future), however, it is important to acknowledge that in the narrative approach the ‘time 
slices’ are parts of the whole. So instead of seeing identity as something that is made up of 
multiple time-slices and an accumulation of person-stages, narrative theorists see an ongoing 
narrative of a person’s life and, from this, the individual moments can be separated. This is the 
response to the extreme view as it requires us to see our lives as a whole, but still continuously 
experiencing each individual moment. Consequently, if we are to experience our lives in such 
a way, there is no question as to why we would be responsible for our past actions and be 
concerned for our future ones. Schechtman’s example clearly illustrates this in action: 
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“If, for instance, the hard work I do now will be rewarded in the future 
when I achieve my goal, the Narrative Self- Constitution view implies 
that I am, right now, experiencing hard-work-in-the-service-of-a-goal 
rather than hard-work-imposed-on-me-for-the-benefit-of-another, and 
these are different experiences” (Schechtman, 2014, p.100-101).  
If I see my future reward as completion of my PhD, then this is affecting the character of my 
hard work. The experience has character because of its role in one’s narrative. Now, having an 
autobiographical nature of the narrative does not mean that we are constantly retelling our 
story, it is “cashed out mostly in terms of the way implicit understanding of the ongoing course 
of our lives influences our experience and deliberation” (Schechtman, 2014, p.101).   
Additionally, with the constraints of what constitutes a self-narrative, the narrative self- 
constitution view demands the narrative meets a reality and articulation-constraint  
(Schechtman, 2014). The narrative approach does not wish to give the opportunity for 
individuals to ascribe experiences and attributes to themselves that are simply false, so the 
reality constraint forces the individual to work from a shared conception of personhood. This 
leads to automatically following the articulation constraint as the individual can then interact 
with others socially and keep in line with the Lockean line of thought and its forensic 
dimensions. For example, people cannot just make up unrealistic events that supposedly 
occurred in their lives, like saying that you did jump off a plane when, in reality,  you did not. 
The constraints do not allow for this. The constraints placed on the narrative self-constitution 
view do not allow for people to attribute experiences, beliefs and attributes to themselves that 
are simply fictional and it requires a narrative that is social as well as individual.  
Now that I have looked at a narrative theorist, it is important to look at a criticism of the 
approach in the form of Galen Strawson; he denies the very foundations of the approach and 
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finds the analogy that our life is a story absurd. The constraints that Schechtman places on the 
narrative are unnecessary for Strawson because our lives are not narrative in structure; 
furthermore I will discuss his criticisms and the relevance to Hume.  
 
3. Strawson’s Criticism of Narrative Theory 
Galen Strawson (2018) outright denies the foundation of the narrative approach, in fact he 
begins his book Things that Bother Me: Death, Freedom, the Self etc. by listing the numerous 
assumptions of the narrative theorist that he does not believe. These include: “We make sense 
of our lives….by turning them into stories” (Strawson, 2018, p.177). The idea that we are 
stories is not a universal truth for Strawson even if it may be true for certain individuals. Even 
in these cases of storying oneself, there is hardly any accuracy to how one is presenting oneself. 
He states the “narratives, are-at best-generalizing from their own case, in an all-too human 
way” (Strawson, 2018, p.178). 
Now, before Strawson criticises the narrative approach, he wanted to get a clear definition of 
it and found it to not be a simple task. Reminding ourselves of the definition provided by Peter 
Goldie, above, Galen Strawson defines being narrative as: 
“….naturally disposed to experience or conceive of one’s life, one’s 
existence in time, oneself, in a narrative way, as having the form of a 
story, or perhaps a collection of stories, and in some manner to live in 
and through this conception” (Strawson, 2018, p.179).  
He suggests that not only can the narrativist24 conceive of their lives in a narrative manner, but 
they indeed live their lives in accordance to this narrative basis, in other words, they see 
                                                          
24 Term coined by Strawson to refer to writers who think that life is a narrative activity  
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themselves through this narrative style. The term disposition suggests some sort of natural way 
that one’s thinking is narrative, but Strawson argues that some individuals are naturally non-
narrative in their disposition; they do not follow the narrative line of thinking. As I outlined, 
Schechtman, in her narrative self-constitution view revised, claims that an autobiographical 
narrative is the medium through which we experience the world. Strawson disagrees with this 
because he cannot see it as a universal principle even though he is aware that certain 
experiences such as upbringing can affect one’s life-view. Strawson finds himself agreeing 
with Schechtman and sees himself as a creature who considers itself as itself the same thinking 
thing in different situations (times and places), but despite remembering that he does not live 
his life in the present moment. Schechtman concludes her theory by breaking down the term 
narrative, likening it to the structure of one’s life as ‘diachronic.’ Strawson agrees with the 
removal of the term narrative but sees as himself as an episodic instead of a diachronic. They 
are defined as follows:  
A. Diachronic: “One naturally figures oneself, the self or person one now experiences 
oneself to be, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the 
(further) future”  (Hutto, 2007, p.86). 
B. Episodics: “One does not figure oneself, the self or person one now experiences oneself 
to be, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) 
future” (Hutto, 2007, p.86).  
These two different types of people; the episodics and the diachronics, have opposite kinds of 
depth awareness of themselves as beings in time. Diachronics do not necessarily have to be 
narrativists but narrativistss are most certainly going to identify themselves as diachronics. 
Strawson believes the diachronic structural unity “seems to be lacking, for at least some human 
beings, in their experience of existence from moment, day to day, month to month, year to 
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year” (Strawson, 2018, p.190).  Strawson’s response is a direct reply to Kathleen Wilkes’ 
criticism of his claim that his life is episodic. She writes;  
“Morality is a matter of planning future actions, calculating 
consequences, experiencing remorse and contrition, accepting 
responsibility, accepting praise and blame; such mental phenomena are 
both forward- and backward-looking. Essentially…emotions such as 
love or hate, envy, or resentment, would not deserve the name - except 
in some occasional rare cases - if they lasted for but three seconds, and 
were thereafter claimed, not by any me, but by some former self…The 
Episodic life could not be richly moral and emotional; we must have a 
life, or self, with duration. We are, and must consider ourselves as, 
relatively stable intentional systems. Essentially” (Wilkes, 2007, p.87).  
Wilkes believes that the episodic is unable to live a fully moral life because of one of the main 
definitions of what an episodic is. The episodic does not believe that the self or any other person 
is someone that existed in the past or in the future, so how can the episodic take moral 
responsibility if they believed they were not part of the past? And how can the episodic have 
self-concern when they believe they do not exist in the future either? Additionally, the 
diachronic believes that the episodic cannot develop meaningful relationships because there 
would be no continuity of duty and friendship over time. Strawson says he reluctantly agrees 
with a lot of what she says but she has misinterpreted what an episodic is and therefore gives 
that response.  
Contrary to the diachronics’ belief, Strawson believes that an episodic can lead a full 
meaningful life despite not thinking of his life as narrative in structure.  
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“An episodic, they say, properly inhabits the realms of responsibility, 
duty and obligation - not to mention those of friendship, loyalty and so 
on” (Strawson, 2007, p.86). 
The response that Strawson gives to this diachronic claim acknowledges the differences in both 
lines of thinking: “The episodic life is certainly not the same as the diachronic life, any more 
than the non-narrative life is the same as the narrative life, but it is certainly not less moral, or 
less feeling. Nor is it less human or humane, less vivid, less understanding or less responsible. 
A happy-go-lucky person can be the best among us” (Strawson, 2007, p.87). Strawson responds 
by saying that human beings are different and they can flourish in different ways, so although 
the diachronic may see them as cold and unfeeling, it does not reduce their relationships to 
meaninglessness. For the non-narrativist this kind of psychological treatment is pointless 
because there is no special kind of influential link between the past to the present. Additionally, 
Strawson agrees that the process of self-authorship may be how some people  develop their 
sense of self but this is not a point that can be generalised; it does not apply to everyone, just 
because somebody thinks the self is created does not mean everyone does.   
“There’s an experimentally well-attested distinction between human 
beings who have the ‘emotion of authorship’ with respect to their 
thoughts, and those who, like myself, have no such emotion, and feel 
that their thoughts are things that just happen” (Strawson, 2018, p.180).  
Strawson acknowledges that somehow the narrativists believe they are the epitome of human 
autonomy; to think human life is narrative and “life-writing is not only a necessary task for any 
self-respecting human being, but also, at least in the best case, an exercise of autonomy-self-
determination” (Strawson, 2018, p.182). But, he claims, this is not the case. 
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Another belief of the narrativistss that is refuted by Strawson is the use of counterfactuals in 
their stories that add a sense of mystery and wonder to the self. For example, one could ask, 
what if I never went to this place, I would not have met my husband. These kinds of questions, 
Strawson says, make good stories but have no factual basis, after all, if a situation did not 
happen then something else would have happened. Therefore the ‘What if?’ question should 
not be considered in the first place. Strawson is not against using the phrase “awareness of an 
aspect of one’s essence” (Strawson, 2018, p.184).  
 For Strawson, even if we understand narrative as some sort of unity of life, this still is an act 
of self-deception. Strawson does not deny that we have a kind of psychological identity and 
there is no question that we have a past; he even states that we might have a kind of life 
“story”,25 but this does not mean he is prepared to say his self is constituted of these factors 
since he states this understanding cannot possibly be universal. With there being gaps in 
memory and unreliable knowledge of what happened in our past, the best we can ever have is 
bits and pieces of self-knowledge. “I don’t spend time constructing integrative narratives of 
myself - or my self - that selectively recall the past and wishfully anticipate the future to provide 
my life with some semblance of unity, purpose, and identity” (Strawson, 2018, p192).  
Schechtman, however, argues that all selves are inherently narrative, not allowing for 
Strawson’s proposition that some selves are inherently non-narrative. She acknowledges that 
Strawson identifies and rejects two kinds of narrative approach. Firstly, the idea that humans 
experience their lives in narrative form; secondly it is essential to experience our lives as 
narrative because it helps us define personhood. Strawson uses “I” (me, mine and so on) to 
represent “that which I experience myself to be when I’m apprehending, myself specifically as 
a self or inner subject considered as something different from GS, i.e. the human being that I 
                                                          
25 He uses this in speech marks as well. 
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am considered as a whole” (Strawson, 2007, p.87). He argues that I understand the past is mine 
as I see myself as a human being and I also understand that this past can have a link to me today 
or now. “Simultaneously I don’t think it is obvious that I was there in the past, it is not fact that 
I was there” (Strawson, 2007, p.87). 
Schechtman evaluates Strawson’s criticism and immediately recognises that his denial of any 
kind of unity in life does not apply to all kinds of narrative theory. It only is applicable to 
accounts that insist selfhood is the capacity to think in narrative terms.26 This is how 
Schechtman breaks down Strawson’s criticism: “…either narrative views are too demanding 
to be plausible or they are not ‘narrative’ in any sense”. She also says “either the narrative view 
really demands that our lives and self-understandings are like literature in some strong sense 
or it does not” (Schechtman, 2011, p.408). The former criticism allows room for Strawson’s 
episodic life to be a counter-example. But if we consider the latter criticism then there is a risk 
of the narrative approach becoming trivial; for example, if making a cup of tea is considered a 
part of one’s narrative and involves narrativity then there will be plenty of narratives of this 
nature. This means that the narrative approach becomes trivial and the value of it as a definition 
of selfhood is reduced.  Schechtman believes the Hermeneutical theorists (those who hold that 
the self inherently involves understanding one’s life as a narrative and simultaneously enacting 
this life) should respond to Strawson’s claim to be living an episodic life by arguing that   
episodicity is actually narrative in structure. When Strawson calls himself an episodic, he 
“precisely tells us something about his deeper nature and the values that shape his life as a 
whole” (Schechtman, 2011, p.408-409). She is referring to when Strawson calls the episodic a 
happy-go-lucky person and how these kinds of people can actually be the best among us. He 
uses terms such as ‘blessed’ and ‘profound’ to describe the episodics and Schechtman states 
                                                          
26 Schechtman calls the theorists who have this approach, Hermeneutical theorists.  
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these are indeed ethical terms. Additionally these traits are visible in literary characters and the 
actual process of wanting to distance oneself from a restricting unity can actually be considered 
a quest for a kind of narrative of one’s life.  Furthermore, Schechtman’s narrative self-
constitution view  can be used to claim that the “…way in which Strawson recognises all of 
the actions and experiences of GS as having implications for how things are for him and for 
what he must do is all that is required for a self-narrative” (Schechtman, 2011, p.409).  
However, Schechtman is aware of how Strawson could respond to this criticism:,he would say 
that if his description of the episodic life seems narrative in nature, then he would claim that 
this narrative is something that just inherently exists within us. If this is the case, then the 
narrative theorists cannot possibly claim that a narrativist life is more meaningful because 
everyone just has this life anyway. Schectman reminds us that a lot of narrative theorists state 
that we cannot not have a narrative so this would not be an issue for those theorists.  
“But if any set of preferences counts as an ethical orientation or a quest 
for a good, the claim that someone has a self-narrative in even the 
strongest sense proposed seems to collapse into a claim that selves have 
some set of characteristics and need a basic understanding of the 
unfolding of events, and this does seem trivial” (Schechtman, 2011, 
p.409).  
In the second part of Strawson’s criticism, a self-narrative does not necessarily need to have 
characteristics that exist in literature. Schechtman states that if we are to say this, we need to 
explain in what sense it is a narrative and by doing this we do not accept the criticism that the 
narrative approach is trivial. Schechtman gives a response on behalf of the narrative theorist: 
she says that to say that selves are narrative in structure is to simultaneously claim that the self 
cannot be reduced to a physical criterion. She states there is a “way in which human actions 
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hang together that is characteristic and purposive” (Schechtman, 2011, p.409).  She states that 
just because we include everyday actions (such as making tea) in our narrative, it does not 
make them trivial and it does not take away from the fact that our life as a whole is narrative 
in form.  
Schechtman recognises another disagreement between Strawson and the Narrativists and this 
is in the definition of the self. Strawson defines self just in terms of subjectivity and ignores 
agency. For Schechtman this opens up a whole set of questions for the narrative theorist 
concerning self-consciousness “….and the capacity to know oneself as oneself” (Schechtman, 
2011, p.410). Schechtman admits that this exposes an unfilled gap in the narrative approach 
because “…it is not always evident where the brute phenomenological experience of oneself 
as a self distinct from others fits into the whole picture” (Schechtman, 2011, p.410).   
Strawson says that narrativists often do not believe the non-narrativists are as episodic as they 
claim. Here Strawson mentions Schechtman’s understanding of self-narration in her Narrative 
Self-Constitution View which requires a full self-narrative in order to understanding the self. 
One of the key objections to Strawson lies in his acceptance of a part of Schechtman’s theory. 
Surprisingly Strawson prefers Schechtman’s view that one’s self narrative can be mostly 
implicit and unconscious because it actually allows her to claim that non-narrativists may be 
narrative without even being aware of it. Schechtman believes that the criticisms presented by 
Strawson do not dismantle narrative theory because they can be met with logical responses. 
Continuing on the narrative path, I will now explore the claim that Hume can be seen as a kind 
of narrative theorist, by  focusing on the work of Lorenzo Greco. 
1. Greco’s Humean Narrative Theory  
Lorenzo Greco in his paper ‘The Self as Narrative in Hume’, defends Hume’s narrative view 
of the self. Referencing Myra Schechtman, who I have discussed above, Greco believes that 
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Book 1 of the Treatise is a response to Schechtman’s reidentification question: What makes a 
person the same at different times? Moreover Books 2 and 3 are a response to the 
characterization question: What actions, experiences and character traits should be attributed 
to a particular person? This response is focused on practical concerns.   
“…I maintain that whereas in Book 1 Hume is using his philosophical 
empiricism to provide his own version of the problem of how to 
recognise persons as the same at different times, in Books 2 and 3, he 
is presenting selves from a different, both sentimental and ethical 
standpoint, as the focus of people’s concerns” (Greco, 2015, p.699).     
Greco maintains that Books 2 and 3 present us as people with enduring character traits, those 
which explain the way we act and our relations with others, and those towards which we 
sometimes feel pride and humility. In these Books, Hume has a ‘sentimentalist virtue ethics’ 
(Greco, 2015, p.699) which is based on judging whether another’s character traits are a virtue 
or a vice. Greco does not think there is a contradiction between the scepticism presented in 
Book 1 and his positive account of the self. Instead we need to focus on the narrative component 
of Hume’s self. To understand Hume as a narrative theorist would be to give a convincing 
picture of the Humean self as a “flesh and blood agent” (Greco, 2015, p. 700). Hume’s 
sentimentalist account of human nature allows us to see Hume as a narrative theorist. Moving 
away from the bundle theory in Book 1, Greco finds importance in “The self-consciousness 
generated by our being proud and humble in relation to ourselves” (Greco, 2015, p.708). Greco 
thinks Hume’s positive account of the self has similarities to the modern narrative conception 
of self. The Humean understanding of self as narrative is that of a being who is consciously 
aware that they have characteristics of which they are morally proud or humble. 
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“It is my view that reference to the feeling side of human nature is what 
allows us to see the Humean self in a narrative light” (Greco, 2015, 
p.701). 
Greco argues that it is wrong to conclude from Hume’s account that there is no self. So, at what 
point does Hume answer the characterisation question? Greco highlights that the source of the 
self is the “self-consciousness generated by our being proud or humble in relation to ourselves” 
(Greco, 2015, p.708). He also suggests that we could interpret this as Hume not steering too 
far away from his propositions in Book 1 because he still describes the passions of pride and 
humility as being a succession of related ideas and impressions. When, however, we feel these 
passions, we feel a sense of concern in ourselves, not only for our future but also for our past 
and this is what makes different experiences connected in a whole and thus we start to see 
ourselves in narrative terms.  
“Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are 
always consider'd with a view to ourselves; otherwise they wou'd never 
be able either to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease 
or diminution of them. When self enters not into the consideration, 
there is no room either for pride or humility” (THN 2.1.2.2; SBN 277). 
We are connected to other human beings on a “sentimental level” (Greco. L 2015 p.709). 
“Specifically, the “characterization question” is fully answered by the 
self-consciousness we have of ourselves as possessors of virtuous and 
vicious characteristics in relation to which we become objects of each 




The account of self-consciousness that Greco presents seems to lie in the social self. We, as 
individuals, become aware of ourselves as beings who possess virtues and vices. In turn, we 
become morally evaluated or even judged by others. Through the mechanism of sympathy, we 
do not see ourselves as mere bundles of perceptions, we become unified selves. The only way 
that this unified self makes sense is to understand the self from a practical point of view as a 
moral agent..  
“Thus it seems to me that his reflections on pride and humility in 
determining the self as a feeling and agential entity clearly exhibit this 
primacy of practice” (Greco, 2015, p.710). 
 This is reflected in the importance Hume places on the social side of human nature. We may 
understand and be intimately conscious of our sentiments and actions, however it is the 
response we get from others through sympathy that also contributes to our self. Hume is not 
just asking what the status of the self is in reference to the mind, but he begins to look at the 
non-metaphysical self which is characterised by practical and  moral concerns.  
  
The role of the past and present are vital in Greco’s narrative interpretation of the Humean self. 
This Humean self is “able to trace a connection between the events of our past and present and 
to project ourselves into the future by conceiving ourselves as individuals with specific 
characteristics in relation to which we are proud and humble” (Greco, 2015, p. 711). So, the 
glue that holds together each part of one’s beginning, middle and end is the awareness that we 
have good and bad characteristics and the defining factor is pride and humility. Our past gives 
meaning to our present and gives us motivation with our future in mind.  The unitary self, the 
cohesive whole that is lacking in Book 1, finds its roots in Books 2 and 3. Our individual stories 
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give meaning to the consciousness we have of our characteristics. This understanding also 
gives us motivation to act in a manner that would affect our future states.  
However, Greco acknowledges an immediate criticism that could be levelled at him for 
interpreting Hume in this way. Hume does not think memory is sufficient in relating one’s 
experiences with each other and certainly not enough to shape one’s sense of self.  The reason 
why memory is an issue for Hume is because it is not enough that one simply remembers things, 
there must be an accompanying self-understanding that takes those memories and understands 
that they are constituent parts of one’s life. This self-understanding cannot be fulfilled without 
the feeling or passionate element of the self; this element allows the self to be concerned with 
their past actions and acknowledge their influence on the present self.  
“To have this, the philosophical capacities of the understanding alone, 
such as memory are insufficient. A feeling element seems to be 
required, whereby the agent comes to be concerned with moments of 
his or her past that he or she recognises as fundamental in shaping who 
he or she has become at present” (Greco, 2015, p.711).  
Greco believes that Hume’s sentimental understanding is what makes this easier to understand, 
and specifically the role played by the passions of pride and humility.The sentimental 
understanding establishes a correlation between our past moments and experiences and the 
present, and this gives us a negative or positive feeling towards that moment. We then create a 
certain picture of ourselves concerning what kind of individual we are. 
“Moreover, by being pleasant and painful passions, they provide the 
indirect motivation, to pursue our goals and aims given the present 
conception we have of ourselves, hence providing a ‘centre of narrative 
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gravity’ that allows us to see ourselves as unified selves” (Greco, 2015 
p.711).  
 The positive and negative nature of the passions givs us motivation to act in a certain manner. 
The fact that pride and humility may provide us with motivation, brings a normative aspect to 
the Humean account; the agent knows that acting in a certain way will result in the future of 
said agent to be positively or negatively affected.  
“…if we are able to tell stories of ourselves following a coherent line, 
such that our existence appears as a form of narrative identity, this is 
due to our reflecting the multiplicity of opinions that others have 
concerning us” (Greco, 2015, p.713).  
The passions that give us pain and pleasure provide us with the motivation to pursue goals and 
provide what Greco calls a “centre of narrative gravity” that allows us to see the connection 
that make us unified selves. The stories that we are able to tell of ourselves are crucial since 
we naturally reflect on the opinions that others have about us through the sympathetic 
mechanisms described in chapter 3. Others in our social circle help us form unbiased opinions 
of ourselves. By internalising these opinions, we develop virtuous characteristics in accordance 
to the common moral point of view.  
Further, Greco highlights the idea that pride is not based on individual actions or even on 
individual character traits, but on a person’s entire character and this is where the self as 
narrative would enable us to speak of the entirety of our character. We do not feel pride in 
particular virtues, but on how they work together to make a unitary self. In Hume's History of 
England (1778), his character sketches show how one's moral virtues and character are judged. 
The virtuous character of the minister, for example, is described through his behaviour, as a 
whole, because even when he had great power, he did not want to dominate: He was a man 
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who had been steady to the crown, yet he never showed, even in the most difficult times a  
disposition to enslave or oppress the people” (Hume, 1778 p.1. full vol.). Page numbers refer 
to those detailed at davidhume.org and for a full volume it is a continuous prose on one page. 
Hume, (1778), History of England. from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 
1688, 6 vols. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Press. 
 
However, this reputation becomes tarnished by some accusations of gaining the king’s 
affections by immoral means; the entirety of their character is thus bought into question here 
despite the positives of his reign. (Hume, 1778 p.1. full vol.) The Earl of Leister’s moral 
character is immediately brought into question: The violence, ingratitude and treachery of his 
behaviour gave a very bad idea of his moral character.  However, this is followed by an 
appreciation of his virtues, such as courage and the ability to manage people with his military 
skills and political ability. He was able to govern men and business, these are considered virtues 
that build part of his character. (Hume, 1778 p.1. full vol.) is gradually better known by the 
public and they find him gentle and humane, a true human being, he was receiving impressions 
from those surrounding him, we see the importance for Hume of the opinions of others in our 
own self-conception, and although they admired him in this way, they found him lacking in 
some desirable qualities of a leader; for example he was unfit to conduct war; without policy 
or art, he was ill-fitted to maintain peace. Despite the character of the king being kind and 
gentle, he lacked some characteristics of a king that were needed  (Hume, 1778 p.1. full vol.). 
 
The unitary character of the self comes from our feeling of pride in conjunction with how others 
view us, from the mechanism of sympathy. As the social nature of our self is important, would 
a recluse be able to have a developed sense of self compared to a social being?  I think social 
interaction is vital because even in the character sketches, part of their moral character is 
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derived from how the public viewed them: they worshipped the Earl of Leister like a Saint, for 
example, even after his death, despite some of his moral shortcomings. The character of the 
King became more and more well-known with each passing day and received nothing but 
affection from others around him; other traits such as being unfit to conduct war did not come 
in the way of the impressions he received from those he loved. I think Hume’s traits personify 
the idea that we need others, and that we are social beings that depend upon the opinions and 
sentiments of others. It could therefore be argued that being a recluse with no social interaction 
would leave one void of an identity or sense of self that is built by others through sympathy 
because it is these interactions that build our self.  
For the narrative theorist, simply a Humean bundle of experiences would not hold enough 
substance to make a person; a moral agent. The experiences we do have must be unified into 
the life of one narrative ego, and this unification is represented through the story the individual 
tells of themselves and thinks about themselves. It is this story that structures one’s experience.  
Without the narration of this story, the experiences we have would be meaningless, singular 
events without a role in a unified narrative. Therefore it becomes necessary to look to Hume’s 
second and third Book of the Treatise, pulling away from the bundle theory as Greco does in 
his interpretation. Greco says that Hume’s narrative self:  
“consists in the self-consciousness people develop as bearers of 
characters of which they can be morally proud and humble. It is my 
view that reference to the feeling side of human nature is what allows 
us to see the Humean Self in a narrative light; but I also think the 
reference frames the Humean self in a distinct way when compared 
with other proposals concerning the relationship between narrative and 
self” (Greco, 2015, p.701).  
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We are self-conscious of our virtuous and vicious characteristics, according to Greco. I am 
suggesting it is my having and being able to think about a narrative that enables me to better 
understand what kind of person I am.  This does not mean that just any narrative, such as one 
including what I had for lunch, would mould my sense of identity; it is the emotional influential 
narratives that shape my sense of self. For example, if I defended someone who was being 
racially abused, I may become visibly shaken. I play through the narrative in my thinking, and 
when I voice this narrative I become proud of the lengths I am willing to go to defend my 
beliefs and my level of courageousness. The character trait of courage becomes brighter 
because of the narrative and the resultant pride I feel in my behaviour; I see it more clearly and 
I see it practically. If this experience had not happened, I would not be able to see myself in 
such a light. This emotional narrative is not me, but the influence of it helps me to understand 
who I am as a person; it contributes to my sense of self.  
Here, it is important to recognise that the Humean mechanisms of sympathy  are of fundamental 
importance to this narrative interpretation of his account of the self. We look to the opinions 
and approval and disapproval of others, and these become a part of the picture we form of 
ourselves through sympathy. We then approve or disapprove of the image we have of 
ourselves, and  this helps us develop “unbiased narratives of ourselves” (Greco, 2015, p.713).  
“Furthermore, sympathy does not only pass from others to ourselves, 
but also from ourselves to ourselves. Our concern for our future can be 
read as a form of sympathy for the person we will become, that is, for 
that individual who will be the result of the purposes, the aspirations, 
and the projects that give meaning to our present existence” (Greco, 
2015, p.713).  
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Sympathy is what enables us to see the self in the future because it goes beyond the pleasures 
and pains that we feel in the present. When we say that we are concerned about ourselves, we 
realise that we are guided by motives that do not just affect us in the present but also concern 
the future long-term consequences and the next section will explore this in further detail. In 
therapy a person is often transported back into their past and forward into their future, and the 
person can feel sympathy not only with others but with different aspects of themselves. If, in 
therapy, one is essentially telling a story of oneself, then to sympathise with different parts of 
ourselves in our timeline, we must see ourselves through a narrative structure. I will further 
investigate the Humean narrative self by turning to Jane McIntyre’s interpretation of sympathy 
with our past and future selves.  
4.1 Sympathy with Past and Future Selves 
In her paper ‘Personal Identity and the Passions’, McIntyre talks of having sympathy with our 
past and future selves. McIntyre begins by stating there is a need to distinguish between the 
understanding of personal identity in Book 1 regarding the thought and imagination and 
personal identity in Book 2 which regards the passions or concern we take in ourselves.  Hume 
argues that it is mistaken to believe that we remain the same over time. He says, as discussed 
in chapter 1, that experience shows relations of resemblance and causation which makes us 
think that the mind is identical over time, but this is a fiction. Hume refers to personal identity 
in relation to the passions.  
“And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, 
but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may 
vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, 
without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several 
parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view 
162 
 
our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with 
regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions 
influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or 
future pains or pleasures” (THN 1.4.6.19; SBN 261).  
Thus, McIntyre says, “The self is not only an object of thought: it is an object in which we have 
interest and concern” (McIntyre, 1989, p.547). She argues that Book 2 of the Treatise uses the 
passions to explain why we have a level of concern for our actions both in the future and the 
past. But if Hume is rejecting the identity of the self across time, then how can we say that 
these past and future actions are those of one and the same person?  
“….all are agreed that an account of personal identity must justify 
concern with our past and future actions - that it must explain the effect 
of the past on our present feelings and thereby provide a foundation for 
considering the future in choosing our present actions” (McIntyre, 
1989, p.549).  
Hume account of the self is that of a person whohas moral responsibility and one which we 
should be concerned about. Hume also differs from other theorists because he does not need 
there to be a unitary self which is considered necessary for self-concern.  
“For Hume, considerations relating to the passions, or to morals, such 
as the purported necessity of a substantial self to explain self-concern 
or moral responsibility, cannot override the fact that there is no 
impression to give rise to such an idea” (McIntyre, 1989, p.549). 
Even though Book 1 identifies the self as a connected bundle and succession of perceptions, 
and the principles used such as those of association, Hume does not claim that it is a complete 
account of personal identity; his theory of pride, sympathy and imagination are necessary to 
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fill out his ideas on self-concern. But can his theory of mind presented in Book 1 be used to 
support the concept of self-concern he develops? It could be claimed that if Hume denies that 
the self in the present exists in the past or will exist in the future then we cannot have concern 
for anything else other than our present self, and we similarly cannot have moral responsibility 
for past and future actions. McIntyre questions this:  
“The self is extended through time for Hume, but not via the persistence 
of substance. My past encompasses those perceptions, thoughts and 
actions related to my present self, primarily by causation and 
resemblance” (McIntyre, 1989, p.550).  
She also believes that Hume’s account of the passions is needed to explain why past actions 
and thoughts affect our present state and why I act out of concern for my future states. This is 
explained through his indirect passions and character. He believes that when one applies blame 
for a past action, this is a representation of a link to the person’s character and to their past. 
Hume agrees that the past affects us and there are actions and character traits that naturally 
produce pleasure and pain in the spectator which also result in feeling the indirect passions 
such as pride and humility. The self is the object of these passions, with the underlying 
mechanism of the double association of ideas and impressions turning attention toward my self. 
McIntyre thinks that this explanation of the passions is Hume’s way of explaining why we have 
concern for our past actions..  
“Furthermore, it is the same fact of relatedness to my present self that 
gives a past occurrence a role to play in the generation of my passions. 
Insofar as it is independently a source of pleasure or pain, a past action 
will affect me with pride and humility” (McIntyre, 1989, p.551).   
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This is evident when we feel shame about a past event or pride in something we achieved in 
the past. McIntyre believes that introducing the indirect passions brings a social dimension to 
the concept of self-concern because of the role of the other. The pleasure and pain received 
from other people are communicated through the mechanism of sympathy. We depend on the 
approval of others: “But…reputation is cumulative and refers to a person’s past. Concern with 
reputation is, therefore, the more public aspect of concern with one’s past” (McIntyre, 1989, 
p.552).  Pride and humility play a crucial role but in Book 2 we are also shown that passions 
such as fear and hope play a foundational role in our  concern for the future. Hume focuses on 
not just feeling such emotions, but also on how the actions in the present are tailored with future 
consequences in mind; these actions follow from my character, motives and intentions.  
Sympathy plays a substantial role in having concern for our past and future, since in 
sympathetic communication we can feel pains and pleasures not just as they are felt but as they 
are anticipated. As discussed in chapter 2, we may enter into a communication whereby we 
feel the concern of others and make them our own, but even in the case of our selves, the 
possible condition of the future person that is a result of my actions becomes a present concern. 
This explains why we take future-directed actions even if there is no identity across time. 
“This extension of sympathy requires a connection between the idea of 
the person in the future and some enlivening feature of the present: the 
degree of sympathetic concern with the future varies according to the 
vivacity of that present impression” (McIntyre, 1989, p.555-556).  
For Hume, a strong connection between the principles of association makes for a stronger 
narrative.  In the writing of literature and history, for example, “he holds that if events or 
characters are introduced that are only loosely connected with the rest of the narration, the 
author makes it very difficult for the reader to maintain a high level of concern for the authors’ 
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characters and their fate. An author who injudiciously makes this mistake finds that he 
inevitably loses that communication of emotions, by which alone he can interest the heart and 
raise the passions to their proper height and period” (Bailey and O’Brien, 2006, p.44). Perhaps 
this account of the relation between narratives in literature and history can be seen as relevant 
to Hume’s account of the self. If future events are only loosely connected to one’s narrative 
then one may not be concerned for oneself in the future, whereas if there are strong connections 
via the principles of association, then we would have such concern. If I see myself as the cause 
of my success in the future, then I am concerned about my ongoing efforts. For example, if a 
future event is that I will successfully complete my PhD, this is closely connected with my self 
through the emotions of anticipation, fear, and joy and therefore I would be concerned about 
the effort that I am now in the present putting in to completing this piece of work; so that I can 
achieve this future event, I show concern for myself.  
McIntyre presents the view that “Somewhat paradoxically, then, self-concern is a product of 
the fact that we are social beings” (McIntyre, 1989, p.557).  Not only do we face moral 
judgement from others in our social circle, but we also find ourselves approving and 
disapproving of moments of our lives that form an integral part of who we are presently. In a 
narrative understanding of self, there must be an aim or intention for directing our lives in a 
certain direction; these aims must be tied together by a bond. Just like a literary story, an 
individual’s life makes sense as a continuous trajectory. . The mechanism of sympathy is not 
just involved with our interactions with others; we can also have sympathy for our future self, 
a worry for the person we will become. This anticipation gives the self a sense of motivation. 
This gives the self a meaning that goes beyond passing pleasures and pains, it shows long-term 
purpose. This structures the narrative identity which brings in the necessary components of 
pride and humility.  
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In this chapter I started by looking at Goldie’s introduction to the different kinds of narrative 
theory and his understanding that although the self is not narrative, we still have aspects of our 
lives that are narrative in nature. Then I looked at the other two ends of the narrative spectrum, 
starting with Schechtman’s self that is inherently narrative followed by Strawson’s criticism of 
a life lived narratively. I then circled back to the focus of this thesis, that being Hume and the 
controversial view of Greco that Hume is a narrative theorist. In the next chapter I explore the 
modern-day platform that can be used for self-authorship, that of social media. This provides 
an outlet to display our self-narratives without having to see each other face-to-face. If Hume 
is considered a narrative theorist, then I believe we must consider his approach in relation to 
















HUME’S SOCIAL SELF AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
In this final chapter I argue that Hume’s social conception of the self can evolve with the 
changes in communication that have developed with respect to social media. The constantly 
developing online sphere has brought the Humean self into a new domain. This chapter 
explores questions concerning whether the Humean theory of the self can withstand the new 
forms of communication that we find ourselves thrust into with the digital age. But what is it 
about these contexts that motivate me to ask this question in the first place? First, Humean 
theorists should readily embrace social media because it provides another version of receiving 
feedback which, as we have seen, plays a fundamental role in the mutual construction of pride 
and self. Second, I want to highlight how exactly I can directly apply the Humean mechanisms 
to this new platform for communication. For example; how can we show sympathy whilst 
online? In what manner does the double relation of ideas and impressions translate to a mutual 
construction of pride and self in the online realm? What role does narrative play online?  
Further, we find ourselves embedded in the virtual world and Hume’s social theory becomes 
more persuasive as I delve into the specifics of the mechanisms. We constantly find ourselves 
waiting for feedback from social media and it is easy to feel one’s sense of self embodied in 
these communications. The online self and experience of self-consciousness can therefore 
become easier to understand as we explore how Hume’s account of the social self engages with 
the world of social media.  
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 I am going to look at the relation of social media to two attitudes we hold to ourselves, namely 
pride and vanity. The first is pride in the context of the interactions and attitudes common in 
eighteenth-century society. I will follow this with the evolution of communication in the form 
of social media, pride is still seen as a virtue and I will show examples from the social media 
platform as to how pleasurable responses online can lead to the feeling of pride; this will 
subsequently act as a good comparison between different times. Following this I show how 
followers online widen our narrow circle and create a new perspective in moral judgment away 
from the common point of view. It is here that I will further discuss whether one should be 
judged on single acts or the entirety of their character. Pride felt through social media will be 
shown to be positive, but there is an aspect of filtering whereby individuals may not be honest 
about themselves online, both physically in pictures and metaphorically in behaviours. The 
second attitude lies in the dangers, these arise when pride cross the line into vanity through 
comparison with others which can lead to an inflated sense of self-worth. Hume’s inconsistent 
use of the term vanity presents a fork where it is seen as both a negative and positive trait which 
I will differentiate and examine. Self-love as a form of vanity is intertwined with narcissism 
and self-engrossment but like its counterpart can be seen as a positive and negative trait. I find 
that social media becomes a portal through which we express sources of pride.  Hume knows 
that these dangers are possibilities and even in some sense part of our nature, so he finds a 
balance between pride and these dangers. Our social interactions may now involve the online 
world but I postulate that the Humean Self can evolve with this change and I will begin with 
pride.  
 
1. Hume and Society  
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It has been established that pride is the result of the double relation between ideas and 
impressions. The pleasure we feel in the things we do and in our achievements is converted 
into the feeling of pride, as we saw in chapter 3, section 2. This pleasure that we feel has its 
source in our sympathizing with the pleasure expressed by others. Further, in chapter 3, section 
4 we saw how pride plays a constructive role with respect to the self. If the self is constructed 
from pride, then we can claim that the self is dependent on the structure of wider society and 
the people that inhabit it. Without other people and their reactions, we would not be able to feel 
pride. For Hume, it is evident that the self is dependent on the society that we live in and he 
sees being alone as “perhaps the greatest punishment we can suffer” (THN 2.2.5.15; SBN 362-
3). I cover two main aspects of society here, firstly society in the eighteenth century, and then 
I fast-forward two hundred and fifty years to the world of  social media.     
According to Hume, the passions would not have any force, were it not for the sentiments of 
others and O’Brien highlights the role of social interaction in society: 
 “Wider social interaction became necessary for society to function, individuals 
depending for resources not just on what could be acquired from, or with the help of, 
one’s friends or compatriots, but also on the social structures underpinning the 
emerging commercial society.” (O’Brien, n.d, p.37)  
O’Brien highlights Hume’s reference to the commercial cities of Scotland and the salons of 
Paris and the fact that the perfect character should be able to “converse in both realms” 
(O’Brien, n.d, p.36). The rapid evolution of commercial societies continues today but what it 
meant for Hume in the eighteenth century was a change in relationships between characters.  
Sympathy was then seen as an important mechanism in social interaction, but this did not 
necessarily mean sympathy with people that are familiar with us. In an ever-increasing market, 
deals, contracts and decisions resulted in there being the need to correspond with strangers, but 
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not just to correspond with them, but also to build a level of trust with them (O’Brien, n.d, 
p.37).  I find that this relation of trust can be likened to the relationships that we develop on a 
social media platform and I will show how this takes place in section 2 of this chapter. 
Sympathetic interaction between one another not only strengthens one’s understanding of 
oneself but also one’s usefulness in society. In fact, self and society are intertwined: 
“Wisdom is this acquired, and it is essentially social: the wise man is 
not the solitary sage, but the thinker immersed in sympathetic 
engagement with the community. The wise do not shun society” 
(O’Brien, n.d,  p.38).  
A sympathetic engagement in the community is also addressed by Jackie Taylor, who also 
looks at the role of the indirect passions in a broader context and considers them social 
phenomena. Taylor’s chapter is entitled: “Toward a Humean Social Theory’ and by this she 
means; 
“an explanation of the indirect passions in relation to the distribution 
of wealth and property and other forms of social power (typically 
grounded in government and other social institutions) as week as styles 
of living, learning and working, and the commitment to various values. 
We shall examine how these various values and the influences on them 
contribute to the kinds of understand people have of one another’s 
social position” (Taylor, 2015, p. 34).  
In chapter 3, section 3, I showed Hume suggesting that we know our rank in society and that 
this governs the kinds of things and achievements we come to feel pride in:  
“Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without 
government. Government makes a distinction of property, and 
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establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic, 
manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, 
cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause 
such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an uniformity in 
human life” (THN 2.3.1.9; SBN 402).  
Similarly, Taylor takes a sociological perspective on  the norms that govern expectations for 
people’s behaviours towards one another.  
“social conventions and institutions make it the case (in a modern 
western society) that the wealthy and powerful have more reason to be 
proud than the poor and powerless, and men have traditionally had 
greater reason to take pride in, or receive recognition for being proud 
of, their family” (Taylor, 2015, p. 34). 
This suggests that those with a higher rank in society are presented with more reasons to feel 
pride, but I think this focuses more on societal expectations. For example, she states that they 
have a greater chance to receive recognition. This may be since they find themselves socially 
in certain crowds that would praise behaviours that social conventions would deem 
praiseworthy. In chapter 3, section 4 I mentioned a potential criticism of the Humean account 
concerning an individuals’s aspirations and personal expectations for pride, rather than simply 
those of the community. These may not reflect the societal ones but nevertheless still allow the 
person to feel pride: for example, someone with a higher rank in society may feel pride in their 
career achievements and simultaneously in their personal achievement of spending more time 
with their family. It may not be a societal expectation but for him it is nevertheless  a 
praiseworthy achievement in his and his family’s terms. Focusing on Taylor’s term 
‘recognition’, social ranks may put people in positions where they are able to get recognised 
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for something that warrants pride on their part, so perhaps social ranking is inextricably linked 
with opportunities available to the person.  
Our understanding of the passions come from principles of human nature and Taylor focuses 
on sympathy. This principle not only allows us to communicate and become aware of others’ 
responses and opinions but it also explains social cohesion and sociability.  The importance of 
sympathy in society, for Taylor, “functions to produce social cohesion…through transmission 
of shared meanings and values, as these are reflected in our beliefs, passions and sentiments” 
(Taylor, 2015,p. 35).  In section 2 of this chapter, I will use Taylor’s understanding of Humean 
sympathy to show how this relates to different methods of posting information about oneself 
on social media. I argue social media can play a constructive role with respect to the self  
In line with Taylor’s ‘Humean social theory’, O’Brien (n.d) states that we can also feel pride 
as a result of trusting the testimony of others in society concerning things and achievements of 
which we should be proud. Referring to the example that I used in chapter 3, section 4 (entitled: 
‘Grades’), I would like to expand on this, emphasizing the layers of testimonial approval that 
can fuel pride.  I will feel proud because my supervisor who is an expert in the topic, gives me 
a good grade on my assignment as well as positive feedback. Additionally, If I send my paper 
to a student journal, the anonymous referee sends me feedback, as does the editor and thus I 
improve the paper. I re-send an improved version of the paper and then receive more feedback. 
It is then accepted and subsequently published. Someone may further reply to my paper in the 
next volume of this journal or another journal and I receive more feedback – my paper perhaps 
gaining a wider audience through philosophers’ blogs and twitter, as will be discussed in the 
next section. I will feel proud as a result of others commenting on my work through reviews, 
peer assessments or as O’Brien calls them, “testimonial reports of others concerning her skills” 
(O’Brien, n.d, p.33). The importance of social interactions lies within their feedback; in the 
example of peer-reviews, the grades example has expanded from an exchange between 
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supervisor and student to an audience comprised of other experts in the field and beyond. In 
this situation, I felt pride when I received feedback from my supervisor, and this constituted 
my sense of self. Furthermore, the testimonial reports from the journal editors, readers and the 
blogosphere also, in Chazan’s words, feed my feeling of pride as well. O’Brien describes the 
process as follows:  
“First, from sympathizing with the community she comes to know that 
being an author is a respected profession (in some circles) and thus she 
learns when and where to express pride in her skills and whose 
approbation she should respect and share. Second, she may learn - via 
testimonial - which reviewers are sycophantic, which publishers mere 
vanity presses, who is to be trusted and who is not, and thus she 
develops general rules that further modulate her sympathetic responses, 
the pride she feels and her own conception of the her self.” (O’Brien, 
n.d, p.33)  
Hume emphasises social relations in the world and highlights that everyone has their place 
based on their contributions. Conversations between members of the society are supported by 
the mechanism of sympathy and as mentioned at the beginning of this section “wider social 
interaction becomes necessary for society to function” (O’Brien, n.d, p.37). We are not just 
dependent on those around us with whom we have a close relation, we interact with others in 
society, and are aware of the social structures that build the foundations of society. 
Consequently, these play a constructive role in our sense of self.  Hume highlights the 
importance of observing the role of sympathy in our social interactions:  
“The best method of reconciling us to this opinion is to take a general 
survey of the universe and observe the force of sympathy thro' the 
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whole animal creation, and the easy communication of sentiments from 
one thinking being to another. In all creatures, that prey not upon 
others, and are not agitated with violent passions, there appears a 
remarkable desire of company, which associates them together, without 
any advantages they can ever propose to reap from their union. This is 
still more conspicuous in man, as being the creature of the universe, 
who has the most ardent desire of society and is fitted for it by the most 
advantages. We can form no wish which has not a reference to society” 
(THN 2.2.5.15; SBN 362-3). 
I introduced this section with thoughts concerning the role of social interaction in Hume’s 
society of the eighteenth-century, and related this to the role of the other in pride and in our 
self-conception. Knowing the importance of social feedback in the construction of the self, it 
is interesting to see how this took place so that the comparison can be made to society today. 
In the eighteenth century, during Hume’s time, social feedback was shown through face to face 
interactions, meetings, social events or gatherings. Hume could go home after an evening with 
his peers and this feedback will be shut off until the next interaction. But imagine a society 
where we were constantly surrounded by social feedback from others? If responses were 
constantly available to us? We do not have to imagine such a place because it exists in the form 
of social media; with a bombarding of friends, followers, likes or dislikes, we cannot escape 
from the never-ending form of social feedback. We do not even have to leave our home or see 
anybody face to face again.  
 
 
2. Social Media: The Modern Platform for Pride  
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The question I would like to further explore in this section is: What would Hume say about the 
effects of social media on pride and the self? With the world becoming increasingly obsessed 
with social media, is our sense of self partly constructed from our presence online? First, then, 
I will outline what social media is. 
Social Media is defined as: “forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social 
networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share 
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos)” (Webster, 2019). 
Through social media, individuals can communicate in a way that has evolved from face to 
face interaction. Whilst an individual may only be exposed to a certain number of 
interactions, maybe due to factors such as geographical restrictions, financial constraints or 
lack of opportunity, social media finds a way to remove these barriers. Social media 
platforms allow for one to build a much wider audience in comparison to the one offline.  
There is an interesting use of ‘community’ in the definition of social media, which suggests 
that the online platform allows for the building of a community that can contribute to our 
sense of self in the same way that the offline community can.  
The term social media defines a variety of platforms and I will explain what each of them 
consists of. Facebook is used to post pictures and updates about oneself, it  allows for one to 
make a profile that covers personal details or at least those that one chooses to share. For 
example, birthday, interests, friends and events, and photos. LinkedIn is like Facebook but 
for your career: users network with other professionals in order to make business 
connections and seek work opportunities. Twitter is an online news and communication site 
where users write short messages limited by number of characters and people follow one 
another if they want to keep up to date with the posts of the person they are following. You 
can like and retweet those posts that you have an opinion on. Instagram is a site that is 
mainly focused on photos; one can post their photography for others to see and like or 
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comment on. All platforms allow one to message their friends and search for people in order 
to remain in contact with them. Like twitter, you follow people on this site to keep up to 
date with their posts and the amount of followers on both of these platforms are visible to 
anyone that searches the profile. Now, with YouTube, you can ‘subscribe’ to a person’s 
channel in order to keep up to date with their content and with all of these platforms you can 
choose to be notified whenever the person you are following posts something on their profi le 
or channel. YouTube is a platform where persons post videos for others to see, like, dislike, 
comment on and share. On social media, likes are shown on profiles for others to see. 
WhatsApp is a site whereby users are able to communicate through a messenger service and 
are also able to make calls, and one of the recent updates also included making a status 
update which can consist of pictures of texts and this is only shown to those that have your 
phone number. Academic.Edu is social networking for academics: they can share their 
papers, work-in-progress, CVs and books. It is a place to share and follow research. Social 
media platforms are continually expanding, and I have only covered a handful of the key 
sites that are relevant to my thesis. All of these interactions happen in real time and provide 
very quick feedback, something that was not prominent in the eighteenth century Humean 
society that was outlined in section 1 of this chapter. 
At this point, the link between social media and the Humean self may not be so obvious but I 
want to show how the social feedback that is so prominent for the Humean self is present in 
another form in the online world. It is a pool of reactions to our actions that do not need a face 
to face interaction or even acquaintance with the person who is giving the feedback.  In section 
1 of this chapter, I expanded the Grades example that I used in chapter 4, section 4. In this 
example the testimony of others widened the audience for the student because it allowed for 
their work to be exposed to other experts in the discipline. Social media widens this audience 
even further: if the student were to share their work on a social media platform then they would 
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certainly receive more feedback.  O’Brien has argued that “one only comes to see oneself as 
an epistemic agent in the context of social relations in which testimonial transactions occur, 
where we are praised and blamed and where we come to feel proud of some of our traits” 
(O’Brien, n.d, p.33). I suggest that a different form of testimonial report is also presented on 
social media using emoticons and symbols such as the thumbs up and thumbs down. This may 
not be the constructive and detailed  feedback that one would receive from a professor on their 
assignment, but it still is a representation of how the other person has reacted to something 
associated to you and thus in turn is part of the construction of your sense of self.  
If the responses of others play such a pivotal role in the Humean social self, then it is a necessity 
to explore the online realm as an influence on one’s sense of self. I see social media as a pool 
of “reactions”; an individual that creates a profile is not only able to post messages and photos, 
but they are also able to react to others’ posts and have their ones reacted to through the 
provided functions. Remembering Hume’s account, the self is embedded in the reactions of 
others and I find that social media is a way in which our communication as a society remains 
the same but the medium through which it takes place has differed significantly. I want to go 
through three main aspects of social media platforms that I find make parallels to the Humean 
Account.  
First, as discussed in the beginning of this section, social media platforms allow users to ‘like’ 
one another’s posts and this represents positive feedback. If pride is a result of the pleasurable 
reactions from others then to like a post is to show the pleasurable reaction in another form. 
Let us take an example; an individual posts a picture of a designer handbag that they were 
saving up for a long time to purchase. This photo is then seen by her friends who express their 
pleasure at her purchase by pressing the ‘like’ button and posting a complimentary message; 
this then represents their feeling of pleasure. The person who posted the message can see this, 
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attribute the pleasure to their act of purchasing the desired item and consequently then feel 
pride in their achievement.  An important part of feeling pride is if the act itself intrinsically 
can cause pleasure. Taking the example above, the act of purchasing a desired item produces 
pleasure. This is independent to the relation with the self, but once the act is attributed to the 
self then the feeling of pride arises. The handbag is the subject that produces pleasure in the 
object, which is the self. The mechanism of the double relation of ideas and impressions can 
be applied here. The pleasure felt by the friend who likes the post is related to me, this feeling 
is then associated with the pleasurable feeling of pride. The cause is related to the idea of the 
self, with the attention turning to the self. These two associations work together to create the 
feeling of pride in the individual that posted about purchasing the handbag.   
The second aspect I would like to discuss is the potential impact and dangers associated with 
the enduring traces on leaves behind on social media platforms, traces that one would rather 
not exist. . In chapter 2, section 1.1, I outline Baier and Waldow’s approach that we are able to 
understand the feelings of others by looking to certain behavioural cues. There is a clear barrier 
that comes with lack of face to face interaction with certain types of social media platforms; 
the most that one can use to show their feelings is text. However, with the rise of platforms 
such as YouTube, the evolution from social media pages to videos, users try to present cues 
that are stereotypically associated with a certain emotion. An example of this in action is when 
a beauty YouTuber Laura Lee committed an undesirable act, and someone unearthed some old 
posts from her twitter account that were racist. Upon finding this, members of the beauty 
community  - that is, the online community of followers of webpages devoted to discussion of 
beauty products and techniques - lost respect for her and she simultaneously lost a significant 
amount of her followers. Seeing this, she made an apology video whereby she portrayed 
behavioural cues such as crying, a stressed expression that she felt represented regret and 
remorse. There seems to be some key behavioural cues that link apology videos together: the 
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person appearing in the video does not wear makeup or style their hair, their tone of voice 
reflects that they have been distraught, they cry and continuously apologise to their fans and 
all they have hurt. Whilst behavioural cues are usually used as a way to understand the emotion 
the other person is feeling; the cues in these videos have almost become a mockery in the 
community. They become a base from which to determine how genuine the video creator is.The 
community judges them; for example, viewers of the videos communicate through comments 
and messages to show either their joint acceptance or dismissal of the apology. They will make 
comments about the sincerity of the behavioural cues and whether they are made with the 
correct intentions rather than merely as a way of manipulation so as not to lose followers and 
save their reputation. The intention behind the video or post is very important on the online 
platforms. One thing to always remember about social media is that even if you delete a post 
or a video then someone will have saved, downloaded or screenshotted it; therefore, it can be 
hard to escape any sort of ‘identity’ that one has created online. In an online article, ‘Social 
Media Shapes our Identity’, Renner asks the question as to whether we can ever remake 
ourselves if social media constantly confronts us with our past actions. Regret cannot prosper 
if the internet does not allow evidence of our past to ever go away completely. “The persistence 
of certain images is more of a problem for some than for others. There are moments, elevated 
not by the fact of being recorded but by the impossibility of being erased, that become 
traumatic” (Renner, 2019). The suggestion is that capturing and permanently keeping parts of 
someone alive on social media may prevent them from moving on with their life and almost 
re-make another version of themselves, away from the negative things in the past. The example 
just outlined of the beauty Youtuber presents a case whereby the tweets were found from over 
years ago and she wanted to escape that type of person that she states she ‘used to be’, but the 
access on social media did not allow for her to remove herself from these actions that are now 
set in stone.  
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The third aspect of social media that I would like to discuss is the phenomenon of ‘Reaction 
Channels’. These surfaced on YouTube around 5 years ago with the first channel called 
‘FineBro’s React’ and this included people being invited on the channel to react to videos and 
give both their facial and verbal responses to other videos. From this a wave of new videos 
arrived onto the platform which involved the person recording themselves reacting to things 
on other social media platforms. Reaction channels are a way for people to respond to posts 
and videos on social media whilst simultaneously being able to showcase their reaction in video 
form. The change from reacting with likes, emoticons, ‘thumbs up’ and comments to reacting 
with videos is something that I find significant in online communities. The person may react 
negatively or positively and this in turn will affect the entire community’s thoughts on your 
behaviour. thus, through the mechanisms discussed throughout this thesis, leading to the feeling 
of pride or shame and consequently constructing the self.  For example, a Youtuber called 
Mr.Beast made it a mission to plant 20 million trees by the year 2020 and he was successful in 
this; multiple people made videos in response to this success in support and praise of his 
dedication. The Youtuber will then interpret these videos and posts as showing approval. The 
approval is converted into pride via the double relation. He will associate the idea of his success 
in planting the trees to the idea of his self. Simultaneously, the feeling of pleasure (that was 
acquired via sympathy from the viewer’s approval) becomes associated with the feeling of 
pride. The YouTuber now feels pride for his actions. Social media allows for an online 
community and the mechanism of sympathy plays a key role here; Jackie Taylor states that  
“Sympathizing with opinion and belief explains how various groups of 
people acquire and transmit the collective social attitudes as well as a 
commitment to, or at understanding of, the values of their community” 
(Taylor, 2015,  p37). 
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So, the different communities online still have their own beliefs and values, but we have moved 
from smaller interactions to a much wider scale due to the sheer capacity of the social media 
platforms. Looking back at the mechanism of the double relation of ideas and impressions, we 
are not just taking the pleasurable response as represented by a ‘like’; there has now been an 
evolution whereby the person is able to see the behavioural cues which represent pleasure, 
without having to leave their home for a social interaction. We can see behavioural feedback 
in the comfort of our own homes. If someone were to make a response video to a video that I 
posted, then I take their pleasurable smiling and positive attitude and associate it to my video 
and its contents and then I see the cause of their pleasure as associated to me, so in turn I feel 
pride. We are still following the Humean line of thought, but we have just moved it onto another 
platform.  
In the next section I shall return to considerations of morality. Social media, whilst being a new 
way to connect with others, also often involves  judgements of the morality of the actions of 
others.  We may find ourselves judging people on what they post. Social media, however, can 
be considered an unreliable method of judging character traits because it shows only certain 
acts, and whether these can be considered representative of one’s entire character is a question 
I will explore.  
 
3. The Ever-Widening Narrow Circle  
I introduced Hume’s account of character and morality in chapter 2, section 1.2, and made 
reference to the role played by what Hume calls one’s narrow circle; here I shall expand on the 
meaning of this term. Hume uses the term ‘narrow circle’ to describe the general or common 
point of view. Consideration of the narrow circle allows us to judge whether actions are  
virtuous or vicious. I also outlined the importance of character for Hume when making moral 
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judgments. In this section, I will explain the role of the narrow circle as understood by Hume, 
particularly in moral judgement. Additionally, I will show how this circle is not only relevant 
to considerations and judgements of morality in the present day within social media but is also 
widened by this continuously widening communication platform.  
Firstly, virtues and vices are judged by the narrow circle: 
“The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and 
virtue but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a 
character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To 
disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness. The pain and 
pleasure, therefore, being the primary causes of vice and virtue, must 
also be the causes of all their effects, and consequently of pride and 
humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of that distinction” 
(THN 2.1.7.5; SBN 296). 
The idea of the narrow circle can be explained in the following example. I hear that Jane has 
completed a parachute jump for a fake charity, and my initial reaction to this is negative 
because I feel that Jane is promoting others to contribute towards a scam. This initial reaction 
is not a moral one, it is just a quick response to a situation. But to think in moral terms, is to 
see the situation from a common point of view; so, when I make a moral judgement, I must 
adopt this point of view and I do this by thinking about the narrow circle of Jane. I think from 
the perspective of the narrow circle and ask what they would think; the answer to this is that 
they would approve because they know that Jane’s intentions are sincere, and she is unaware 
of the dishonesty of the charity. From adopting this common point of view and sympathising 
with the judgement of the narrow circle, I therefore come to feel the moral sentiment of 
approval. One of my claims is that the narrow circle of Jane can now involve her social media 
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contacts. So, we look to the narrow circle in order to form judgements concerning a person’s 
moral character. It is not that we must completely remove our prejudice and take up some form 
of ideal view, rather we look to the ‘narrow circle’ that the individual moves in and form a 
common point of view, and today people ‘move in’ various circles that exist in the realm of 
social media.  
“Judgements concerning his character though, should be independent 
of my own weaknesses, interests, mood or circumstances. They should 
not be made solely from my own point of view but from some ‘common 
point of view’ (THN 3.3.1.30; SBN 590-1). 
I shall now go on to further discuss two of my claims concerning the relation of social media 
to the use Hume makes of  the narrow circle in morality. First, social media focuses on singles 
acts to determine another’s’ character, and this may distort our judgements of morality. 
Secondly, when making moral judgements we think of the narrow circle of the person that we 
are judging. Social media means that this narrow circle is being widened. 
 
3.1 Acts vs Character  
When it comes to social media, it is a platform that focuses on virtuous acts instead of virtuous 
character traits whereas Hume would highlight the latter as the important focus of moral 
judgment. His focus is on the durability of character over time; this is why Hume believes that 
you should not judge a person over a single act, the continuity of their character should be 
considered; 
“If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some 
quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the 
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mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal 
character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant 
principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and 
consequently are never consider'd in morality” (THN 3.3.1.4; SBN 
575). 
Often, responses will be to single posts on social media and when people share every detail of 
their life online then followers feel they are able to judge the contents of character. The fact 
that it is not shown through multiple acts, should not undermine an individual’s virtuous 
character. So even if someone is not constantly posting about the good deeds they have done, 
does not mean their character should be judged based on this. On the other hand, if someone is 
constantly posting about good deeds they have done, this does not mean the general tendencies 
of their character are entirely virtuous. I think Hume would agree that social media has affected 
what we see is virtuous. I will use an example to clarify my point; a Youtuber Josh Paler Lin 
filmed himself giving $100 dollars to a homeless man and then secretly followed him to see 
how he would spend it. The homeless man spent it on food and resources for others in his 
community. This video received a lot of recognition and the YouTuber was praised on his kind 
act. He continued to then make more videos with this man, like taking him to get a makeover 
and meals out. He created a GoFundMe account whereby people donated to the homeless man. 
So, on face value, it seemed like he was really changing this man’s life for the better. However, 
behind the scenes, the homeless man did not receive all the money that was donated for him 
and the little money he did receive, he got alcohol poisoning and drank himself to death. The 
Youtuber was then criticised because he just used the homeless man for views on his videos, 
did not give him the money that he was entitled to (it was a large enough amount for him to be 
able to find a place to live) and was just putting his act on social media for more personal 
recognition and not out of the kindness of his heart. The video received over 50 million views 
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and Josh made money from this on YouTube. Seeing this from a Humean perspective, there 
are two ways this can be interpreted. The first is that the viewers of his videos may first see 
someone helping out a homeless person from sheer and praise his actions but if we were to 
look to the narrow circle for a common point of view, it is he wanted to help a homeless man 
and gave him a way to better his life. So, the viewers then through sympathy, also adopt this 
point of view and accept that he tried to help. However, the second interpretation shows that 
the followers on his social media were the ones to see his true intentions prevail because they 
were able to see he was profiting financially through the views. I will discuss these perspectives 
in the next section 3.2 in accordance with Baier’s different circle widths.  I think it is vital to 
recognise the modern day job title for those who use social media as their main source of 
income which is called ‘Influencer.’ A few more examples that I want to outline here; people 
who want fame and recognition in good ways and bad ways: for example, wanting to  be 
admired for their looks, others to be admired for their actions. Isn’t it strange that in moving 
away from people judging us on our individual actions, we want people to judge us as the 
narrow circle would; by our full character.  
Then the question needs to be asked; could the people that watch these influencers on social 
media become part of the narrow circle?  I find that there is a conflict between Hume’s 
interpretation of the narrow circle focusing on the entirety of one’s character rather than a single 
act versus the online community being exposed to single acts that can actually represent an 
individual’s character. In this sense I would argue that followers on social media widen the 
narrow circle. Even though a single act does not show the contents of character, as Hume says 
“we are never to consider any single action in our enquiries concerning the origin of morals; 
but only the quality or character from which the action proceeded. These alone are durable 
enough to affect our sentiments concerning the person” (THN 3.3.1.5; SBN 575). Hume 
highlights the importance of action when he states that “actions are, indeed, better indications 
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of a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but 'tis only so far as they are such 
indications, that they are attended with love or hatred, praise or blame”  (THN 3.3.1.5; SBN 
575). 
Now if actions are considered an important part of understanding one’s character then social 
media has increased the amount of people that judge others’ character. It certainly widens our 
narrow circle and I will consider this approach in the next section.  
 
3.2 Social Media widens our narrow circle  
How wide is Hume’s Circle? This is the question raised Annette Baier’s paper of the same 
name. Baier begins by stating that Hume’s understanding of moral assessments in his Enquiry 
concerning the Principles of Morals involves judging whether something is a virtue or vice by 
judging from a ‘principle of humanity’:  
“…we perceive, that the generosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom extends 
beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country. Being thus 
acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him; but 
confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a 
judgment of his moral character” (THN 3.3.3.2; SBN 602-3). 
Baier questions; 
“Does this represent a revision, on Hume’s part of his Treatise claim 
that sympathy with a person’s ‘narrow circle’ is what enables us to 
judge that person’s moral goodness? A humanity-wide circle is 
scarcely ‘narrow’ even if it is not wide enough for those who see our 
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treatment of animals as relevant to our moral merit or demerit” (Baier, 
2006, p.113).  
An example of the need to look toward the circle is as follows: if an individual is seen shouting 
at a person for being unhealthy and unfit, from an outside perspective they may be being 
unnecessarily harsh and not constructive. However, the members of the narrow circle know 
that said individual has lost family members through heart attacks caused by an unhealthy 
lifestyle. Therefore, their anger is an illustration of how they do not want to see this person face 
the same fate. This example shows that passions are not necessarily inherently linked to virtue 
or vice.  If an individual’s character traits are positive within his narrow circle then we 
simultaneously sympathise with the members of the circle and discard our interests and 
judgments. This two-way process will allow us to approve of the moral character of the 
individual.   
“When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable 
and useful within his sphere, we approve of his character, and love his 
person, by a sympathy with the sentiments of those, who have a more 
particular connexion with him. We are quickly oblig'd to forget our 
own interest in our judgments of this kind, by reason of the perpetual 
contradictions, we meet with in society and conversation, from persons 
that are not plac'd in the same situation, and have not the same interest 
with ourselves” (THN 3.3.3.2; SBN 602-3). 
But is this process of feeling sympathy with the narrow circle enough for us to recognise virtues 
or vices in another’s character? Perhaps not, since the verdicts of a person’s narrow circle may 
itself be biased.  Hume never states that a person’s narrow circle “…was enough to enable us 
to recognise her bravery, her proper pride, her prudence, her good judgement, her wit, her 
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integrity, her justice or her allegiance to lawful magistrates. It is needed only to judge her 
goodness and benevolence” (Baier, 2006, p.114).  I therefore argue that the narrow circle’s 
perspective needs to be wider than the circles within which one moves on a day-to-day, face-
to-face level. The moral point of view should take a holistic perspective, rather than a restricted 
one; we need to know the entirety of that person, to know their story.  But should the person 
who is truly virtuous be subjected to all perspectives in order to fairly be judged? This is where 
the social media circle comes in, it brings a different perspective to judging one’s character; if 
you share enough your followers can know more about you than your family but if you do not 
share much then your followers barely know you. This is accentuated by Baier through her 
need for different perspectives, she states that Hume talks of a moral point of view but she 
suggests different circle widths. It is:  
“…possible, indeed plausible, that sympathy with circles of different 
widths will be needed to recognise different virtues and groups of 
virtues. For some, such as justice, “extensive sympathy” is needed. For 
others, such as affability and other aspects of “goodness” we 
sympathise with the effects of the person’s character on a less extensive 
circle” (Baier, 2006, p.114). 
 Let us return to the example of the homeless man that was outlined in 3.1. As was stated above, 
from the perspective of the narrow circle, his act towards the homeless man may be seen as 
kind. On the other hand, if we take a look at the social media circle then his act was rooted in 
selfish intentions; followers on his YouTube account saw the financial profit that he gained 
from the videos in addition to the rest of his content. From this they conclude that his intentions 
were for fame, recognition and profit which are immoral and show exploitation of a vulnerable 
person. Taking Baier’s approach, sympathy with different circles provides different views as 
to the moral stance of the person.  
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Hume claims that those in the narrow circle are those that have an immediate connection to 
that person..  
“But the circle of Hume’s correspondents was very wide, and to judge 
of his generosity and benevolence, we would move into a narrower 
circle, and consider his relations with his family, servant, lovers and 
friends” (Baier, 2006, p.115).   
This shows that anyone that we have had a connection with cannot make up our narrow circle, 
we need to look to a closer range to judge certain virtuous character traits.  On the other hand, 
Baier also acknowledges that Hume’s popularity also means that “Hume’s words and his 
reported life affect all his readers, so they too are in the circle we must consider to judge his 
character” (Baier, 2006, p.115) Hume’s circle is ever widening, with his near contemporaries 
being included as well as his living readers and interpreters. If we are to look at the reciprocal 
relationships of Hume, the circle is not so narrow and the circle which included people that he 
had correspondence-mediated contact with is a circle that is even wider. Additionally; “if we 
are to count his influence on all readers of his writings, then the circle to consider widens 
indefinitely” (Baier, 2006, p.115). Baier responds to this by stating that we should also restrict 
‘commerce’ like ‘intercourse’ to a relationship between people that have “mutual knowledge” 
(Baier, 2006, p.115) and for the purpose of judgement, we should put aside natural virtues. 
Baier argues that when we judge artificial and natural virtues, posterity, a person’s descendants, 
the effect on future generations, is important.  Baier acknowledges that when Hume is judging 
English monarchs he does not leave out details of how their decisions would inadvertently 
effect the future generations and this is a vital aspect of their reign that should be considered. 
He may acknowledge that virtuous character traits such as courage may have led to some bad 
outcomes but he will not blame the monarch for his decision making. If Hume’s readers can 
widen his circle then why can’t followers of in social media do the same thing? If I post regular 
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updates about my life, share my thoughts, emotions and beliefs on my account, then I could 
say that my followers also belong in my circle. In fact, in some cases I might feel more 
confident to share things online rather than telling a family member face to face. 
It is clear that Hume does not restrict himself to goodness and benevolence, there is more to 
Humean virtues. To understand these other virtues, there is a need to have a “sympathetic 
understanding of the impact of a person’s character on anyone, however remote” (Baier, 2006, 
p.116). Character traits such as generosity may need a wider circle because Human generosity 
does not limit itself to just people that we know because we must take charitable donations into 
account.  In the same manner, positivity and benevolence need not be limited to people that are 
known to us. Hume believes that Hume’s commentators and not Hume himself that give the 
phrase ‘narrow circle’ meanings that he may not have intended. In conclusion, Baier believes 
that the narrow circle outlined in the treatise by Hume, has “always had a narrow role, to 
explain how we judge a restricted set of virtues” (Baier, 2006, p.116). It seems that we look to 
the narrow circle in order to judge a set of virtues and not the entirety of the Humean theory of 
virtue. This limitation could be answered by looking to another circle, one that is wider than 
the narrow circle and provides a different kind of knowledge on the person. The online realm 
provides a place to create an identity online that may not be able to be fully known from the 
perspective of the narrow circle. In my view, if interpreters and readers of Hume were 
considered influential enough to be part of his circle then he would certainly relish in a land of 
online followers. Hume delighted in people reading his work, he enjoyed the company of 
others, he did not see anything wrong is showing your material items either. I believe Hume 
would say that social media is a useful and interactive place to be able to display sources of 
pride in order to receive feedback from others which would create the feeling of pride and 
ultimately his self-construction. One could say that the person that is presented on social media 
is not the true representation of their self, it is a version manufactured by all of the good parts 
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of a person sprinkled with exaggeration. One may pick the aspects of themselves that they want 
others to see and react to positively in order to build their own sense of pride. Therefore, the 
reaction to the person presented online may not be showing the whole picture of that individual.  
In the next section, I will show how the self can be a cleverly crafted success story.  
 
4. The Filtered Self  
At this point, I have suggested that the feedback we receive online from our social media 
profiles can make us feel pride and in turn construct our sense of self through this. What I want 
to consider here is that this online self to which people react may be inaccurate due to filters 
that people place on the self; both literally and metaphorically. The filtered self is a term that I 
coined which means that the self on social media goes through a self-filtering process that does 
not accurately reflect a person’s personality and achievements.  
It may sound strange, but when it comes to our social media profiles, we are, in a sense, 
constructing a self; One that does not have any flaws or negative emotions, one that exudes 
confidence and most importantly, one that we want to show the world. For example, one may 
build a social media profile that accentuates the positive attributes and experiences of one’s  
life, whilst simultaneously being aware of issues they are having in their life, the social media 
profile provides an escape from the less desired reality.  
“….but that these primary causes “have little influence, when not 
seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others.” (THN 2.1.11.1; 
SBN 316) 
 We play pick and mix with the self: we choose what we want to and ignore the rest. I want to 
call this ‘The Filtered Self’ because it is wound up to perfection. It could be argued that this is 
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done in real life as well; when we meet new people, we may want to portray ourselves a certain 
way, whether that be confident or successful; here we may also choose to hide our flaws. I 
would say, though, it is done to a much larger degree when it comes to social media, because 
the audience is larger and because it is easier to filter one’s self-image.  
The increased number of people that follow you, automatically increases the instances in which 
the passion of pride can be felt. Instead of looking to the person sat next to us at the bus stop 
or even to a member of our own family, we may look to the online comments on our picture 
that we posted to feel pride in how we looked that day. This photo would be taken at the perfect 
angle, covering any facial flaws; I could take it as many times as I want until I am happy with 
the finished product. In real-life, the person is seeing you as you are, which can never compare 
to the filtered version. If someone comments on an aspect of my appearance online, then from 
their pleasurable response I will feel the passion of pride. This will, in turn, play a role in the 
construction of the self.   
In his paper, ‘Personal Identity Online and Offline’, Soraj Hongladarom finds that the 
introduction of social media has simultaneously brought about the philosophical question of 
how to understand the self online. “During the last few years social networking websites such 
as Facebook and Twitter seem to throw much of the traditional thinking about he self and object 
into confusion” (Hongladarom, 2011, pp.533-544). I found it interesting that Hongladarom 
uses the term “circle” as he argues “in an online world, things do not need to be radically 
different. We can regard the moment when someone registers their profile onto sites such as 
Facebook and becomes known to the circle of people who are already on Facebook” 
(Hongladarom, 2011, p.542). He seems to argue that there is a new kind of self that takes over 
the online world, different to the self in the real world; but he believes that the line between 
them is difficult to decipher. “The line between the real person (or the “offline” one) and her 
projection onto social networking sites (her “online” self) is becoming blurred” (Hongladarom, 
193 
 
2011, p.534).  There are Humean aspects to Hongladarom’s claim  that both types of self do 
not have an essence - by which he means “any characteristic inherent to them that serves to 
show that these selves are what they are and none other. Instead an externalist account of the 
identity of the self is offered that locates the identity in question in the self’s relations with 
other selves as well as other events and objects” (Hongladarom, 2011, p.533). Hongladarom 
argues that the self is indeed a construct and especially on social media whereby one can, in 
essence, build the self into what they desire.Hongladarom also notes that there may be 
situations whereby people have multiple accounts which each highlight different personality 
traits, for example one may be a professional account and the other may be a more fun and 
adventurous one. One part of Hongladarom’s argument that is consonant with my account of 
the role played by social media in a Humean account of the self, is his claim that “the so-called 
online self, in other words  the putative self existing on profile pages and updated timeline or 
news status on social networking sites such as Facebook Twitter and others, is essentially no 
different from the real self that is already there in the ‘offline’ world” (Hongladarom, 2011, 
p.534). The is because in his view, the online and offline self are both constructs, in particular 
the online self is “a persona, a front used by the underlying person when she faces the public 
world, and there is a degree of freedom within which the person can create the persona the way 
she likes” (Hongladarom, 2011, p.533). However, this freedom of representation brings with it 
dangers. The self that is created online needs to be an accurate representation, otherwise the 
feedback that one is receiving from followers is not based on a full representation of the self 
and one’s pride would not be warranted, as was discussed in the section on well-grounded pride 
in the previous chapter. When I stated in section 3.1 that followers should understand the full 
character of the online person, this is hindered by the fact that people pick and choose parts of 
themselves that they want to be showcased on their social media profile. The next stage of this 
filtering process can lead to the creation of a self that is vain. 
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It is easy to exude narcissism in one’s  posts by boasting of luxurious material items, success 
and wealth. This inflated sense of self-worth coupled with dependency on the online feedback 
one receives from others  becomes dangerous for one’s sense of self and separated from 
Hume’s notion of pride. Furthermore, the social ranks on social media became prominent with 
the lack of inhibition to share vain and luxurious posts and to see yourself as somehow superior 
or less worthy than others through comparison. Additionally, in the online world, when you 
make a profile on social media, especially on YouTube you cannot escape from how you gained 
your audience and most have been from relatability.  Often people on the space are looking for 
followers that are able to understand them as they are and the rise of luxury and the fact that it 
is becoming more socially acceptable to share them on the platform is only pushing the 
narrative that social media influencers are no longer relatable. Many influencers, however, 
rather than luxury, share their worries online in order to find others that relate to the same 
issues; some may seek validation of their viewpoints from their followers, I will explore the 
depths of these comparison, vanity and self-love in the next section. 
 
5. Pride, Vanity and Self-Love   
So far in this thesis, we have seen that Hume sees the notion of pride in positive terms. In 
chapter 3 we saw how pride was agreeable to the person feeling proud and how it was a source 
of motivation and useful to society. Many users of social media put up selfies and photos of 
themselves and when they get likes and comments from their friends and family, they may feel 
a sense of pride in their appearance and achievements. Someone, for example, may put up a 
photo of a new car they bought through hard work and saving money, so the compliments on 
the photo reflect the achievement they felt when they bought it. Now, Hume thinks that such 
pride is well-grounded because he states that we can feel pride in material things such as clothes 
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and our appearance, and in achievements that are the result of virtuous character traits and 
activity. Such pride would not be considered a vice for him. There are, however, passions 
related to pride that might be more problematic for Hume, these being vanity and self-love. I 
shall consider how such passions relate to key aspects of the world of social media.  
The issue that Hume has with vanity lies in its intrinsic selfish nature: to be vain would be to 
place importance on one’s own appearance and possessions. Further, the positive feedback 
received from others can make one dependent on it. Referring back to Chazan in chapter 3, 
section 3 and her idea of the sustaining and feeding of pride, if our online friends are constantly 
feeding our pride, then there is a danger that this feeding become insatiable.   
Hume outlines some limitations to pride, and I will here focus on the third limitation. This 
states that:  
“the pleasant or painful object is very discernible and obvious, and 
that not only to our selves, but to others also. This circumstance, like 
the two foregoing, has an effect upon joy, as well as pride. We fancy 
ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we 
appear so to others; but are still more ostentatious of our virtues than 
of our pleasures. This proceeds from causes, which I shall endeavour 
to explain afterwards.” (THN 2.1.6.6;  SBN 292) 
So, it seems that we have this need to show our followers that we are happy or virtuous due to 
the impending reactions that will follow from our posts. We are happier if we think others see 
us as happy. The Humean self is so inter-twined with society that it would be difficult to not 
incorporate social media into this, especially with many social interactions now taking place 
online. As said, Hume would accept online sources of pride in appearance and possessions to 
a certain degree, and the pride we feel from these would contribute to our sense of self. 
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Nevertheless, we must not become inter-twined in a web of vanity because this would 
completely undermine the sentiments we feel from others through sympathy.  Postema 
highlights the dangers of vanity when he says: 
“Our need to see ourselves through the eyes of others and the delight 
we take in the company of others while not rooted in self-liking, can 
drive us apart as easily as it can bring us together” (Postema, 2005, 
p.251).  
This is where Postema is highlighting the risks of comparison. I have mentioned this notion in 
chapter 2, section 1.1. When we compare ourselves to others, our judgement is clouded by 
comparison rather than focusing on the intrinsic value of our virtues. One can come to 
undervalue one’s own achievements. In the context of social media, pictures of people’s 
material items, their sporting ability, and their friendships may be a source of comparison for 
followers which in turn affect their sense of self-worth. This comparison can be toxic and Hume 
argues that we should try and conceal much of our pride (as discussed below), but the platforms 
on social media make it difficult to do this.  
Interestingly, Hume is inconsistent with his usage of the terms “pride” and “vanity”, sometimes 
using them as synonyms and approving of vanity as well.  
“Thus self-satisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable, but 
requisite in a character. 'Tis, however, certain, that good-breeding and 
decency require that we shou'd avoid all signs and expressions, which 
tend directly to show that passion. We have, all of us, a wonderful 
partiality for ourselves, and were we always to give vent to our 
sentiments in this particular, we shou'd mutually cause the greatest 
indignation in each other, not only by the immediate presence of so 
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disagreeable a subject of comparison, but also by the contrariety of our 
judgments” (THN 3.3.2.10; SBN 597-8).  
Even though Hume acknowledges vanity, he still highlights that we should avoid overt displays 
of pride, because of the dangers discussed above.  
“Nothing is more disagreeable than a man's over-weaning conceit of 
himself: Every one almost has a strong propensity to this vice: No one 
can well distinguish in himself betwixt the vice and virtue, or be certain, 
that his esteem of his own merit is well-founded: For these reasons, all 
direct expressions of this passion are condemn'd; nor do we make any 
exception to this rule in favour of men of sense and merit. They are not 
allow'd to do themselves justice openly, in words, no more than other 
people; and even if they show a reserve and secret doubt in doing 
themselves justice in their own thoughts, they will be more applauded” 
(THN 3.3.2.10, SBN 597-8). 
It’s OK to feel pride inside, but not to ‘show off’.  
“That impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men, to over-
value themselves, has given us such a prejudice against self-applause, 
that we are apt to condemn it, by a general rule, wherever we meet with 
it; and 'tis with some difficulty we give a privilege to men of sense, 
even in their most secret thoughts. At least, it must be own'd, that some 
disguise in this particular is absolutely requisite; and that if we harbour 
pride in our breasts, we must carry a fair outside, and have the 
appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and 
behaviour.” (THN 3.3.2.10, SBN 597-8)  
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Enrico Galvagni in his paper, ‘Pride, Vanity and Society’ (2020) states that interpreters of 
Hume do not focus enough on the relation between pride and vanity. Even though he does not 
provide a separate definition for the latter, Galvagni states that the difference between the two 
does exist. Vanity has importance in society, with it being an indirect passion alongside pride. 
Galvagni argues that they share some important features, and they even both arise from the 
double relation of ideas and impressions. He uses the following extract to highlight this:  
 “We are seduc’d into a good opinion of ourselves, and of all objects, 
that belong to us. They appear in a stronger light; are more agreeable; 
and consequently fitter subjects of pride and vanity, than any other” 
(THN 2.2.4.8; SBN 354-5). 
Galvagni concludes that:  
“(i) that (at least in some cases) pride is not vanity(ii) that pride can be 
paraphrased as ‘self-esteem’ and (iii) that vanity can be paraphrased as 
‘desire of reputation.’ This sentence seems to confirm the hypothesis 
that pride and vanity, despite the foggy use of the terms, are 
(sometimes) conceptually distinct. But the salient point here is that 
vanity is described as a desire seeking satisfaction” (Galvagni, 2020, 
p.6).  
There also is a distinction between pride being the feeling that we get from the original cause 
and vanity being where the pleasure lies in the secondary cause; examples used are fame, 
praise, esteem and reputation. Let us return to the use of social media and the danger of vanity: 
if we take Galvagni’s approach and see vanity as a desire seeking satisfaction then this can be 
mirrored in the desire for followers to react positively to posts shared, the need for others to 
see the things they bought, their lifestyle and social status. YouTubers are often referred to by 
the term “celebrity” and some find this to be inaccurate since they usually found fame for no 
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particular talent or skill, rather they are famous for posting videos about themselves and simply 
talking to the camera. Vanity is certainly a desire seeking satisfaction, whether it is the desire 
of a reputation, fame or money.  
To present vanity in the online sphere, one can use luxury items in order to show off to 
followers. One may present material items in order to see themselves as superior in comparison 
to others who do not have the same items. For someone on social media, these items may be 
the factor that makes the creator lose their relatability, here I will explore luxury not just in the 
negative manner but also positively.   
Hume argues that luxury plays a positive role within society, especially within its financial 
development in the commercial age. His praise of luxury: 
“does not consist merely of an assertion of the compatibility of moral 
virtue with the enjoyment of luxury, but lies rather in Hume’s emphasis 
on two aspects of the beneficial interaction between morality and 
luxury. First, the historical process of the introduction of luxury is 
regarded by Hume as fostering new morals peculiar to the commercial 
age; and secondly, the enjoyment of luxury is seen as a condition 
favorable to the maintenance of morals” (Susato, 2006, p.168). 
Galvagni in his paper does not just limit luxury to its place in the economic sphere in society, 
he determines that it has a relation to sociability and human nature. The reason why I mention 
luxury in association with the lack of relatability is because from the start of the rise of social 
media, one the main concepts that caught the eyes of viewers on YouTube was the ‘relatability’ 
of the person who posted the video; what I mean by this is that they showed characteristics and 
qualities that the viewer felt they related to, such as social awkwardness, shyness, lack of 
knowledge of career choice, identical hobbies. Now these traits may seem mundane, but to the 
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average viewer this became a way to relate and the beauty of YouTube was that anyone could 
pick up a camera and post a video; this is how communities of followers formed. However, 
with the rise of sponsorships and advertisements providing a way in which to financially benefit 
from making YouTube videos, Youtubers have found themselves being able to afford a more 
luxurious lifestyle; but at what cost? Their relatability. With Youtubers flaunting designer 
items, sports cars and expensive lifestyles, they slip away from the very thing that made them 
popular in the first place, which was the ability to relate to an ordinary member of the public; 
something a celebrity could not do, it becomes a way to publicly create this image of luxury.  
“Hume’s psychological theory based on associationism provides the reader with a 
suitable and coherent explanation of how social esteem works: not through mere 
rational awareness of one’s power, but by appearances and other people’s expectations” 
(Galvagni, 2020, p.9).  
It is not without question that luxury items bring with them social esteem and our appearance 
to others is very important in this step. “By showing off their luxurious clothes, accessories, 
and private possessions in general, people are socially regarded as more prestigious” (Galvagni, 
2019, p.11). In real-life communities this raises people’s social ranks, but this luxurious 
lifestyle is not necessarily positive in the realm of social media, it can often represent how 
further away the person is going from their viewers. 
Additionally, vanity has a negative effect on one’s social relations: “The desire of reputation 
brings one to break some of their social relations, refusing the company of poorer friends. In 
these cases, vanity can fuel conflicts and dissension with detrimental effects on social stability” 
(Galvagni, 2020, p.10). Galvagni brings up the mechanism of sympathy here in association 
with social class:  
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“When we are in the presence of a poorer person, we cannot help 
sympathizing with her and therefore we receive part of her pain 
stemming from her being part of a lower social rank. We then associate 
her with the uneasiness we feel in her presence and will try to avoid the 
person who makes us feel this negative, painful emotion of hatred.5 On 
the contrary, when we interact with a richer, opulent individual, we 
reflect her happiness, feel her joy, and seek her company. She will 
accept our presence, however, only if she does not get a sense of 
uneasiness from our presence, i.e. if she does not regard us as socially 
inferior to her. This mechanism justifies Hume’s conviction that 
society is and cannot avoid being divided in ranks” (Galvagni, 2020, 
p.6).  
But as much as it can dismantle such relations, it can also enhance social relations: vanity will 
bring with it the desire to please our peers; far from being harmful, vanity also brings one to 
the desire to please, to be appreciated and recognized by their peers. It is a powerful engine to 
socialization, “a bond of union among men” (THN 3.2.2.12; SBN 491-2). Galvagni suggests 
that vanity, for Hume, plays a double role in society:  
“In summary, vanity can manifest itself in two different forms. On the one hand, it can 
be a desire of due pride. On the other, it could bring to a relentless, devouring desire of 
excessive self-applause. In the former sense, vanity is much closer to pride. In the latter, 
it appears to be similar to another disrupting passion: avidity” (Galvagni, 2020, p.10).  
 
The final self-attitude and also another danger that I will now focus on is self-love. This is a 
form of vanity and, like it, can be seen in both a positive and negative manner. Hume 
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questions the place of self-love in his moral theory. Alanen thinks that self-interest is 
important for Hume: “He believes that human beings are possessed with a number of natural 
endowments that work together with self-love, but which cannot be reduced or derived from 
it” (Alanen, L. 2006, p.194). However, the reason why he removed it from his moral theory is 
because;  
“Far from deriving moral sentiments from self-interest, Hume 
explicitly excludes self-love and passions composed of it from his 
theory of the origins of morals, not because they are too weak, but 
simply because they do not have the right direction” (Alanen. L 2006 
p.195).  
It seems, though, that Hume makes a stronger claim and that he does not think it makes sense 
to talk of self-love because love must be directed to something external to us;  
“As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical 
person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately 
conscious; so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of 
whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious. This is 
sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and hatred are always 
directed to some sensible being external to us; and when we talk of self-
love, 'tis not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it produces any 
thing in common with that tender emotion, which is excited by a friend 
or mistress. 'Tis the same case with hatred. We may be mortified by our 
own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred, except from 
the injuries of others” (THN 2.2.1.2; SBN 329-30). 
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When Hume states that “each person loves himself better than any other single person” (THN 
3.2.2.7; SBN 487) Welchman interprets it as him illustrating the common sense claim that we 
often act for ourselves most of the time. But she later states that Hume’s account directly 
challenges this alleged common sense belief that we act in a self-directed manner; he denies 
self-love as a passion that we possess.  “In sympathy, our own person is not the object of any 
passion, nor is there anything, that fixes our attention on ourselves” (THN 2.2.2.17; SBN 
340).27  
Welchman, however, argues that at face value, the Humean position on self-love is contradicted 
by common sense.  
“The world of inter-personal action seems overflowing with evidence 
of the power and prevalence of self-love. Moralists throughout the ages 
have invoked self-love to explain why human beings find it difficult to 
                                                          
27 In line with my approach in this thesis, Welchman stresses that we should not focus on Book 1 of the Treatise 
when considering Hume’s account of the self. She argues that neither Book 1 nor Book 2 “explain the origin of 
the mistaken belief that we are also persisting objects of our own practical agency or the equally mistaken belief 
that we are naturally and powerfully disposed to have ‘concern’ for ourselves” (Welchman, J., 2015, p.33). 
Welchman questions, that if we agree with Hume and cannot ‘love ourselves’ then how can these mistakes be 
made? Also what is the causal role in moral and social life with regards to self-love? Welchman strongly believes 
that Hume answers these questions, but in Book 3, so his account of personal identity is not contained within 
Books 1 and 2; we must reference Book 3 in order to fully understand it. It is important, then, to outline how 
Welchman describes the role of each Book in the bigger picture of personal identity for Hume: “Book 1, Hume 
focuses on our belief that we are enduring subjects of conscious experience. In Book 2, Hume goes on to 
reconstruct the process through which we arrive at an expanded conception of ourselves as subjects of practical 
agency, possessing passions and powers of actions. In Book 3, Hume moves on to our ideas about self-directed 
action in the inter-personal world of practical and moral life, reconstructing the fiction that we ourselves are the 
persisting objects of most, if not, all of our acts” (Welchman, 2015, p.33). 
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obey laws, moral, social and religious and to maintain social peace” 
(Welchman, 2015, p.42). 
 If we are to take Hume’s approach as correct then Welchman states that we cannot then be 
enduring objects of our practical agency. This is where she brings Book 3 of the Treatise into 
the picture. “Since self-love is neither a passion, nor an independently motivating reason for 
action, this only leaves a ‘situation’ of the objects of our desires as a possible ground of 
explicating the apparent phenomena of self-love” (Welchman, 2015, p.43). 
Welchman argues that we are unable to give the same attention to friends, family or even 
strangers compared to the attention that we give to ourselves because of the principle of 
association of contiguity.  
“Our own pleasures and pains being most vivid to us, crowd out to the 
less vivid impressions of pleasure and pain communicated to us from 
family and friends via sympathy. These, in turn, crowd out the still less 
vivid impressions of pleasure and pain communicated to us from 
strangers. Thus we can never feel or act impartially when either our 
own interests or the interests of the loved ones at stake” (Welchman, 
2015, p.45). 
Welchman argues that the psychological effects of contiguity give an explanation as to why we 
are partial in our actions. They also explain “the common sense belief that we possess and act 
from a passion of self-love” (Welchman, 2015, p.45). Welchman coins the phrase “Narcissistic 
Engrossment”; this is when we act in a way that is very similar to  action driven by self-love, 
except the motivation is different. If you were to act out of narcissistic engrossment it can 
motivate us to act in ways that can be comparable to self-love, but the difference is that with 
narcissistic engrossment we may even neglect the well-being of our future selves. Hume argues 
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that we do not give any more impartial attention to our own personal interests than we do to 
the interests of others. Hume thinks that to act with a focus on ourselves can be damaging to 
society: 
“This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves 
and our nearest friends is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly 
destructive of society” (THN 3.2.2.12; SBN 491-92).  
Hume reduces self-love to narcissistic engrossment, and  this is supposed to explain self-
directed action “…in a way that conforms to common sense experience without invoking 
philosophical fictions, such as self-love” (Welchman, 2015, p.47).  
One answer that Welchman wishes to propose as a response to Hume’s denial of self-love is 
that he needs to consider self-love not just of one’s present self, but also of one’s past and future 
selves. Hume claimed that people were most likely to care about what would happen to them 
in this moment in time and not in 10 years time. He also claimed that people who sacrifice 
something in the present for a future benefit will not be able to enjoy this pleasure in the future; 
the future possibilities are not as vivid to us as the present pleasures. Hume argues that it is 
natural to act in a manner likened to narcissistic engrossment.  
“But as most of us are capable of some affection for our future selves 
and have some current projects for whose future success we now care 
deeply, most of us are capable of making some prudent sacrifices for 
the sake of our future selves” (Welchman, 2015, p.50). 
Welchman states that Hume would have to admit that this may not be true.  
“If self-love is love for our present selves, then strictly speaking no one 
loves themselves. But as self-love can also mean love of past or future 
selves, sufficiently remote in time to be perceived as non-identical, then 
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people can, and often do, have a loving regard for themselves” 
(Welchman, 2015, p.51).  
The influence of contiguity is so strong that the love that we would have for our future selves 
will be stronger than the love we have for the future selves of others. If there were to be a 
conflict of interest, our self-love will motivate us to pick our own interests. For Welchman, the 
role of self-love is more important in the Treatise than Hume proposed. He denies that self-
love could even be a motivation to act in a just manner; pride, though, plays this role.   
Margaret Watkins in her chapter on ‘Self-Loving’ agrees that “Hume is surely right about one 
aspect of the phenomenology: love of self does not feel the same as love of others. We can 
more easily imagine a violent (in Hume’s sense) love of others than love of self” (Watkins, 
2019, p.169). To draw a distinction between pride and self-love Watkins  describes that 
“Humean self-love is not complacency in ourselves; pride comes closer to that description. But 
then what is self-love? What is its affective quality and what object does it pursue? Hume does 
not give us a definition but his uses of the term refer to pursuing and caring for one’s private 
interest” (Watkins, 2019, p.170).  
I want to look at an example of self-love in the social media realm. The Body positivity 
movement is a relatively new movement that encourages women to love themselves and their 
bodies as they are and not change to fit societal expectations of beauty. Individuals struggling 
with their weight find ‘Pride in numbers’ with other people. This can sometimes turn into a 
hostile environment that does not encourage anyone suggesting advice to change for the better. 
Many social media channels may promote an unhealthy lifestyle because they have the support 
of loyal followers that will continue to compliment and positively react to the individuals’ 
photos and videos whilst, in fact, shaming people that look different to them. Sympathy also 
comes into play here, with supporters understanding the people in the movement because they 
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are in the same position themselves. One aspect of this movement lies in not being ashamed of 
how one looks and one’s body. Hume would certainly agree that we should not feel shame of 
our body; in fact the feeling of shame is a vice. To feel shame is a vice because it is self-
deprecating, it can be likened to the other monkish virtues such as humility which I discussed 
in chapter 3, section 5. Whereas for the monkish to feel shame is a key part of the construction 
of the self and the religious life. According to the religious teachings at the time, humility is 
seen to save people from becoming too conceited, too proud of their achievements and 
possessions, and too divorced from God. Hume would disagree and believes that such an 
attitude is entirely self-destructive; in fact he says humility “diminishes us in our own eyes” 
(THN 3.3.2.6, SBN 595-6). In the case of body shame, this would mean that one has a low 
opinion of themselves and how they look. Additionally, they may feel others’ negative opinions 
on their appearance are valid due to their own shame. We must not cultivate such a negative 
environment, therefore the body positivity movement encouraging women to not feel shame is 
precisely the attitude that Hume would like to spread. His anti-religious point is that we should 
not cultivate shame and humility in ourselves as if such feelings are virtuous. It creates a more 
accepting and welcoming society. Now Hume would agree that shame should certainly not be 
felt, however, the other mantra of the body positivity movement lies in ‘self-love,’ which Hume 
says prevents us from acting justly due to the selfishness of its ‘appetite.’  
With a theory revolving around interactions in the social world, the concept of self-love can 
seem too self-centred. Love must be, for Hume, person-directed, to love one’s self would be to 
only think of myself without consideration of anyone else. Our practical agency is not self-
directed; it is inter-twined with society, including a genuine concern for others. These concerns 
can often be mistaken as shaming and are often ignored by online communities. To be able to 
feel the sentiments of others is an aspect of sympathy and “in sympathy our own person is not 
the object of any passion, nor is there anything that fixes our attention on ourselves” (T 
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2.2.2.17; SBN 340-1). It is not self-love that we feel, but a self-directed narcissistic 
engrossment that revolves around satisfying our immediate pleasures and pains.  
This chapter aimed to detail three self-attitudes that one ascribes to themselves in the Humean 
social self, namely pride, vanity and self-love. Starting with pride, I began by highlighting the 
role of the other in eighteenth-century society and then compared it to the ever-changing 
communication platform which is social media. Taking aspects of the platform and likening 
them to Humean mechanisms allowed it to become clearer how Hume’s approach can evolve. 
Looking to the common view in morality, I suggest that social media widens the narrow circle 
because a person may expose more about themselves on an online platform, thus showing more 
of their character. As discussed, though, how to judge one’s character can be difficult since  
one filters one’s self online.. Delving then into the second self- attitude which stems from an 
extreme form of filtering, vanity shows, for example, how one can become stuck in attempting 
to present oneself  as living a life of  luxury in order to boost one’s own self-worth and to put 
others down; this would not be something that Hume would find virtuous. Lastly, self-love also 
has its dangers of falling into narcissism, but one thing is clear, there are positive perspectives 
even to the dangers presented. In conclusion, there are a range of self-attitudes that can be seen 
as virtuous or vicious; sometimes bad and sometimes good. Social media, however, accentuates 









William Randall in his book The Stories We Are at first states that we are constantly “…chatting 
to ourselves, telling ourselves now this and now that about what we are doing or feeling” 
(Randall, 1995, p.42). This suggests a kind of self-creation,28 but in this thesis I have stressed 
the importance of the role of the other and rather than following the Humean route, Randall 
suggests that our feelings about ourselves (that we already have) will, in turn, project 
themselves on the other person thus creating an impression in that person’s mind of our 
character. His example illustrates this:  
“If I tell myself today, for example, that I am a bright, clever, capable 
person, then, to the extent I believe myself and do not have direct 
experiences to belie that message, it is quite conceivable that, at least 
today, I shall be a bright, clever, capable person and that all of my 
engagements with others, will reflect the same brilliance and ability. I 
shall do better because I shall see myself as better. If, on the other hand, 
I tell myself that I am stupid or incompetent, then the chances are that 
                                                          
28 Jonathan Glover speaks of Self-Creation and he states our identity is something that we partially create ourselves 
“in the light of our own values” (Glover. J, 1988 p. 18). He understands that there are certain uncontrollable factors 
such as genetics, but we have an “inner story” that is imperative to our self-creation. I would imagine that Glover 
would take a Humean line of thinking as a sceptical stance towards his approach; he said the possibility of shaping 
ourselves, needs to be defended against and is a threat to freedom of choice; the idea that “we are entirely a product 
of the various social pressures on us during our lives and that these pressures leave no room for any effective 
choice to be one sort of person rather than another” (Glover. J, 1988 p. 18). Glover seems to be focusing on the 
negative social aspect here, whereas Hume thinks of social interacting as building the self in a positive way (not 
that he did not also know that there would be negative reactions), highlighting the role of pride. Social interaction 
is seen less as a “pressure”, but rather as consisting of reactions that can build the self. 
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most of my interactions with the world will come off rather badly” 
(Randall, 1995, p.43). 
For Randall, it seems that the individual describes themselves to themselves, through this 
already established self-conception, the interaction they have with another person is influenced 
by this existing self-conception. How that person already sees themselves then influences the 
social interaction: if you are positive you will have a positive interaction and if you are feeling 
negative this will show itself in the interaction. Hume would respond by questioning the origin 
of Randall’s very first step. If we are telling ourselves how we feel and establishing character 
traits to describe ourselves then Hume would ask from what experience do you conclude that 
you have these traits? Hume would say that the moment you describe yourself as a bright, 
clever, capable person, then this self-knowledge is rooted in experiences that you have with 
other people and their responses to your past actions is what makes you confident to describe 
yourself in such a manner. Randall does realise that others will react to us and make some form 
of judgement: 
“Furthermore, if I am in a context where no one has known me before, 
then the impression I create, through my deeds and words alike, can be 
quite unfortunate for me, playing a disproportionate role in 
determining, how people respond to me, the decisions they make 
concerning me, and the limits they place upon my options for my 
future” (Randall, 1995, p.43). 
Note that Randall uses the phrase  “How people respond to me” which symbolises the 
importance of others’ responses, not just for the moment, but he even goes farther and says that 




“…An interesting sort of ‘feedback loop’ is at work: what I tell myself 
about myself affects how I present myself to others; how I present 
myself to others affects the options they make available to me reinforce 
or challenge what I tell myself about myself thereafter” (Randall. W.L 
1995 P.43). 
Randall is seeing that although we may describe ourselves in a certain manner before the 
interaction with others, that their opinions can challenge what I thought of myself beforehand. 
The ‘other’ has a strong influence and Randall sees that when he states that other people can 
reinforce or challenge this. Where Hume would differentiate his views, he would claim that the 
other would not just respond to the already existing opinion, but they would indeed create the 
self, their responses would build and establish these characteristics. So, in this thesis, how was 
the Humean self created?  
A key aim of my thesis was to show how Hume’s conception of the  self can be seen as relevant 
to changes in the kinds of sociality that have occurred in the modern world; my aim is to show 
how the Humean self can be successfully inserted into the modern-day social sphere. Chapter 
1 highlighted the arguments behind Hume’s initial scepticism towards the self. If there is no 
single thing that can define us through introspection and we are merely a bundle of experiences 
then there is nothing that we can call the ‘self.’ But if Hume had stopped here, then this thesis 
would not exist! The passions opened a door for Hume that would allow him to consider an 
understanding of others and ourselves through emotions such as pride. This would occur 
through the mechanism of sympathy which takes place between people. I then applied this to 
a therapeutic setting whilst showing that the principles can be applied to everyday 
conversations as well. At this stage, Hume has shown a way in which others can be understood, 
but the self has still not made an appearance. Incorporating the ideas and impressions 
introduced in chapter 1 with the sympathetic mechanism presented in chapter 2, the double 
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relation of ideas and impressions is born. In chapter 3, I show that this is a process through 
which we feel pride in our actions, and this, in turn, provides Hume with an account of mutual 
construction of pride and self.  The role of the other has been cemented as a necessary part of 
our self-constitution and Hume’s presentation of the sources of pride shows an unconventional 
list of the origins of this emotion. It is here that I take a detour with chapter 4, where I consider 
a narrative approach to the self. How we present ourselves to others and this presentation, 
whether behavioural or verbal, represents itself as a narrative. It is this narrative glue that joins 
single actions together to create the entirety of one’s character thus unifying the self. Taking 
instances of feeling pride and emotions and bringing them together to create a story that 
accentuates character traits that are conducive to one’s self, allows for one to understand said 
self in terms of an emotional narrative. This narrative image of ourselves cannot be derived 
from simply face to face interactions as the main form of communication in the modern world 
is not of this kind. In chapter 5 which, in turn, is the final one, I showed that the account of the 
self so far presented by Hume can evolve with the rapidly changing avenues for communication 
in the form of social media platforms. The presentation of social media as the ever-growing 
platform for human interaction does not mean that Hume’s account of the self cannot still 
apply; the importance of wider society on one’s self-constitution is still prominent with the 
changing times. In fact, it has become easier than ever to receive a constant loop of feedback 
from others and for Hume this would only add to one’s sense of self. I show how different 
aspects of social media can be likened to the Humean account with behavioural cues becoming 
known through sympathy, with likes allowing one to feel a sense of pride and the entire 
platform being a pool of reactions and announcements of approval and disapproval of our 
behaviour. With forms of communication finding themselves in a time of rapid change and 
Hume’s theory rooting itself in the social, I think it would not be right to ignore the online 
social realm with respect to Hume’s account of the self. Without consideration of the online 
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world we would be stuck in a line of waiting for face to face interactions to feel pride rather 
than embracing the constant feedback available in the age through a presence online. In my 
thesis, I show that social media does not change any of the Humean mechanisms, it just takes 
them and places them in a different platform. The goal of this thesis is to show how the Humean 
self, intertwined with sympathy, pride and narrative  - survives the change in communication 
that accompanied social media. Such social communication is how we can come to understand 
our self.  
The modern Humean self would be partly constituted by our relation to others on social media 
platforms. I have no doubt that if Hume were here today, he would have his own social media 
profile. This is evident through his own documented self-conception. According to the recent 
biography by James Harris (2015), Hume wanted a “career as an independent man of letters, 
not as a professional philosopher” (Harris, 2015, p.2). Hume spoke of his own character in a 
holistic manner which seems to encompass the various aspects of his sense of self:  
“I was, I say, a man of mild disposition, of command of temper, of an 
open, social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little 
susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. Even 
my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my temper, 
notwithstanding my frequent disappointments.” (MOL 21, Mil xl-i ) 
His love of literary fame could be fed by online interactions. 
If Hume were to be around during the social media age, I imagine that he would not refrain 
from being opinionated on the platform. His views would have reached a wider audience and 
at a faster rate. His views concerning issues such as religion would likely incite something of a 




“In a word, though most men any wise eminent, have found reason to 
complain of calumny, I never was touched, or even attacked by her 
baleful tooth: and though I wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both 
civil and religious factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf 
of their wonted fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate any 
one circumstance of my character and conduct: not but that the zealots, 
we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate 
any story to my disadvantage, but they could never find any which they 
thought would wear the face of probability. ( MOL 21, Mil xl-i ) 
 In the same way that positive reactions online can make us feel pride, negative reactions can 
also damage our sense of self-worth and people who do not agree with us can cause quite the 
stir on social media profiles. On the other hand, at the same time, he would most certainly find 
those that have similar views to himself and consequently build an online community of 
intellectuals that enjoy debating and discussing philosophical questions. I suggest that Hume 
would thrive in the exposure, networking and communication on a social media platform.  
Hume did take pride in his work and would certainly have liked it to be accessible to more 
members of the public. He was keen for philosophy to not be limited to the ivory tower, and 
he wanted to be talked about in coffee shops and the wider world.  
Learning has been…a Loser by being shut up in Colleges and Cells, 
and secluded from the World and good company….Even Philosophy 
went to Wrack by this moaping recluse Method of Study, and became 
as chimerical in her Conclusions as she was unintelligible in her Stile 
and Manner of Delivery. And indeed, what cou’d be expected from 
Men who never consulted Experience in any of their Reasonings, or 
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who never search’d for that Experience, where alone it is to be found, 
in common Life and Conversation? (Hume, 1987, 534–5) 
 
Common life and conversation is now pursued online and the feedback that he would receive 
from his social media posts would consist of some pleasurable responses, and he would ascribe 
such responses to something he has said or done. From this, he will be able to feel pride in his 
academic life and his social endeavours, and he would have fulfilled the wish to be able to talk 
of his work in an everyday setting. According to Hume’s own account of the mechanisms 
involved in the construction of the self, his social media presence would play a constructive 
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